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ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL CREDIT
INSTANCES of municipal default upon interest or principal of debt obligations
now number more than two thousand in forty-one different states, with addi-
tional defaults occurring at an estimated rate of over one hundred a month.'
That many other local governmental units, while not actually in default, are
virtually insolvent seems certain from their inability to pay employees, their
rse of sinking funds to meet current expenses, and their failure to turn over
funds owed to other political subdivisions. As a result of these two conditions,
it is probable that obligations aggregating from $1,500,000,000 to $2,000,000,-
000 are uncollectible at the present time.2 The character and significance of
1. A discussion of defaults and their extent may be found in the testimony of Represen-
tative Wilcox, HEARINGS BEFoRE A SUBCOMMsiEE OF THE COWIaTTEE ON THE JDICiAY
ON S. 1868 AND H. R. 5950, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at 12.
2. Estimated in the summer of 1933 at $1,200,000,000, PuBsc ADumaNISTRATION SERWvcE
No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults (1933) 1; estimated in the early part of 1934 at $2,000,-
000,000. HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
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the groups which hold municipal securities3 make it inevitable that the reper-
cussions of this financial collapse should be felt throughout the economic
structure. And the very magnitude of present local indebtedness, estimated
at some $15,000,000,000,' makes the problem of preserving municipal credit
for necessary future financing one of national importance.
Periods of extensive default on municipal obligations have been of sporadic
occurrence.5 The inability of many southern cities to meet indebtedness thrust
upon them during carpetbag rule was one of the concomitants of the recon-
struction period following the civil war. The depression years of the eighteen
seventies and eighteen nineties precipitated defaults on the part of many
municipalities, especially those in the west, which had issued heavy amounts
of railroad aid and general improvement bonds. The present depression period
has brought insolvency even to municipalities that in 1929 appeared to be
conservatively financed and well managed.6 Reduced land values, unemploy-
ment and bank failures have caused enormous increases in tax delinquency, 7
while available funds of the municipalities themselves have been permanently or
temporarily lost through the closing of local banking institutions.8 At the same
3. As of Dec. 31, 1932, it was estimated by Mr. Carl Chatters, editor of the Bond
Buyer, that municipal bonds (including state bonds) were distributed as follows:
Individuals with annual income exceeding $5,000 $4,500,000,000
Corporations except bank and insurance companies $4,000,000,000
Sinking funds, public trust funds, and investment
funds of states and their political subdivisions $3,380,000,000
Banks $2,800,000,000
Life, fire and casualty insurance companies $1,000,000,000
Fraternal insurance companies $500,000,000
Individual investors, income under $5,000 $900,000,000
Other holders $1,420,000,000
TOTAL. $18,500,000,000
PuBruc ADnsTRS so SERvicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
4. CLARK, THE INTERNAL DEBTS OF UNITED STATES (1933) 258. State and local
net indebtedness has increased from $39.88 per capita in 1912, to $132.75 per capita in
1932. Id. at 254. This tremendous increase is, however, matched in great part by an
increase in the national wealth between 1913-1914 and 1932-1933 from $192,000,000,000
to $300,000,000,000, and by an advance in total long term indebtedness during the same
period from approximately $38,000,000,000 to $134,000,000,000. Id. at 10 and 13.
5. For a discussion of eras of default prior to the present one, see PuBLic ADmINsTRA-
IToN SERVICE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 10 et seq.
6. CL.ARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 271.
7. A study of fifty representative cities revealed that tax delinquencies increased from
10.2% in 1929 to 15.5% in 1931 and 18.85% (partially estimated) in 1932. Fifteen per
cent is regarded as the maximum margin of safety. Bird, American Cities Face 1933 (1933)
22 NAT. MuNr. REv. 51.
8. CLARK, THE INTERNAL DEBTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1932) 255. The default
of Detroit, Michigan, at first thought to be temporary, was occasioned by the fact that
its funds were on deposit in the banks which closed in February, 1933. (1933) 22 NAT.
MUN. REV. 153.
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time, the position of the municipality as one of the chief governmental agencies
for relief has necessitated extraordinary expenditures.
Business recessions, however, do not alone explain the recurring failure
of cities to meet their obligations. The factors which may adversely affect
'the financial position of a taxing unit are many; for the most part, a depres-
sion but aggravates conditions already existing. Extensive contractions of
the property tax base, and consequently of the income of a municipality,9 have
occasionally resulted from physical catastrophes,10 abandonment of local manu-
facturing in response to shifting industrial centers," or depletion of important
natural resources.' 2 But more often the cause of financial distress is trace-
able to an over-expansion of indebtedness.' 3 A number of things may con-
tribute to such a condition. Municipalities have not been free from modern
tendencies to resort to borrowing in order to live in a manner better than
could be afforded; comparative figures show that a greater portion of the
proceeds of municipal bond sales is devoted to non-income producing improve-
ments in America than in Europe.' 4  Of perhaps greater importance, however,
has been the rapid industrialization of this country. The development of
industries within a city, with resulting sharp increases in its population, have
in some instances necessitated large investments for legitimate expansion of
municipal plants and services.' 5 Such investments were frequently made
possible only by borrowed funds, with the result that debt charges were
incurred at least equalling and perhaps exceeding the corresponding increase
9. See PUBuC ADmOsATioN SER VicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9.
10. The experience of Astoria, Oregon, is illustrative. The present insolvency of this
municipality is accounted for in part by two fires occurring in 1922, one of which destroyed
an industrial enterprise, the other a part of the business section of the town. Information
from a pamphlet circulated to bondholders of the city, June 15, 1933.
Such catastrophes not only deplete the tax base but also throw a heavy and unexpected
burden of expense upon the local government afflicted. Thus Galveston, Texas, defaulted
in payment of indebtedness following a severe flood; while Memphis found itself in financial
straits following a plague of yellow fever. Chatters, The Problem ol Municipal Bond
Dejaudts, in CURENT PROBLEMS un PUBLIC FW-NC- (1933) 333.
11. An effort to meet one phase of this problem is illustrated by Nueces Valley Tounsite
Co. v. San Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf Rr. Co., 67 S. W. (2d) 215 (Tex. 1933).
12. The present financial predicament of Astoria, Oregon, to which the conflagrations
of 1922 were contributing factors, has been precipitated by the depletion of timber
resources that once formed a large part of the tax base. See note 10, supra.
13. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5-23; Chatters, supra note 10, at 334. It is, of
course, difficult to say whether present troubles are caused by over-expansion preceding
the depression, or by the depression which followed a period of rapid development.
14. Powers, Increasing Municipal Indebtedness (1914) 3 NAT. MUN. REv. 102.
15. Detroit, Michigan, is interesting in this connection. Expanding with the growth
of the automobile industry, Detroit's population doubled during each decade since 1900.
Improvements were necessary to accommodate the growing population. The government
under whose supervision much of this expansion occurred was apparently able and honest.
If the expenses incurred by it were unwise, they were at least carefully considered and it
is doubtful that the errors now apparent could have been avoided. The resulting debt
structure was such that heavy maturity of obligations fell due in the decade from 1930-40.
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in tax revenue. And not uncommonly excessive municipal borrowing has
been a product of unbounded optimism in contemplating a city's future. 16
To the disproportion between income and total operating and debt costs
thus arising from contractions in a municipality's tax base or from undue
expansion of its indebtedness, or from a combination of these causes, unwieldy
governmental organization and mismanagement have added further difficulties.
One of the primary factors prompting the movement for more effective forms
of municipal government has been the undoubted fact that loosely organized
local administration results in unnecessary expenses as a consequence of
duplication in activities and lack of proper control over disbursements. More-
over, this condition in municipal government invites political favoritism with
its inevitable concomitant of improper expenditures.' 7 On the other hand,
tax collection is frequently lax, taxing officials leaving payment to the initia-
tive of the taxpayer rather than themselves assuming the burden of enforce-
ment; while foreclosure of tax liens is often long deferred. Yet notwithstanding
this, little or no effort may be made to set up reserves to cover delinquent
taxes. The untoward effect of the resultant cleavage between the operation
of the collection machinery and the demands upon the municipality's finances
is aggravated by a failure to synchronize collections with maturity dates of
obligations. Such a failure necessitates resort to tax anticipation warrants 8
which not only burden the city with new interest charges but remain as
outstanding indebtedness if current income' 9 is insufficient to meet them.20
The refusal of bankers to finance short term borrowing on advantageous terms
when such a floating indebtedness exists forces a funding of any carry-over;
the ultimate result is thus an increase in the amount of long term debt with-
out any corresponding benefit accruing to the municipality.
Consequently at the present time Detroit is unable to repay its maturing debts although
eventual repayment in full is assured. Cf. (1931) 45 Ams. Crr (No. 2) 107; (1932) 27 J. Am.
STATIS. Ass'N 141; (1916) 5 NAT. Mur. Rzv. 620; (1917) 6 id. 424, 515, 707, 710; (1918)
7 id. 322; (1922) 11 id. 317; (1924) 13 id. 720; (1925) 14 id. 56, 132, 134; (1926) 15 id.
108, 623; (1933) 22 id. 153, 352.
16. The sale of bonds by Coral Gables, Florida, to enable the completion of an exten-
sive system of streets, sidewalks and sewers has resulted in a situation in which 31,294
real estate lots have been developed for a city of six thousand population and only 1,866
buildings erected; the per capita debt increased to over $1300 per person; and the city
able to repay at most $4,000,000 of its total debt of $9,000,000. PuBuc Aim%,irsRATOxO
SERvicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8; (1931) 45 A.m. CITY (No. 4) 121.
17. For recent instances of this in Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, see Ligitt, The
Plunder of Chicago (1932) 25 Amx. MERCURY 269.
18. Cf. Oakey, Municipal Accounting and Finance (1927) 37 Air. CIT 243; (1932) 14
PUB. MANAGEMENT 170.
19. Warrants may be limited by their terms so as to be payable only from particular
funds. Upon failure of these funds there is no legal remedy for their payment. 6
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2412.
20. Chicago in 1928 and 1929 followed the usual practice of issuing warrants against
anticipated revenue without, however, ascertaining the actual value of the property involved.
The subsequent assessment was at a lower figure than the estimate, delinquencies were
high, and collections were $12,000,OCO less than the face amount of warrants outstanding.





EFFORTS TO AVERT INSOLVENCY
In an attempt to counteract these contributing causes of insolvency, and
thus to avoid default on their obligations, municipalities have resorted to a
variety of schemes for increasing revenues, decreasing expenses, and borrow-
ing additional funds.
A. INCREASES IN REVENUES
Raising the Tax Rate, Extending the Tax Base. The dependence of local
governmental units upon the general property tax for two-thirds or more of
their revenues' in itself severely limits, especially in a time of depression such
as the present, their ability to avert insolvency. The virtual impossibility of
taxing personalty effectively and the consequent metamorphosis of the general
property tax into a tax on real estate, has been increasingly apparent in recent
years. 2 Thus it has been alleged that although the value of taxable personal
property in Cook County, Illinois, is three times that of taxable real property,
83 per cent of the burden is borne by real estate.3 In New York, personal
property assessments in 1930 constituted only 1.3 per cent of the property
tax base, and collections were even less significant; 4 as a result, local levies
on personalty have been discontinued.3 But while there thus rests upon real
estate the principal burden of supporting local government,6 of all possible
sources of revenue the tax on real property is least flexible and therefore least
able to respond to such extraordinary demands as have been made by the current
depression. This period has been marked by a precipitate decline in property
values7 and a correspondingly marked increase in property tax delinquencies.8
1. In 1931, 310 cities whose population comprised 38.6% of the total population of the
United States, obtained approximately 66.2% of all their revenues from general property
taxes. U. S. BUREAU or CENSUS, FINANCIAL STATISTICS or CITIES HAVING OvER 30,000
POPULATION (1931).
2. On the breakdown of the general property tax see generally GREEN, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OP MODERN TAxATION (1933) c. 2; LuTz, PuLIc FINANCE (2d ed. 1929) c. 17;
SELIGaIAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (10th ed. 1928) c. 2.
3. Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N. E. 417 (1932).
4. REPORT or NEW YORE STATE COiMnnSION FOR TE REvisIox or THE TA X LAws
(1932) 123.
5. N. Y. Laws (Ex. Sess.), 1933 c. 470. For an interesting account of the difficulties in-
volved in assessing personal property in Palm Beach County, Florida, see Harjim v. Owens,
52 F. (2d) 530, 534 (S. D. Fla. 1931).
6. Real estate taxes probably provide from 75% to 90% of the revenues from general
property taxes. Notes 1 and 3, supra. Although real estate property taxes produced a
smaller proportion of total local revenues in 1933 than in 1931, much of the income from
other sources will be non-recurring (as, for example, that from state and federal grants).
The general property tax remains the most important source of municipal income. Leffler,
Ebb Tide in Taxation (1933) 22 NAT. Mui. REv. 541; Editorial (1934) 28 ILL. L. REv. 662,
664. See note 158, infra.
7. For an illustration of how serious the situation may become, see Federal Title & Mort-
gage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 166 Atl. 538, 539 (N. J. Eq. 1933).
8. Although in some localities, collections of real property taxes had lagged before 1930,
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The delinquencies have occurred most frequently with the least valuable
properties,9 and have continued until parcels were worth less than the accrued
taxes, interest charges and penalties.' 0 Of 139 tax sales in 1930 in Lorrain
County, Ohio, for example, only 24 parcels of land brought more than enough
to pay the costs of sale alone; only one piece sold at a price sufficient to pay
taxes and accrued penalties."1 When to these difficulties is added the tradi-
tional hostility of the courts towards tax deeds,12 it becomes apparent that
attempted enforcement even of normal municipal taxes in many cases results
only in the purchase of the property by the city or the county; thus no
revenue is in fact secured, and the property is removed completely from the
tax rolls.13 And increases in the tax rate to meet current demands for relief
of human want are productive only of increased delinquencies.
To these practical limitations upon property tax rates, the law adds others.
Constitutions or statutes generally limit municipalities to a rate sufficient to
provide for current expenditures; 14 some allowance may apparently be made
the increased delinquency after that year was general throughout the country. Thus,
although in Cook County, there was an abnormal increase as early as 1927, the 1930 levy,
payable the latter part of 1932, was 41% delinquent. Simpson, Tax Delinqvency-Economic
Aspects (1933) 28 ILL. L. Rev. 147, 148. The levy in Detroit for 1928-1929 was only
8.8% delinquent in contrast to a 361 delinquency in the 1931-1932 levy. Beyer, Financial
Dictators Replace Political Boss (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. RaV. 162, 166. The four-year trend
for tax delinquency for cities over 50,000 population has been computed by Frederick L.
Bird, and is reproduced as follows from (1934) 23 NAT. Mux. R v. 111:
145 cities 1930 1931 1932 1933 Increase
Median 10.8 13.3 20.1 25.2 12.2
Av. of
Percentages 12.9 15.8 22.1 26.3 13.2
These figures, of course, can give no idea of the wide discrepancies in the experience of the
individual cities. The figures for each city are, however, available in the above citation.
9. A great number of vacant city lots were found on the delinquency lists of various
cities. See REPORT, op. cit. supra note 4 (Memo. 12), at 16.
10. Leffler, supra note 6, at 543; Aldis, Real Estate and Taxes (1934) 39 CuR. HILST. 513,
519; Nilsson, Why Pay Property Taxes (1932) 10 TAx MAo. 131, 216.
11. Nilsson, supra note 10, at 153.
12. The purchaser takes at his peril; any failure to observe the strict letter of the law
during foreclosure of the Hen will void the deed. Perham v. Putnam, 82 Mont. 349, 267
Pac. 305 (1928); Shubat v. Glacier County, 93 Mont. 160, 18 P. (2d) 614 (1932) (deed
void because not stating proper amount due to county); Adams v. Rogers, 158 Okla. 163,
13 P. (2d) 170 (1932) (void for failure to file application with county clerk) ; cf. Bowers v.
Glos, 346 111. 623, 179 N. E. 80 (1931); Moe v. Jones, 153 Wash. 476, 279 Pac. 741 (1929).
For this reason, and also because of the long period between delinquency and sale, pro-
fessional speculators-usually the only attendants of tax sales-will pay little for delinquent
lands. Nilsson, supra note 10, at 216.
13, With regard to the creation and extent of this new public domain, see Simpson,
supra note 8, at 149.
14. E.g., CoNe. Rwv. STAT. (1930) §§ 1204, 1208, 1216; FLA. Co1aW. LAWS (1927) §§
937-939, 3000-3004; KFAx. RLV. STAT. (1923) §§ 79-1801 to 79-1806, 79-1901 to 79-1944;
N. Y. TAx LAW (Cahill, 1930) arts. 1-5.
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for anticipated delinquencies,'5 while the obligation to creditors requires that
the rate be sufficient to pay pre-existing debt charges,16 and to finance perma-
nent improvements' 7 which have been approved by the electorate.' 8 More-
over, nineteen state constitutions 9 limit the general property tax to a certain
percentage of assessed valuation of taxable property, and similar statutory
limits included in municipal charters or imposed by general legislation are
almost universal.2 0  Usually these tax limits may be exceeded upon an affirma-
tive vote of a certain percentage of the municipality's electorate; some addi-
tional flexibility is obtained in a few states by varying the limit according
to population, or by authorizing a yearly increase in the tax rate.21 In some
jurisdictions the limitations may be exceeded without electoral approval when
an emergency exists.2 2  But these concessions are far from sufficient to enable
municipalities to function properly under limitations in many cases provided
decades ago for very much smaller cities, and based upon different conceptions
of value and of proper fields of municipal activities. Evasions of these limi-
tations have therefore been legion. One escape has been found in extensive
use of special assessments to pay for improvement projects. And since such
assessments cannot exceed the benefit conferred upon the assessed property
without constituting a taking of property without due process of law,23 the
assessment district has frequently been incorporated 24 and authorization pro-
15. Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, 311 Pa. 191, 166 At. 493 (1933), noted in (1933) 43 YALE
L. J. 143.
16. This is true. regardless of constitutional or statutory tax limits imposed after the
debts were contracted. Perry v. Town of Samson, 11 F. (2d) 655 (S. D. Ala. 1926); cf.
Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 535 (1866); Bee v. City of Huntington, 171 S. E. 539
(W. Va. 1933).
17. The tax rate must be sufficient to pay interest charges and to provide a sinking fund
for the retirement of bonds sold. See, e.g., N. Y. GEN. MUN ciPAL LAw (Cahill, 1930) arts.
1, 6; OxLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 26.
18. Improvements of this nature, which cannot be financed out of current revenues, must
ordinarily be so approved. ARY. CONST. Amzmns. 11; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18; IDAHO
CONST. art. VIII, § 3; KY. CoNsT. §§ 157, 158; LA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 14f; Mo. CoNsr.
art. X, §§ 12, 12a; OKLA. Co-NsT. art. X, §§ 26, 27; UTAH CoNsT. art. XIV, §§ 3, 4. These
restrictions and those cited in note 14, supra, in practice operate as debt limits, not as
tax limits.
19. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See PuaLic ADrISTRATIo SERVIcE No. 36,
Property Tax Limitation Laws (1934) 38, 39.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. See, e.g., CAL.. CoNsT. AimryNs. (1933); Ind. Acts (Sp. Sess.) 1933 c. 10; cf. Burr
v. City and County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. 508, 199 Pac. 1034 (1921) (mandatory salary
increases are not temporary charges created by the emergency of the 1906 fire, justifying
increasing the tax rate beyond the limit); MVurray v. Zook, 187 N. E. 890 (Ind. 1933)
(finding of county board of tax adjustment that an emergency exists is conclusive in the
absence of a showing of fraud).
23. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (1898).
24. Where improvement districts are organized by incorporation, and the levy provided
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cured for a levy of its own taxes. Creation of such over-lapping taxing dis-
tricts, stimulated both by efforts to evade tax and debt limits and by a desire
to take certain functions, such as school administration, "out of politics," 25
has required of taxpayers in some localities tax payments that during the
depression have proved altogether too burdensome.26  Thus Chicago, for ex-
ample, had 27 independent tax levying bodies in 1933; and Cook County,
Illinois, had no fewer than 419.27 Where such conditions prevail, tax in-
creases to avoid municipal defaults may be impossible. 28  Public opposition
to this multiplication of tax levies led eight states in 1932 and 1933 to adopt
blanket limits upon the total taxation to which a given piece of property
might be subjected;2 0 such limits, absoutely rigid and impossible of evasion,
have made provision of adequate municipal relief extremely difficult. 30 At-
tempts to solve these and similar problems through unequalP' or excessive3 2
for by statute is in form one to pay the annual charges on bonds, the levy may be per-
mitted to exceed the benefit to the property owner. The bonds in such a case become the
general obligation of the district. Norris v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation District, 248 Fed.
369 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), cert. den., 24S U. S. 569 (1918); Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1352.
25. Beyer, supra note 8, at 167.
26. Porter, A Plague of Special Districts (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REV. 544.
27. Beyer, supra note 8, at 167.
28. PuBIC ADannsTRATIoN SERvicE No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults, (1933) 9.
29. Ind. Acts 1933, c. 97 (taxation by all units of government upon property limited to
1.5% of assessed valuation of property within municipalities, 1.8% outside); MicH. CONST.
art. X, § 21, amendment of 1932 (1.5% general limit), see MicH. LAws 1933, p. 517; NEv.
CONST., amended Laws 1933, p. 368 (proposed 5%o limit, not yet ratified); N. M. CONST.
art. VIII, § 2, amendment of 1933 (2% general limit) ; OHo CONsT. art. XII, § 2, amend-
ment of 1933 (1% general limit), see Omio CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) p. 74; OKLrA. CONST.
art. X, § 9, amendment of 1933 (2.7% general limit), Oxr.A. LAws 1933, c. 169; Wash.
Laws 1933, c. 4 (4% on statutory base of 50%o assessed valuation); W. VA. CONsT. art. X,
§ 1, amendment of 1932 (.5% on personal property; 19 on residences and farms occupied
by owner; 1.5% on other rural real estate; 2.0% on urban real estate). The Washington
limit was adopted by initiative.
The limitations thus imposed may be exceeded by the vote of a certain percentage of the
electors, except in Indiana, where the approval of the Tax Adjustment Board is necessary.
30. See Leffler, supra note 6, at 543. The plight of West Virginia municipalities was
particularly serious; revenues from the general property tax were reduced, as a result of
the blanket limit, from $40,000,000 in 1932 to an estimated $23,000,000 in 1933. See Sly
and Shipman, West Virginia S. 0. S. (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. Riv. 548. New Mexico's
problems are also grave. See note 158, infra.
31. See, e.g., Harjim v. Owens, supra note 5, where the court ordered a reassessment of
Palm Beach County for 1929 and 1930. Cf. Bistor v. McDonough, supra note 3, where
the Illinois court refused to grant relief on the ground that the taxipayer should have pre-
sented his complaint before the Board of Review.
32. Most of the complaints alleging excessive assessments have been brought before
administrative bodies. In Bistor v. McDonough, supra note 3, at 626, 181 N. E. at 418,
plaintiff alleged that 35,000 complaints were filed with the board of review of Cook
County in 1927, 100,000 in 1928, and 43,000 in 1929, and that few of these were heard.
A reassessment, ordered by the state tax commission, and supervised by experts, consumed
18 months. See McDonough v. Cesar, 349 Ill. 372, 376, 182 N. E. 448, 450 (1932). No
taxes were levied during this period.
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assessments have also encountered strenuous opposition. The number of com-
plaints disputing property assessments led the Washington legislature to author-
ize administrative officers to reassess individual property summarily; 33 the
state supreme court, however, held the law to be an unconstitutional delega-
tion of the taxing power.34 A number of other state legislatures have ordered
reductions in assessed valuations, 35 and reassessments required by courts or
initiated by assessment authorities have generally resulted in lower tax bases.30
Statutes37 declaring that property should be taxed at its "full market value"
are probably of little significance unless the assessment machinery3 8 is ade-
quate to cope with the problem of valuation at a time when sale of real estate
is virtually impossible.39 It is thus apparent that neither through increases
in the property tax rate nor through extensions of the tax base can munici-
palities find the escape they seek from impending defalcation.
Collection of Delinquent Taxes. Depression efforts to increase municipal
revenues have for this reason been directed principally to the return of delin-
quent property to the tax rolls, the payment of delinquent taxes, the more
efficient collection of current taxes, and the development of new sources of
revenue. Much delinquent property still unsold three years after its first
offering tias been restored to local tax rolls in Nebraska under a statute"
permitting sale, free of all liens, at the highest price bid even though that
price does not equal accrued taxes, interest and penalties.4 ' The validity of
similar statutes in other jurisdictions has generally been sustained against
attacks alleging violation of constitutional requirements of uniform taxation
and equal protection of the law, even when the result is to release liens of
governmental units; 42 it must be clear, however, that the full amount of
33. WAsH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) §§ 11301-11308.
34. State Tax Commission v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P. (2d) 619 (1932).
35. CAL. CONST., as amended by Cal. Laws 1933, c. 84 (reassessment in counties dam-
aged by earthquake); Kan. Laws 1933, c. 323 (reduction of 20% from 1932 valuations);
Minn. Laws 1933, c. 359 (assessments reduced from 33% to 20% on rural, and from
40% to 25% on urban homesteads).
36. See Leffler, supra note 6, at 543; Aldis, supra note 10, at 519; N. Y. Times, March
30, 1934, at 1.
37. Cf. CAL. ConsT., as amended by Cal. Laws 1933, c. 63 (full cash value); Iowa Acts
1933, c. 121 (actual value instead of one fourth thereof) ; N. M. Laws 1933, c. 107 (market
value) ; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 142 (usefulness under normal conditions to be considered).
38. For a description of the machinery to be used in the reassessment recently ordered
in New York City, see N. Y. Times, March 30, 1934, at 1.
39. Other factors have also contributed to a lower tax base. Railroads and utilities
have in some instances been made subject only to state taxes. PuBLic AniinmSrTTiox
SERvxcE, loc. cit. supra note 28. And public acquisition of delinquent properties on fore-
closure sales has decreased the tax base. See note 13, supra.
40. NEB. CoArp. STAT. (1929) § 77-2039.
41. Commercial Savings & Loan Association v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237
N. W. 575 (1931).
42. Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller, 102 Fla. 378, 136 So. 546 (1931); Commercial Savings
& Loan Association v. Pyramid Realty Co., supra note 41; Ledegar v. Bockoven, 77 Okla.
58, 185 Pac. 1097 (1919); cf. Dowling v. Butts, 149 So. 746 (Fla. 1933) (owner may be
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such liens cannot be realized.4 3 Yet a number of courts have held that sale
of lands within special assessment districts for less than accrued taxes, inter-
est and penalties impairs the district's obligation upon its bonds.4 The
distinction is, however, justified, since the special assessment bondholder
has no lien on general revenues of the district.
Relief to the delinquent taxpayer appears to be exclusively within the legis-
lative domain. No matter what the hardship, the courts are powerless, in
the absence of specific authorization, to release penalties on 45 or extend the
time for payment of4" taxes; to do so would be to usurp the legislative func-
tion.47 Nor can a governor grant a general amnesty discharging tax penal-
ties; his power in this regard is confined to the release of criminal penalties. 48
While statutes of the type discussed above are not designed so much to attract
the delinquent taxpayer as to restore the revenues of the taxing district itself,
the former may take advantage of them by purchasing his land as a stranger
and thereby in effect redeeming it without full payment of the sums due.49
Moreover, a large number of statutes recently enacted make direct concessions
to delinquents in the expectation that payment of overdue obligations will
thereby be encouraged. Thus there now exist laws permitting payment of
delinquent taxes in instalments,50 reducing or remitting penalties and interest
on delinquencies, 3 ' postponing the time for payment of those taxes already
permitted to redeem lands purchased by state at tax sale and held for two years, without
paying penalties). See Comment (1933) 21 CAmx'. L. Rxv. 376.
43. Cf. Moore v. Gas Securities Co., 278 Fed. 111 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
44. Malott v. Board of Commissioners of Cascade County, 89 Mont. 37, 296 Pac. 1
(1931); cf. Moore v. Gas Securities Co., supra note 43; Shull v. Lewis and Clark County,
93 Mont. 408, 19 P. (2d) 901 (1933).
45. Lamont Savings Bank v. Luther, 200 Iowa 180, 204 N. W. 430 (1925).
46. State v. Fifth Judicial District Court, 36 N. M. 151, 9 P. (2d) 691 (1932).
47. Id. at 153, 9 P. (2d) at 692. It appears, however, that the district courts of the
state had frequently entered orders of this kind, either because the tax rolls were not ready
on time or for economic reasons.
4S. Hutton v. McCleskey, 132 Ark. 391, 200 S. W. 1032 (1918).
49. Nilsson, supra note 10, at 216.
50. Ariz. Laws 1933, c. 72, allows payment of real estate taxes delinquent June 1, 1933
in twenty semi-annual instalments, beginning November 1, 1933, provided current taxes are
paid. Failure to pay two such instalments makes original tax due and subject to sale.
See also: Cal. Laws 1933, c. 1018; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 30; Md. Laws, 1933, c. 4; Mich.
Laws 1933, no. 126; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 337; Mo. Acts 1933, pp. 451, 452; N. J. Stat.
Serv. (Feb., 1934), § 208-444a; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 679; N. C. Laws 1933, c. 181; Ohio
Laws 1933, S. B. 42; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 462; Pa. Laws 1933, no. 42; S. D. Laws 1933, c.
194; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 169; Utah Laws 1933, c. 61; Va. Acts 1933, c. 35; Wash. Laws
1933, c. 53; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 244.
51. Typical statutes are those of Michigan, Public Acts 1933, no. 126, cancelling penalty
and interest on delinquent taxes of 1931 and prior years, and Public Acts 1933, no. 267,
which provides that taxes for 1932 and prior years may be paid on or before Nov. 1, 1933
without penalty or interest. See also: Ark. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1933, no. 2, p. 3; Fla. Gen.
Laws 1933, cc. 16032, 16038; Idaho Laws 1933, cc. 9, 41, 73; Ind. Acts 1933, c. 30; Kan.
Laws 1933, c. 313; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 414; Mo. Acts 1933, S. B. 80, p. 423; Mont. Laws
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levieda2 or for tax sales on delinquent property,5 3 and increasing the redemp-
tion period on delinquent lands held by governmental units. 4 Many of
these enactments were unfortunate. The leniency shown led taxpayers to
demand further concessions, and in many states the legislators responded5"'
with a generosity that had serious effects upon municipal credit.5 Creditor
groups in some instances were able to limit such concessions by making them
available only upon payment of all current taxes, 57 and imposition of this
1933, c. 41; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 155; N. M. Laws 1933, c. 96; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 468; N.
C. Laws 1933, c. 181; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 255; OKLA. STATS. (1931), § 12720, Laws 1933,
cc. 1, 41; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 462; Tenn. Acts 1933, cc. 22, 126; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 169;
Utah Laws 1933, c. 61; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 53; W. Va. Laws 1931, cc. 38, 39; Wis. Laws
1933, c. 288; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 72.
52. Iowa Acts 1933, c. 124 extends the time of payment without penalty of the first
instalment of 1933 taxes. The following statutes are in general similar: Cal. Laws 1933, c.
100. 103, 591; Fla. Gen. Laws 1933, c. 16253; Minn. Laws 1933, cc. 36, 38; Mont. Laws
(Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 1; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 155; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 91; Ohio Laws 1933, H.
B. 1663, p. 544, Ex. Sess., S. B. 24; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 209; Pa. Laws 1933, no. 75, p. 214;
S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 3155; Tenn. Acts 1933, c. 7; Tex. Laws 1931, c. 3, § 1; Wash.
Laws 1933, c. 82; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 16.
53. An example of this type of statute is Ind. Acts 1933, c. 2, postponing 1932 delinquent
tax sales until 1934. See also Ariz. Laws 1933, c. 72; Cal. Laws 1933, c. 591; Fla. Gen.
Laws 1933, c. 16252; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 133; Md. Laws 1933, c. 196; Mich. Acts 1933, no.
2, p. 3; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 337; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 264; Pa. Laws 1933, no. 84, p. 239,
no. 279, p. 1134; Tenn. Acts 1933, c. 22; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 53; Wis. Laws 1933, cc. 81,
350.
54. A typical statute is Minn. Laws 1933, c. 414, extending from three to seven years
from date of sale the redemption period on land sold for 1926 and 1927 delinquent taxes
and bid in by the state. See also Ark. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1933, no. 2, p. 3; Idaho Laws 1933,
cc. 2, 3; Ind. Acts 1931, c. 12; Kan. Laws 1933, c. 312; Mont. Laws 1933, cc. 49, 125; N.
C. Laws 1933, c. 181; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 258; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 41; S. D. Laws 1933,
c. 198; Tenn. Laws 1933, c. 22; Utah Laws 1933, c. 61; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 244.
55. Examples are legion of ever-increasing leniency on the part of legislatures. Kansas:
Laws 1933, c. 313, extended to Jan. 1, 1934, the period for redemption without penalty
of lands bid in by a county at tax sales. 'Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1933, c. 120, further extended
the redemption period until Jan. 1, 1935. Ohio: Laws 1933, H. B. 663, p. 544, extended
the time for payment without penalty of 1933 taxes, until June, 1933. Laws (Sp. Sess.),
S. B. 24, postponed the date of payment of the same taxes to Oct., 1933. Pennsylvania:
Laws 1931, no. 132, p. 280, deferred until 1931 tax sales of property on which taxes for
1930 or prior years were delinquent. Laws 1933, no. 84, p. 239, further postponed the date
of sale of such property to 1933. Texas: Laws 1931, c. 3, extended the time for payment
of 1930 taxes, without penalty, to Oct. 15, 1931. At the last legislature this was extended
still further to Sept. 30, 1933, although providing for a nominal (1%) penalty. Laws
1933, c. 169. Legislatures having continued to grant concessions such as these in the past,
will be expected to do the same in the future. See (1934) 23 NAT. MuN. REV. 39.
56. Linen, Causes and Effects of Deterioration of Municipal Credit (1934) 23 NAT. MUN.
REV. 87.
57. E.g., Fla. Gen. Laws 1933, c. 16252, §§ 3, 5; Ind. Acts 1933, c. 30 (release of
penalties); Kan. Laws 1933, c. 312; Mont. Laws 1933, c. 125 (lengthening redemption
period).
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condition was sometimes fairly effective.58 But even this type of statute
entailed an unnecessary loss of revenue and security in failing to discriminate
between delinquent taxpayers who could pay in full and those who were
really destitute.59 Some legislatures did, however, recognize and overcome
the objection by authorizing administrative or municipal officials to. release
penalties or compromise the principal of tax obligations only in cases of
need.Go
The constitutionality of these measures has been seriously questioned. By
relieving delinquents of accrued interest and penalties, and certainly by
reducing the principal of tax obligations or granting moratoria on tax sales,
the legislatures discriminate against taxpayers who by paying promptly have
been deprived of the use value of their money.61 And the statutes enabling
municipal and administrative officials to compromise tax obligations at their
discretion discriminate not only between prompt and delinquent taxpayers,
62
but also among the delinquents themselves.63 If the rights of lienholders or
bondholders are involved, moreover, the obligations of their contract with
the municipality may be impaired by legislation remitting or reducing inter-
est payable to the taxing unit and through it to the creditor. 64 Similarly,
retroactive application of statutes extending the redemption period to lands
purchased by individuals at tax sales cannot be upheld65 unless it be upon
58. See (1934) 23 NAT. Muxr. REv. 39.
59. Ibid.
60. Colo. Laws 1933, c. 184, authorizes county commissioners to compromise up to 50%
of the principal of taxes delinquent prior to 1930, to secure payment; see also Fla. Laws
1933, cc. 15887, 15917, FLA. ComaT,. LAWS (Skillman, Supp. 1934) §§ 1003(48)-1003(54); ILL.
REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 120, § 212; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 414; Nev. Laws 1933, c.
171; N. J. STAT. SEav. (1932) §§ 208-74c, 136-4700 (212); N. J. STAT. SEav. (1933) § 208-
444a (76); Pa. Laws 1933, no. 229, p. 1018; S. D. Laws 1931, c. 260; Tmx. CODE (1932)
§ 1607.
61. Mittendorf v. Hoy, 151 So. 1 (Fla. 1933); Sanderson v. Bateman, 78 Mont. 235,
253 Pac. 100 (1927); Kain v. Fischl, 94 Mont. 82, 20 P. (2d) 1057 (1933); State v.
Montoya, 32 N. M. 314, 255 Pac. 634 (1927).
62. Cf. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 Pac. 981 (1898).
63. Cf. Sanderson v. Bateman, supra note 61 (to permit redemption of land sold to
counties without payment of penalties discriminates against delinquent owners of property
sold to individuals).
64. Cf. Malott v. Board of Commissioners of Cascade County, supra note 44.
65. The interest acquired by the purchaser must be determined by the law prevailing
at the date of sale. Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518, 48 Pac. 613 (1897) ;
Hull v. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 So. 97 (1892) ; Solis v. Williams, 205 Mass. 350, 91 N. E. 148
(1910); Rott v. Steffens, 229 Mich. 241, 201 N. W. 227 (1924); Merrill v. Dearing, 32
Minn. 479, 21 N. W. 721 (1884); Reid v. Federal Land Bank, 166 Miss. 392, 148 So. 392
(1933); Pace v. Wight, 25 N. M. 276, 181 Pac. 430 (1919); Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige
484 (N. Y. 1845) ; Post v. Cowan, 236 App. Div. 26, 258 N. Y. Supp. 405 (2d Dept. 1932) ;
Dallas County v. Rugel, 36 S. W. (2d) 188 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Milkint v. McNeeley,
169 S. E. 790 (W. Va. 1933).
The purchaser taking by assignment from the state obtains, however, no greater right
than that possessed by the state. Extension of time before assignment is valid. Hooker
v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415 (1904) ; XValker v. Ferguson, 176 Ark. 625, 3 S. W. (2d) 694 (1928).
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the precedent of the Blaisdell case.60  And enforcement of statutes 7 in
favor of delinquent taxpayers whose property has been purchased by state
or local governments is perhaps discriminatory as against those whose lands
have been bought by individuals. 68 In jurisdictions where organic law pro-
hibits the release, diminution or postponement of "any indebtedness, liability
or obligation" owed to the state or its subdivisions,69 even greater obstacles
are encountered.
70
Such objections may of course be met. These statutes, although they
may inure to the advantage of persons not properly entitled to their benefits,71
apparently afford the most expedient means by which land now worth less
than the accrued tax obligations can be returned to the rolls.72  Postpone-
ment of tax sales, release of the tax lien upon payment of the principal of
the tax, and reinstatement of delinquent lands as producers of revenue for
the taxing district may, by preventing accumulation of property in the hands
of government officials, ultimately result in a more uniform tax burden and
thereby benefit the taxpayers against whom the statutes appear to discrimi-
nate73 as well as the general creditors of the municipality. 74 Like considera-
66. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934); cf. State v.
Kline, 249 N. W. 118 (N. D. 1933). But cf. Roth v. Waterfield, 29 P. (2d) 24 (Okla. 1934).
67. Note 54, supra.
68. Kain v. Fischel, supra note 61. Cf. note 63, supra.
69. An example of general prohibition against legislation of this kind is ALA. CONST. §
100 (legislature cannot release, diminish, or postpone any obligation owed the state,
county, or municipality, except that doubtful claims may be compromised). See also: ARE.
CoNsT. art. V, § 33 (obligation owed state); CoLo. CoNsT. art. V, § 38; ILL. CONST. art.
IX, § 6; LA. CONsT. art. IV, § 13; Miss. CoNsT. § 100; Mo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 51; Nrm.
CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4; N. M. CONST. art. IV, § 32; OKLA. CONST. art V, § 53; S. D. CoNsT.
art. III, § 24; TEx. CONST. art. III, § 55, art. VIII § 10 (except after great public calamity);
WYo. CoNsT. art. III, § 40.
Many state constitutions forbid the passage of local or special laws remitting or decreas-
ing obligations held by governmental units, e.g.: NEV. CONsT. § 71; W. VA. CONsT. art. VI,
§ 39; WAsH. CONs?. art. IV, § 31. These provisions do not prevent "classification" [State
v. Lawler, 53 N. D. 278, 205 N. NV. 880 (1925); cf. Smith v. Kansas City, 125 Kan. 88, 262
Pac. 1032 (1928)], and have no application to general legislation remitting penalties. State
v. Lawler, supra. But cf. State v. Consolidated Virginia Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882)
(statute remitting penalties on taxes accruing prior to a certain year invalid as special law).
70. Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 59 S. W. (2d) 49 (Mo. 1933); Sanderson v. Bateman;
Kain v. Fischl; State v. Montoya, all supra note 61; State v. Pioneer Oil & Refining Co.,
292 S. W. 869 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). See Yellowstone Packing & Provision Co. v.
Hays, 83 Mont. 1, 11, 268 Pac. 555, 556 (1928); McGruder's Heirs v. State, 68 S. W. (2d)
519, 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
71. That is, those who could well afford to pay.
72. Unless lands can be sold to outsiders and the liens released, at a price less than
accrued taxes. See p. 932, supra.
73. See Remer v. Erskine, 178 Minn. 404, 407, 227 N. W. 209, 210 (1929).
74. Cf. Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller; Ledegar v. Bockoven, both supra note 42. It is
doubtful, however, whether lien holders or special assessment bondholders can secure any
benefit from such action. Cf. Howard v. State, 226 Ala. 215, 146 So. 414 (1933) ; Straus
v. Ketchen, 28 P. (2) 824 (Idaho 1933) (payment of special assessments with bonds of
district impairs obligation of contract with a limited-obligation bondholder).
tions have persuaded most courts that such enactments are constitutional.
Release of penalties usually takes place automatically when laws imposing
them are repealed 75 or amended. 76  And penalties, not being part of the
tax,7 7 are not an "indebtedness, liability, or obligation" owing to the state
or municipality.78 Interest, which is certainly a part of any "obligation" to
a private creditor has, where statutes provide for reduction of interest on
past due taxes, been held to be actually a "penalty" and subject to remis-
sion,79 since taxes are not debts. Compromise or remission of the principal
of taxes, 0 and postponement of enforcement of the obligation by moratoria
on tax sales,81 have been upheld where applicable only after the period of
redemption has expired and the land has presumably depreciated in value.
Application of the statutes only to property subject to liens held by gov-
ernmental units, and similar limited application of statutes extending redemp-
tion periods, can be supported as reasonable classification consonant with
the requirement of equal protection of the laws.8 2 Some decisions have
likened enactments releasing penalties or long past due taxes to statutes of
limitation, terminating the power of government officials to sue and recover.83
Others have supported the legislation frankly as an emergency measure.8 4
75. McKittrick v. Baer, 63 S. W. (2d) 64 (Mo. 1933); Hamilton v. Lawrence, 109 Pa.
Super. 344, 167 Atl. 509 (1933) ; Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 1034.
76. Henry v. McKay, 166 Wash. 526, 3 P. (2d) 145 (1931) (right to penalty must exist
at time of judgment).
77. Crutcher v. Koeln, 61 S. W. (2d) 750 (Mo. 1933); State v. Mayo, 15 N. D. 327,
108 N. W. 36 (1906); State v. Coos County, 115 Ore. 300, 237 Pac. 678 (1925) (remission
therefore not violative of uniformity).
78. Crutcher v. Koeln, supra note 77; McKittrick v. Baer, supra note 75; Jones v. Wil.
liams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. (2d) 130 (1931). Contra: Sanderson v. Bateman, supra note
61; cf. State v. Pioneer Oil & Refining Co., supra note 70.
79. Crutcher v. Koeln; State v. Coos County, both supra note 77; Jones v. Williams,
supra note 78. But cf. Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co., 125 Ohio St. 152, 180 N. E. 700
(1932); State v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578 (1924).
80. St. Lucie Estates v. Ashley, 105 Fla. 534, 141 So. 738 (1932); Lincoln Mortgage &
Trust Co. v. Davis, 76 Kan. 639, 92 Pac. 707 (1907); cf. State v. State Investment Co., 30
N. M. 491, 239 Pac. 741 (1925). But cf. Yellowstone Packing & Provision Co. v. Hayes,
supra note 70.
81. Dowling v. Butts, supra note 42.
82. Cf. Walker v. Ferguson, supra note 65.
83. Beecher v. Webster County, 50 Iowa 538 (1879); cf. S. L. Collins Co. v. Perrine,
188 Iowa 295, 176 N. W. 303 (1920); Lewis v. Tipton, 29 N. M. 269, 222 Pac. 661 (1924).
Contra: State v. Montoya, supra note 61 (not a statute of limitations because state not
allowed any time in which to collect old taxes before collection barred).
84. Sewer Improvement District No. 1 of Wynne County v. Delinquent Lands, 68 S.
W. (2d) 80 (Ark. 1934); cf. Thompson v. Stack, 261 Mich. 624, 247 N. W. 360 (1933)
(statute postponing tax sales impairs contract between cities and note holders, but
mandamus to compel publication of delinquent lands, being discretionary, denied because
of emergency). But see Jones v. Williams, supra note 78, at 99, 45 S. W. (2d) at 131
(statute releasing penalty and interest held constitutional, though depression is not "public
calamity" contemplated by constitution).
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These decisions are justified where the primary purpose of the legislation is
to return property to the rolls, but where the purpose is only to release penal-
ties indiscriminately, considerations of policy scarcely warrant strained con-
struction of constitutional prohibitions.8 5
Far more important in terms of results than any inducements offered
taxpayers for payment of delinquent taxes, are the measures taken to correct
the inefficiency and laxity in the levy and collection of local taxes. A num-
ber of reforms of collection machinery have been effected during the depres-.
sion. Delinquent taxes may now be collected in some jurisdictions by sum-
mary sale of property;8 6 if notice of the sale is given, the taxpayer is not
deprived of his property without due process of law.8 7 Strangely enough,
no state legislature made provision for applying rents and profits from delin-
quent property to the payment of taxes8s until 1921, when a Tennessee
statutes authorized the appointment of receivers in pending tax suits. The
Skarda Act9" in Illinois and the Stout Act9 ' in New Jersey now afford even
more expeditious relief, authorizing the appointment of receivers to collect
income on property more than six months delinquent, regardless of whether
suit has been started. The number of large hotels, apartment houses and
office buildings now to be found on delinquency lists makes these provisions
highly significant. Chicago's collections are reported92 as much improved
since the passage of the Skarda Act, and tax receiverships are said to have
doubled Jersey City's receipts.93 Laxity in the collection of local taxes has
also received attention. Recent legislation in Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia provides that upon failure of local officials to levy
85. See Betters, Bolstering Municipal Credit (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. REV. 268; Recom-
mendations of the Conference on Municipal Finance (1933) 22 id. 401.
86. Sale of personalty by summary distress warrant is generally authorized; such pro-
visions are new only to a few states. E.g., Fla. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1929, c. 14491, §§ 23, 24
(distress) ; cf. Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 74.02, 74.10 (seizure of mortgaged chattels and sale of
taxpayer's interest); City of Tarpon Springs v. Chrysostomides, 146 So. 845 (Fla. 1933)
(charter provision for summary sale of personalty).
Similar process is allowed for real estate. E.g., Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 46 (summary pro-
cess) ; Mo. R.v. STAT. (1929) §§ 9952 a-c, as re-enacted Mo. Laws 1933, S. B. 94, p. 425
(suit not necessary); N. M. Laws 1933, c. 171 (sale of property after notice).
87. Merchant's Trust Co. v. Wright, 161 Cal. 149, 118 Pac. 517 (1911); Simpson v.
Warren, 106 Fla. 688, 143 So. 602 (1932).
88. Perhaps the delay in adoption of such procedure was a result of the expectation that
delinquent property would always be sold promptly, or because of the non-existence of
rents and profits from most delinquent property.
89. TmNN. COnE (1932) § 1602; State v. Collier, 165 Tenn. 163, 53 S. W. (2d) 982
(1932); cf. R. I. Pub. Laws 1931-1932, c. 1919, § 19.
90. IIL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 120, § 238a (on own application, county
auditor may be appointed receiver); cf. Iowa Acts 1933, c. 142 (drainage district owning
tax certificates on property on which taxes subsequent to certificates are delinquent, may
have receiver to manage the property).
91. N. J. STAT. SERv. (1934) § 208-444a (109).
92. (1934) 23 NAT. MUN. REV. 130.
93. Id. at 39.
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taxes to meet bond charges,0 4 or to institute tax suits, 95 or to collect state
taxes,901 or upon mere failure to discharge any duties required, 97 the state
auditor or department of taxation may appoint its own officers to act. Home
rule guaranties are not violated by such statutes, since the power of taxation
always rests in the legislature, and collection of taxes, especially of state
taxes, is clearly of more than local concern.98
But campaigns organized by creditors' and taxpayers' committees have
proved the most efficient means for collecting back taxes. The Detroit banks
in 1932 inaugurated with remarkable success a system of clubs to facilitate
payment of overdue taxes in small monthly instalments. In Trenton, New
Jersey, citizens cooperated with officials on a "Pay Your Taxes" campaign.
Instalment payments were permitted; not only were letters mailed to delin-
quents, but the names of those who did not respond were published; and
city employees were threatened with deduction of taxes from their salaries.
Over a million dollars more was collected in one three-month period than
had been received during the same period in the preceding year.9 9 In
Newark, New Jersey, a house-to-house canvass improved 1933 collections 70
per cent over those of 1932, and secured pledges of payment of delinquent
taxes from 16,700 property owners.100 In Columbus, Ohio, delinquents were
notified by mail or telephone that their taxes were past due, and if they could
not pay at once in full they were encouraged to fund a part; 1ol more than
2,000 persons signed funding agreements, and payment of current taxes was
greatly accelerated.' 0 2 The success of these campaigns amply demonstrates
that in the last analysis collection of delinquent taxes is a political rather
than a legal problem.
Collection of Current Taxes. Traditionally, current property taxes are
payable in a lump sum in the fall of the year, and in the absence of statute
the tax collector is under no duty to accept part payment.' 3 There are no
constitutional objections, however, to a legislative authorization of such pay-
94. OF-LA. STAT. (1931) § 5939 (municipalities or school districts).
95. TENN. CODE (1932) § 1598 (counties; state officials also to sue county officers for
statutory penalties).
96. VA. TAx CODE (Michie, 1930); in certain counties the state official also collects local
taxes. VA. TAX CODE (Michie, Supp. 1932) § 366 authorizes the governor to suspend any
county or city treasurer who is remiss in collecting taxes, and to appoint his successor.
97. Texas Laws 1931, c. 229 (counties); W. Va. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, c. 4 (supervision
of assessment and enforcement of collection; may also enforce penalties against lax local
officials, including removal).
98. Cf. Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186 (1930).
99. (1934) 23 NAT. MuT. REV. 40.
100. (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. REV. 573.
101. See Ohio Laws 1933, S. B. 42, p. 161.
102. (1934) 23 NAT. MuN. REv. 129. For a description of the similar campaign in Day-
ton, Ohio, see (1933) 22 id. at 259. Stimulus was given these campaigns by the National
Municipal League's nation-wide broadcasts on city problems.
103. Julien v. Ainsworth, 27 Kan. 446 (1882); Bridges v. Hurlburt, 91 Ore. 262, 178
Pac. 793 (1919). Contra: Howell v. Lamberson, 149 Ark. 183, 231 S. V. 872 (1921).
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ments. 0 4 Accordingly, many of the state legislatures have in the last two
years enacted provisions enabling the taxpayer to pay his current tax obliga-
tions in a number of instalments.0 5 Other statutes seek to induce prompt-
ness in the payment of current taxes by allowing discounts or interest when
payment is made in advance of the due date. 0 6 Any criticism that such a
discount results in inequality of burden may be met on the ground that "the
inequality of result comes from the election of certain taxpayers to avail
themselves of privileges offered to all."' 0 7 Since the discount only gives tax-
payers who pay in advance the same enjoyment of their money that is had
by those paying on the due date, no inequality in fact exists. 08 Induce-
ments more coercive in nature have also been devised. A few states refuse
to register motor vehicles until certain current taxes have been paid; 0 9 other
jurisdictions now permit municipalities to withhold payment of their own
obligations to taxpayers until the latter have met their tax bills; 110 while
incarceration of delinquents is authorized in Massachusetts and Vermont."
In some states, on the other hand, legislative leniency toward the taxpayer
has led to an impairment rather than to an improvement in the collection of
current taxes. A number of statutes ha.ve been enacted reducing penalties for
104. Spexarth v. Sherman, 93 Ore. 254, 183 Pac. 23 (1919).
105. Ark. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1933, no. 16, p. 61; COLO. CoMp. LAWS (1921) c. 173, § 9194;
Del. Laws 1933, c. 77; Fla. Sp. Acts 1933, c. 16394; Ind. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, c. 30; Kan.
Acts. 1933, c. 310; Md. Acts 1933, c. 4; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 121; Mo. Acts 1933, p. 453.
Mont. Laws 1933, c. 158; Mo. Laws 1933, c. 134; Nev. Laws 1933, c. 99; N. J. STAT.
SEnv. (1933) § 208-66d (602); N. Y. Laws 1933, cc. 174, 463, 725, 832; N. D. Laws 1933,
c. 259; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 86; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 326; R. I. Pub. Laws 1931-32, c. 1933;
S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 3155; Vt. Laws 1933, no. 21, p. 21, no. 22, p. 23, no. 23, p.
23; XV. Va. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1932, c. 12, § 7; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 163.
106. Kan. Acts 1933, c. 310, allows a discount of 2% if taxes are paid in full on or be-
fore the date on which the first instalment is due. Similar statutes are found in: Ill. Laws
1933, p. 905; Ky. RPv. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1933) § 4148; Me. Laws 1933, c. 202; Md.
Acts 1933, c. 338; Mass. Laws 1933, p. 453; N. J. STAT. SEarv. (1932) § 208-66d (615); N.
Y. Laws 1933, c. 832; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 326; S. C. Acts 1932, no. 868, p. 1492; Utah Laws
1933, c. 61; Vt. Laws 1933, no. 18, p. 19; WASE. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 11244; W.
Va. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, c. 12, § 6.
107. Merchant's Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 464 (1897). Accord: Board of
Education v. Sea, 167 Ky. 772, 181 S. W. 670 (1916); Buchanan v. West Kentucky Coal
Co., 218 Ky. 259, 291 S. W. 32 (1927); Norfolk Southern Rr. Co. v. Lacey, 187 N. C. 615,
122 S. E. 763 (1924).
108. The discount may also be upheld as a reasonable classification. Keaton v. Lacka-
wanna County, 292 Pa. 269, 141 Atl. 269 (1928).
109. E.g., S. D. Laws 1931, c. 181 (personal and poll taxes must be paid); Vt. Laws
1933, no. 90, p. 117 (flood and poll taxes must be paid); cf. MD. CODE (Bagby, Supp.
1929) art. 56, §§ 183, 184, 184a (delinquent motor vehicle taxes must be paid).
110. E.g., Idaho Laws 1933, c. 43 (no warrants to be issued to delinquent taxpayers);
Neb. Laws 1933, c. 126 (delinquent personal taxes deductible from claims presented to
municipal disbursing officer).
111. MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 60, § 29; VT. PuB. LAWS (Rev. 1933) § 715. The
threat of imprisonment is ordinarily sufficient. (1933) 22 NAT. Muir. Rxv. 408.
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delinquency," 2 and other legislation extends the redemption period on future
tax sales." 3  In Oregon, although a discount of 2 per cent is allowed if
taxes are paid three months before due,114 the former penalty of 2 per cent
for failure to pay by a given date has been repealed and the interest rate reduced
from one per cent a month to two-thirds of one per cent.115 Similar leniency
with respect to tax sales prevents foreclosure of a tax lien for three years follow-
ing delinquency. 16 It is reported that because of these provisions Oregon firms
transacting business elsewhere meet their other taxes but default on those
levied in Oregon.
117
The majority of the changes in collection procedures have, however, been
directed toward stimulating prompt payment of current levies. To this end
the measures taken to improve the collection of delinquent taxes have con-
tributed. Thus the procedure for summary sale of personalty and realty," 8
tax receiverships," 9 and "pay your taxes campaigns 120 have all increased
current receipts. But vastly more important is the fact that tax offi-
cials have begun to pursue an aggressive collection policy, rather than to
depend upon the conscience and initiative of the taxpayer. The occupation
of tax collector has too often been a sedentary one. Frequently the citizen
himself has had to ascertain the amount of his tax, the due date, and the
official to whom it should be paid. Thus in Rochester, New York, in 1932
the citizen desirous of obtaining his tax bill had either to go to the treasurer's
office and try to discover the proper clerk; or he could obtain a "tax bill
request blank," and mail it with a stamped, self-addressed envelope to the
treasurer. The city made no effort to collect delinquent items for a year
112. Cal. Laws 1933, c. 12; Colo. Laws 1933, c. 183; Conn. Acts 1933, c. 63; Inl. Laws
1933, p. 930; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 132; Ky. Acts 1932, c. 142; Me. Laws 1933, c. 206; Minn.
Laws 1933, cc. 121, 379; Mo. Acts 1933, p. 394; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 134; Nev. Laws 1933,
c. 99; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 257; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 86; Va. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 33;
Wash. Laws 1933, c. 33; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 244; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 72.
113. A representative statute is Kan. Laws 1933, c. 312, § 2, increasing the period of
redemption on future tax sales from three years to four years. See also: Ala. Acts (Ex.
Sess.) 1933, no. 77, p. 74, no. 141, p. 130; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 88; fll. Laws 1933, p. 923;
Ky. Acts 1932, c. 142; Nev. Laws 1933, c. 99; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 262; S. D. Laws 1933,
c. 198; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 244.
114. Ore. Laws 1933, c. 326.
115. ORE. CODE (1930) § 69-720, Ore. Laws 1931, c. 224. Moreover, penalties and in-
terest on unpaid taxes of 1930 and prior years have recently been cancelled. Ore. Laws
1933, c. 462.
116. ORE. CODE (1930) § 69-803. By id. § 69-820 a decree and sale may follow sixty
days later.
117. See (1934) 23 NAT. MuN. REV. 39. Compare Va. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 33 (57
penalty for non-payment on due date; tax sale after only one year delinquency). See
Simpson, supra note 8, at 152; Russell v. County Board of Education, 247 Ky. 703, 57
S. W. (2d) 681 (1933).
118. See note 86, supra.
119. See notes 89 to 93, supra. State collection of local taxes also aids current revenue
receipts. See notes 94 to 97, supra.
120. See notes 99 to 102, supra.
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after the due date.121  In New York City the LaGuardia administration
found that $28,750,000 of special assessment levies, some as old as 1926, had
never been billed. To correct such conditions many cities have recently initi-
ated the practice of billing all taxes before the due date, and immediately
investigating instances of delinquency. In Providence, Rhode Island, a city
noted for its excellent financial condition, uniformed police deliver notices re-
questing delinquent taxpayers to appear at the city hall to make payments; 122
and sales for taxes due in October are instituted the following June. 1' 23 Prompt
collection of taxes is probably assured more by these measures than by numer-
ous statutory provisions which local collectors may disregard. Thus in Wis-
consin if taxes are unpaid the collector must call on the taxpayer at least
once if possible; 124 he may seize any personal property and sell it summarily,
or he may arrest the delinquent, hail him before the justice of the peace and
obtain a judgment against him. And liens on his real estate, enforced by
county officials, may be fortified by execution or garnishment on any of the
delinquent's property.12 But in spite of this excellent procedure, collections
in some Wisconsin cities have been no higher than in the country generally.2' 3
The local officials must ultimately bear the largest responsibility for collection
of current taxes. 27
New Sources of Revenue. The breakdown of the property tax has forced
municipalities of all classes to seek the aid of state legislatures in developing
new sources of revenue. Even home rule cities must have express authorization
for the imposition of a new tax,' 28 although the exception that taxes may be
imposed in aid of some police or other regulatory power conferred by statute has
been extended to include license fees on the sale of such commodities as near
121. Weller, Thoughts on Tax Delinquency (1932) 21 NAT. Mur. REv. 215.
122. (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REV. 533.
123. "Prompt sale of property for taxes in Providence keeps collections high." (1933) 22
NAT. MuN. REv. 408.
124. Wis. REv. STAT. (1931) § 74.02.
125. Stout, Enforcement of Personal and Real Property Taxes in Wisconsin (1932) 16
MARQuETTE L. REv. 83.
126. Percentage delinquency, end of fiscal year:
1930 1931 1932 1933
Madison 8.1 16.4 28.0 47.0
Milwaukee 29.3 35.6 48.3 66.0
Racine 16.7 33.7 38.0
Cf. Av. of Percen-
tages for 145
Cities in U.S. 12.9 15.8 22.1 26.3
Figures for Milwaukee and Racine are not entirely comparable because of tax strikes
in the former and collection delays in both. See Bird, supra note 8, at 111 and 113.
127. For other recommended practices, see Chatters, Painless Fxtraction of Tax Dollars
(1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REv. 9.
128. Vance v. City of Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435 (1875) ; International Shoe Co. v. Chap-
man, 311 Mo. 1, 276 S. W. 32 (1925); Siemens v. Shreeve, 317 Mo. 736, 296 S. W. 415
(1927).
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beer,12 cigarettes 30 and gasoline. 13' The forty-seven legislatures that met in
1933132 empowered municipalities to tax most of the sources already taxed by
the state and federal governments; 1 33 license, occupation, admissions and other
taxes, and higher charges for municipal services, were authorized.1 34  Many
new taxes, hurriedly enacted, have brought little revenue; others have aroused
threats of retaliation or public opposition and consequently have not been en-
forced. Maryland imposed a four cent tax upon every gallon of gasoline used
by interstate buses within the state,135 but apparently has made no attempt to
collect it because of threats of retaliation by other states. 36 New York City,
acting under legislation authorizing it to levy any tax which the state could
impose,137 attempted a registration fee for out-of-town cars and a tax on stock
transfers; public opposition, and prospective inability to enforce them, forced
abandonment of these taxes. In addition to resorting to new objects of taxation,
many cities have utilized their municipally owned utilities as an important
source of revenue. In some jurisdictions, state commissions, empowered to
regulate the rates of the cities' utilities as well as those of privately owned
companies, have limited the cities to a return either sufficient only to pay actual
costs' 38 or equal only to that allowed utilities privately owned. 139 But where
neither commissions nor statutes impose restrictions, there appear to be no limits
upon the power of municipalities to divert profits from their own utilities, and
thereby to lower the general tax level. 140 Several legislatures have in recent
years restricted such diversions.141 But eighty-four small towns are said to be
supporting themselves entirely with revenues from their own utility plants. 42
State imposition and collection of indirect taxes to be shared with local gov-
ernments, 43 necessitated by the difficulties inherent in local administration of
129. Levitt v. City of Cleveland, 40 Ohio App. 405, 178 N. E. 593 (1931).
130. Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S. W. (2d) 22 (1928).
131. Automobile Gasoline Co. v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S. W. (2d) 281
(1930).
132. Manning, State Tax Legislation, 1933 (1934) 12 TAX MAo. 63.
133. See Legis. (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 503, 509.
134. Ibid.; Manning, supra note 132; AmERzicAN MumiciPAL AssocmmoN, LICENSE TAX
ORDINANCES (1933).
135. Md. Laws 1933, c. 593.
136. Manning, supra note 132, at 64, n. 14.
137. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 815.
138. Matter of Niagara, Rockport & Ontario Power Co. v. Prendergast, 229 App. Div.
295, 241 N. Y. Supp. 162 (3d Dep't 1930).
139. City of Loganport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind. 523, 177 N. E. 249
(1931); Re Garden Electric Light & Water Co., P. U. R. 1920D, 821 (Mont. Pub. Serv.
Comm.); Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 116, 118.
140. Perrin v. Bonaparte, 140 Okla. 165, 282 Pac. 332 (1929) ; Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L.
REV. 338.
141. E.g., Iowa Acts 1931, c. 160, 161 (only after current expenses and sinking fund
charges are paid); N. M. ComP. STAT. Aux. (1929) § 90-2606 (surplus); Ore. Laws
1931, c. 275 (after adequate provision is made for expenses and interest charges).
142. (1933) 15 TnE ARBITRATOR (No. 2) at 3.
143. Only four states-Delaware, Rhode Island, Utah and West Virginia-returned no
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such taxes,1 44 in 1928 brought over $600,000,000, or more than 12 per cent of
their total revenues, to the local governments. 4 5  Since that year many new
indirect taxes have been adopted by the states,'14 6 frequently with the express
purpose of aiding local units. The California legislature, authorized by con-
stitutional amendment' 47 to allocate state funds to meet deficits resulting from
state restriction of local ad valorem taxes, and forbidden to raise more than
25 per cent of its own revenue through the general property tax, has resorted to
sales' 48 and liquor 149 taxes. Maryland, with a new tax on horse racing, 150
higher registration fees for trucks,1 1 and chain store taxes, 1 2 has relieved
counties of debt service for roads and schools, making possible thereby a 50 per
cent reduction in county tax levies.' 53 Florida has apportioned its race track
tax revenues among counties and school boards; 54 Massachusetts distributes
proceeds from its dividend tax to municipalities; 15 and South Dakota 5 0 and
Texas15 7 have adopted similar measures. These enactments have probably more
than doubled the percentage of total revenues received by local governments
from state taxes.158
Yet notwithstanding these various means of increasing revenue, it has been
extraordinary grants in aid which have provided municipalities with the
greatest amount of needed funds. Aid was first given by the states'50 and
indirect taxes to local units in 1932. See REPORT, op. cit. supra note 4 (Memo. 10);
HuTcEalsoN, STATE-AImnIsmmTEPED LocALvY-SmuRw TAxEs (1931); Kendrick, State Collec-
tion and Division of Taxes (1931) 39 J. PoL. EcoN. 25.
144. Collection of indirect taxes requires a large staff; and variations in these taxes
between communities would have an unfortunate effect upon location of capital and
industries. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 4 (Memo. 10), at 15.
145. Id. at 17. Subventions are included.
146. Legis. (1934) 47 HAsv. t. REv. 503; id. at 860; Manning, supra note 132.
147. Cal. Laws 1933, c. 63.
148. Cal. Laws 1933, S. B. 1211.
149. Cal. Laws 1933, cc. 51, 178.
150. Md. Laws 1933, c. 324.
151. Md. Laws 1933, c. 281.
152. Md. Laws 1933, c. 542.
153. Ritchie, The Crisis in Government Economy (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. REv. 323, 328.
154. Fla. Laws 1933, cc. 16116-16141, 16173.
155. Mass. Laws 1933, c. 307.
156. S. D. Laws 1933, c. 185 (55% of gross income tax proceeds for schools, property
tax to be reduced by amount thus made available).
157. Tex. Laws (3d Sess.) 1932, c. 13, § 7h.
158. Cf. CLARx, THE INTERAL DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES (1933) 277, indicating
general increases by 1932. In some states, however, new sources of taxes have not been
productive. New Mexico, for example, with a 20 mill blanket tax limit on general property
taxes, note 29, supra, passed oil severance, liquor, and income tax measures in 1933.
Manning, supra note 132. But instead of an expected income of $5,000,000, net receipts
on all three taxes were little more than $20,C00 the first year. The oil severance tax has
so far yielded no revenue whatever. Albuquerque (N. M.) Morning journal, April 8, 1934.
159. Thus in Ohio a state relief fund, derived from the gasoline tax returns, was
established to aid municipalities. Ohio Laws 1933, S. B. 61, p. 26, H. B. 337, p. 61. See
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the R.F.C.; 160 more recently, the N. I. R. A.'s authorization of outlays for public
works projects of states and municipalities, 161 with outright grants of 30 per
cent of the cost of labor and materials, have provided vital relief. Moreover,
C. W. A. and P. W. A. wage payments have doubtless assisted taxpayers; and
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, with a fund of $2,200,000,000,162 a large
proportion of which may be advanced in cash to home owners for payment of
taxes, 0 3 should effect an appreciable increase in tax collections.16e
B. REDUCTION OF EXPENSES
Reduction of salaries, perhaps the most effective method of retrenchment
in municipal expenditures, is ordinarily distasteful to political interests; but
it has been compelled in some instances by banks and other creditors.' In
Fall River, Massachusetts, for example, a board of finance established after
the city's default and given plenary power over the budget, reduced teachers'
salaries by 20 per cent.2  The pressure brought to bear by New York City's
creditors has, as is well known, effected marked economies of this sort.3  But
the power of municipalities to adjust expenses to depression revenues through
salary reductions is often limited.4 Although the tax levying body ordinarily
has power to reduce salaries, the contracts clause of the Constitution pre-
also Ill. Laws (1st Ex. Sess.) 1933, S. B. 6 (relief bond issue, to be paid from proceeds of
gasoline tax); R. I. Laws 1933, H. B. 569 (bond issue).
160. In 1932, $300,000,000 was made available to municipalities as a "loan" at 3%
interest. P. L. No. 302, 72d Cong., 2d. Seas. (1932) § 1. In 1933 the R. F. C. was
empowered to grant $500,000,000 to the states for relief, appropriations therefrom to be
made by the various governors. P. L. No. 15, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). By Dec. 31,
1933, over $324,000,000 had been advanced. For a summary of R. F. C. loans and
grants to municipalities, see (1934) 138 Comm. AND Fnr. CnaON. 2447.
161. $400,000,000 is to be granted to the states for federal aid highways, and $2,000,-
000,000 is to be spent for public works projects of state and municipal governments. P.
L. No. 67, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) § 203 (a) 2.
162. P. L. No. 43, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. (1933) § 4.
163. See Home Owners' Loan Corp., Legal Bull. No. 1, U. S. Law Week, Oct. 3, 1933,
at 72, Oct. 17, 1933, at 101, Oct. 24, 1933, at 116. Cf. Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 102 (state
protection for Farm Loan mortgagees by advancing them funds for payment of taxes and
insurance).
164. It is estimated that $220,000,000 will be applied directly to the payment of delin-
quent taxes. Indirect results will be even more important. Greider, Effect of Home Own-
ers' Loan Act Upon Tax Delinqtency (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REv. 389.
1. See Beyer, Financial Dictators Replace Political Bosses (1933) 22 NAT. Mium. REV.
162.
2. See Broadhurst v. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 167, 179 N. E. 586 (1932); Paquette
v. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 172, 179 N. E. 588 (1932).
3. Cf. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 178; N. Y. Times, April 11, 1934, at 1, 2; cf. id., April 5,
1934, at 1.
4. Richardson v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 173, 167 At]. 573 (1933); cf. Council of City
of Saginaw v. Board of Estimates, 256 Mich. 624, 239 N. W. 872 (1932).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
cludes alterations of contracts made with municipal employees.5 "Public
officers," however, are not protected by this constitutional provision.6 Even
more serious obstacles are mandatory salary provisions and civil service
restrictions against removal of employees. These may sometimes be evaded
by abolition of the offices involved, 7 and public pressure exerted on such
officials to accept voluntary pay cuts may prove effective. But payment
at the full statutory rate cannot be denied a "public officer" who demands
it, even after he has consented to a reduction, for such waiver of part of
his salary is said to be void as against public policy.8
Consolidation of overlapping taxing districts, though its importance as
an 6conomy measure may be exaggerated, 9 and reforms in the administration
of local governments offer fertile fields for depression retrenchment. 10 The
law, however, interposes many hindrances to the realization of these measures.
They must, apparently, always be authorized by the legislature, and the
legislature must show careful regard for the rights of creditors of the taxing
district involved," and for constitutional prohibitions against special legis-
lation.1 2  In California 13 and Montana 14 these are the only restrictions upon
consolidations of cities and counties; but the constitutions of twenty-seven
states in addition require approval of the voters for any changes in county
seats, and ten states have the same requirement for alteration of county
boundaries.15 In fourteen states, moreover, existing counties can be elimin-
ated only by constitutional amendments.16  Provisions in many constitutions
requiring the election of enumerated officials' 7 likewise prevent any altera-
5. Obenchain, Construction of Indiana's $1.50 Tax Law (1932) 8 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1.
6. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402 (U. S. 1850).
7. Livingston v. MacGillivaney, 28 P. (2d) 424 (Cal. 1934). But cf. Shelby v. City
of Pensacola, 151 So. 53 (Fla. 1933).
8. Glovey v. United States, 182 U. S. 595 (1901); Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 105
Pac. 593 (1909); Ohio National Bank v. Hopkins, 8 App. D. C. 146 (1896); Anez v. City
of Seattle, 28 P. (2d) 1020 (Wash. 1934).
9. Duplications in administration expenses can be avoided, and more effective budgeting
made possible; but consolidation cannot eliminate costs of services. Porter, A Plague of
Special Districts (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. REV. 544.
10. Morgenthau, Bigger and Better Governments Wanted (1933) 22 NAT. MUx. REV.
434. See Recommendations of the N. J. Tax Survey Commission (1932) 21 NAT. MuN.
REv. 211.
11. Landis v. Peacock, 151 So. 4 (Fla. 1933).
12. McCarthy v. Walter, 108 N. J. L. 282, 156 AtI. 772 (1931). Typical provisions are:
CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 25; WASH. CONsT. art. II, § 28. These provisions do not preclude
"classification," however. See Smith v. Kansas City, 125 Kan. 88, 262 Pac. 1032 (1928).
13. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 7, 7, 7Y2a.
14. MONT. CoNST. art. XVI, § 7.
15. Jones, Constitutional Barriers to Improvement in County Government (1932) 21
NAT. MUN. REV. 525, 529. The requirement is probably a necessary safeguard. Id. at
535.
16. Ibid.
17. Election of at least ten county officials is required in Texas. TEx. CONsT. art. V,
§§ 9, 18, 20, 21, 23, art. VIII, §§ 14, 16, art. XVI, § 44. Twenty-two other state
constitutions have somewhat similar provisions. Jones, supra note 15, at 525, 526, 537.
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tion in the existing forms of government,'" unless the designated offices can
be utilized in the consolidated or reorganized government.' 9 During the
depression, however, public insistence upon greater efficiency and economy
in the administration of local governments has led to reforms despite such
obstacles. Virginia has made possible the elimination of five hundred road
districts,20 and similar measures have been adopted in other states.2 1  Chicago
voters are to decide whether twenty-four park districts within the city should
be combined.22 Consolidation of cities and counties,s2 and of school,24 irriga-
tion and drainage,2 5 and other2 6 districts has been authorized. Even more
effective aid has been afforded local governments by legislation shifting the
burden of maintaining schools, 27 roads, 28 and relief2 9 to the states, especially
when the shift has been accompanied by an exchange of state bonds for the
obligations with which the local units had financed those activities. 30 Reor-
13. Ibid. Compare the constitutional obstacles encountered in shifting the assessment
function from local to county officials in New York. REPORT or Nzw YORK STATE COM-
MISSION FOR THE REvIsION OF TnE TAX LAWS (Memo. 3, 1932) 52.
19. When city and county bounds were made coterminous in Philadelphia the separate
governments were retained. In New York City the county offices prescribed by the con-
stitution remain as a skeleton of the county governments. Jones, supra note 15; REPORT,
loc. cit. supra note 18.
20. Va. Acts 1932, c. 415, provided for state maintenance, but allowed counties to
elect to continue under state aid, as before. By September, 1932, 96 out of 100 counties
were operating under the state maintenance plan. (1932) 21 NAT. MuN. REv. 620.
21. E.g., N. C. Laws 1931, c. 145 (local road districts dissolved, state maintenance
substituted for state aid); cf. Idaho Laws 1933, c. 131 (no new highway districts to be
established).
22. (1934) 138 Com. AND Fur. CHRON. 1952.
23. E.g., Minn. Laws 1933, c. 273 (consolidation of counties upon petition of 25% of
voters and approval by 60%); PA. CoNsT. AmEND. art XV, § 4 (1928) (city of Pittsburgh;
voters' approval required).
24. E.g., Ga. Laws 1931, no. 156, p. 103 (proposed constitutional amendment); N. Y.
EDUC. LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 130-134; cf. N. C. Laws, c. 430, § 6, p. 431; Vis. STAT. (1931)
§§ 40.50-40.57; Board of Education v. Racine, 205 Wis. 489, 238 N. W. 413 (1931).
25. E.g., Fla. Laws 1933, c. 16010; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 42, §§ 17a-
17e; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) §§ 4293-4297.
26. E.g., Ind. Acts 1933, c. 76 (abolishing sanitary districts, prohibiting further issuance
of bonds).
27. E.g., N. C. Laws 1931, c. 430, § 1 (state assumes financial responsibility for a six-
month school term, teachers becoming state employees).
28. See statutes cited notes 20 and 21, supra; Tex. Laws (3d Sess.) 1931, c. 13, § 1
(policy of taking over county roads declared); cf. Ind. Acts 1932, c. 16 (maintenance of
highways transferred from townships to counties).
29. See INcRnszs N REvNu Es, supra IA, note 159.
30. E.g., N. C. Laws 1931, c. 145; R. I. Acts 1933, c. 2011; Tex. Laws (3d Sess.) 1931,
c. 13, §§ 1, 7. In some instances local indebtedness for roads and other improvements
was taken over by the states without assuming the burden of maintenance. E.g., Ark.
Acts (2d Ex. Sess.) 1932, no. 15 (4%% state bonds to be exchanged for road district bonds
bearing 4y/o% to 6% interest); CAL. CONST., proposed amendment 1933 (authorizes state
4%% bonds, proceeds to be used in purchasing irrigation and reclamation district 5% to
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ganizations of county and municipal governments have also been accom-
plished during the depression. Establishment of county manager 3' or county
executiveS2 forms of government has been authorized by several legisla-
tures;33 and a similar trend toward centralization of responsibility in city
governments is apparent.34 But the most essential, and perhaps the most
effective, economies are those available through less comprehensive reforms,
particularly through removal of the glaring inefficiencies in existing forms
of government. Creation of budget supervising and efficiency agencies,35
and of planning boards for public works,36 centralization of purchasing37
and consolidation of other related functions,38 are typical measures. Syn-
chronization of tax collection dates with the maturity of municipal obligations,
obviating the necessity for expensive tax anticipation warrants, has been
attempted in several states.39 Avoidance of debt charges is also sought by
"cash basis" laws,40 prohibiting the issuance of any short term obligations
unless funds for their payment are assured, by authorizations for taxes in
excess of current needs to provide cash working funds,41 and by the allow-
6% bonds); GA. CONST. as amended Ga. Acts 1931, no. 152, p. 97 (assumption by state of
county debt).
31. E.g., Mont. Laws 1931, c. 109, Laws 1933, c. 56.
32. E.g., Va. Laws 1933, c. 368, providing alternative county manager or executive forms
of government. In one county that has put the latter form into operation under this act,
large savings are anticipated from reformed financial control, consolidation of functions,
elimination of many offices, and centralization of responsibility. Harris, Progress in In-
ternational Municipal Research (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. Rnv. 329; cf. (1932) 22 id. at 539.
33. See Atkinsen, Principles of a Model County Government (1933) 22 NAT. Murq. REv
469.
34. That the city manager form of government enjoys increasing favor, see (1933) 22 NAT.
MuN. R v. 539; WH=TE, TRNDS IN PUBLIC ADmIN-STRATiON (1933) 213, 218. Mo. Laws
1933, p. 284, is a typical enabling act.
35. See PRESENT AD n axn isnvE Su'Rzvisiox OF GER= FxSAc MAXAGEMENT, infra
"IC.
36. See Shurtleff, McAneny and Bettman, Saving by Planning (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REv.
508; Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N. W. 27 (1920); Village of Lynbrook v.
Cadoo, 252 N. Y. 308, 169 N. E. 394 (1930).
37. (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REv. 409; WmTE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 218, 220.
38. Wnziz, op. cit. supra note 34, at 221, 222; Freeman, How American Cities Are Re-
trenching in Time of Depression (1932) 21 NAT. Mux. REv. 267.
39. E.g., N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 2922; see Jackson City Commission v.
Hirshman, 253 Mich. 596, 235 N. W. 265 (1931).
40. E.g., Kan. Laws 1933, c. 319 (operation on cash basis to be facilitated by funding
floating debt), construed in Citizens Bank of Weir v. Cherokee Township, 25 P. (2d) 1019
(Kan. 1933); Minn. Laws 1931, c. 342, Laws 1933, c. 438 (certain taxing districts to
operate on cash basis, except for anticipation certificates); MoNr. CODE (1921) § 5078,
construed to forbid issuance of warrants in Commonwealth Public Service Co. v. City of
Deer Lodge, 28 P. (2d) 472 (1934); cf. W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 8, § 13 (prohibiting
contracts for expenditure of funds not available for current year); but cf. Ohio Corrugated
Culvert Co. v. Logan County Court, 171 S. E. 110 (W. Va. 1933).
41. E.g., N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1334 (65a) (counties), § 2931a (municipali-
ties; cf ILL. Ray. STAT. (Smith-Igurd, 1933) c. 24, § 667 (a), (b) (cities over 150,000 may
ance of discounts to secure advance payment of taxes.42 Reforms of this
type afford the most desirable means of adjusting municipal expenditures to
depression revenues; the political opposition encountered by many of them43
is indicative of their potentialities.
When the above methods of retrenchment are impossible, or when the
obstinacy of officials prevents their adoption, or when, having been attempted,
they do not succeed in restoring the city to solvency, drastic measures become
necessary, involving serious impairment of essential governmental activities. 44
The reductions in county school budgets between 1929 and 1932, effected
by increasing the size of classes, cutting salaries, shortening the school year,
and even by closing schools entirely,45 has been estimated at $400,000,000;
yet school attendance increased during the same period.4 6 Chicago's library
is reported to have purchased no books for eighteen months.47  Allowances
for welfare4s and recreational activities49 have been slashed. The mayor
of Cleveland has threatened to reduce the city's police and fire-fighting forces
by 50 per cen, and its street lighting by 80 per cent.50  In one Georgia
county, court terms have been limited to two days, and highways are main-
tained, if at all, by volunteers.' And the mayor of a West Virginia city
discharged himself and 270 municipal employees . 2  Although a lowering of
standards of community welfare and government to some extent during a
depression is perhaps inevitable, economies such as these should certainly
be employed only as a last resort.
C. BoRRowING
Unable or unwilling to effect through increased revenues and curtailed ex-
penditures financial adjustments necessary to avert insolvency, municipalities
have had increasing recourse to their power to incur indebtedness. In the
case of long term borrowing, however, there have existed in the great majority
of the states since the aftermath of the panic of 1873, constitutional or statutory
issue bonds without referendum to create cash working fund), upheld in Matthews v. City
of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N. E. 35 (1930).
42. See INcRAnsrs nr REvnES, supra IA, note 106.
43. Mayor LaGuardia's experience in securing enactment of N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 178, is
a conspicuous illustration. See in general, Barrows, A Challenge to Refornz (1933) 22 NAT.
Afux. REv. 223, 225.
44. See Frank, Constructive versus Destructive Economy (1933) 22 NAT. Mi-. Rv.
313; Holcombe, Saving Money in State Government (1933) 22 NAT. Mui. Rv. 317.
45. In Alabama, 85% of the elementary and secondary schools were closed in the fall
of 1933. (1933) 22 NAT. MiTi. RFv. 222.
46. Counts, Norton and Simon, Reducing the School Budget (1933) 22 NAT. MiUN. REv.
374.
47. (1933) 22 NAT. MiVu. REv. 256.
48. Boeckel, Meriam and Bane, Reducing the Welfare Budget (1933) 22 NAT. MtN'i. REV.
410.
49. Appropriations for these activities are estimated to have been 28% lower in 1932
than in 1930. See Wallace, Reducing the Recreation Budget (1933) 22 NAT. MUir. Rav.
420.
50. N. Y. Herald Tribune, March 28, 1934, at 1.
51. (1933) 22 NAT. MuVI. REv. 309. See also Freeman, supra note 38.
52. Seasongood, Getting Our Bearings (1933) 22 NAT. Muir. REv. 584, 585.
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provisions' limiting the total permitted debt to a stated percentage of the value
of taxable property, requiring electoral approval of each bond issue, prohibiting
the incurrence of any debt until provision is made for its payment, or combin-
ing some or all of these restrictions.2  Thus circumscribed in the face of press-
ing need for funds to meet mounting deficits incurred in their various activities,3
cities have resorted to short term borrowing and evasion of the limitations set
upon long term financing.4
Short Term Borrowing. Payment of claims in warrant and scrip, and bor-
rowing from banks and other sources on the security of taxes levied but not
collected, is generally permissible without regard to constitutional or statutory
debt limitations. On the theory that taxes levied are revenues constructively
in the municipality's treasury, the courts reason either that securities other
than negotiable bonds issued in anticipation of taxes create no "indebted-
ness" or that anticipated taxes are deductible from the increased total of in-
debtedness as assets similar to cash.7  In either case the effect has been to
defeat the intended purpose of the city budgetary systems which have been
instituted in many states,8 since control of municipal borrowing by the elec-
torate9 or by supervisory administrative bodies' 0 has been drafted in terms of
1. These provisions are collected in Legis. (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 6S8, n. 6, 689, n. 7;
Legis. (1933) 18 IowA L. Rxv. 269.
2. For general discussion of the problems which have arisen out of constitutional debt
limitations, see SECRIST, AN EcoNo:nc ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
'UPON PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1914); WHITE, TRENDS IN PUBLIC
ADmINISTRATION (1933) 49-57; PUBLIC ADmSmTRATIo" SERVICE No. 33, Municipal Debt
Defaults (1933); 1 DILo, MUNCIP'AL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §§ 198-200; 6 Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS (2d. ed. 1928) §§ 2382, 2387-90; Stason, State Admin-
istrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness (1932) 30 MICH. L. REv. 833, 837; Note
(1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 70 (power of municipality to exceed debt limits); Note (1931)
44 HARv. L. REV. 610; Legis. (1934) 47 HIA.v. L. REV. 688 (loans from PWA in excess of
debt limits); Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 762 (power of municipality to provide unem-
ployment relief).
3. Betters, Bolstering Municipal Credit (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. REV. 268.
4. See Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 704; Has the Indiana Plan Been a Success (1932)
21 NAT. MuN. REV. 101, 103.
5. Tax revenues may even be anticipated beyond the current year, provided the taxes
have been levied. See Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626 (1877).
6. In Illinois, for instance, tax anticipation warrants are treated as assignments of tax
claims, thus negativing any concept of the creation of a debt. See Harrold v. East St.
Lewis, 197 Ill. App. 121, 125 (1915). The legal problems involved in the issuance of such
warrants are fully discussed in Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 704.
7. Holst v. Consolidated District, 203 Iowa 288, 211 N. W. 398 (1926); Barton v. Hop-
kins, 14 Wash. 59, 44 Pac. 134 (1896). Contra: Farbo v. School District, 28 P. (2d) 455
(Mont. 1933).
8. See Kilpatrick, State Codes for Local Budgeting (1933) 22 NAT. MuN. REv. 179.
9. Provisions requiring electoral approval of bond issues are Seldom held to apply to
warrants, Simms v. Mt. Pleasant, 12 S. W. (2d) 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), even though
the latter resemble bonds in every respect except as to the recitals on the face. Note (1933)
45 -v. L. REV. 704, 707, n. 31, 708, n. 32.
10. A requirement that bond issues receive the approval of a state supervisory board
[Vol. 43
mandatory approval only of bond issues." In Kentucky, the constitutional pro-
hibition against borrowing by municipalities in any given year, without the ap-
proval of two-thirds of the voters, in excess of the total revenue "provided" for
that year, has been construed as limiting them only to an amount determined by
the tax which the city could legally levy, not to the actual rate imposed. 12 As a
consequence, the short term debt of Kentucky cities has mounted yearly.13
Yet the fact that warrants may be funded without electoral approval 14 nulli-
fies any effective check upon this increase through enforcement of the require-
ment that a deficiency of one year must be made up in the next year's tax levy.35
Even more difficult of control is "borrowing" by manipulation of accounts.
Diversion of sinking funds,'0 and payment of current expenses from surpluses
and reserves17 or even from funds belonging to counties or other local units,' 8
does not apply to warrants. Cf. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County, 264 Mich.
673, 251 N. W. 395 (1933). In Kentucky, it has been further held that such state bodies
cannot control the discretion of local officers. Fox v. Boyle County, 245 Ky. 27, 53 S. W.
(2d) 192 (1932). See PRESENT ADmmISTPATE SuPERvIsIox or LocAL INDEBTEDNESS, infra
III A; ExTENT OF NncEssiT- FOR EFTECTIVE ADmnnsTRATivE SUPERVISION, infra IV A.
11. Nor is any effective control by the taxpayer possible, for he must enter formal
protest and often demonstrate either that the warrants were invalid ab initio, Chestnutt v.
Yates, 177 Ark. 894, 9 S. W. (2d) 37 (1928), or that the recital of validity is false. See
Note (1932) 45 HA~v. L. REv. 704, 709, n. 47; cf. Ohio Corrugated Culvert Co. v. Logan
County Court, 171 S. E. 110 (W. Va. 1933).
12. City of Providence v. Providence Electric Light Co., 122 Ky. 237, 91 S. W. 664
(1906).
13. See Dietzman, Constitutional Limitations on Public Indebtedness (1931) 20 Ky.
L. J. 75, 80.
14. Vaughn v. City of Corbin, 217 Ky. 521, 289 S. W. 1104 (1927), construing generically
a constitutional clause probably intended to refer only to floating debt incurred prior to
the adoption of the constitution. See Dietzman, supra note 13, at 81. Accord: Huron v.
Second Ward Bank, 86 Fed. 272 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898). Contra: Farbo v. School District,
supra note 7; Glenn v. Board of Commissioners, 201 N. C. 233, 159 S. E. 439 (193.1). Even
if the bonds are sold to fund warrants issued illegally, an estoppel may arise. Cf. Chemical
Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County, supra note 10.
15. McCrocklin v. Nelson County Fiscal Court, 174 Ky. 308, 192 S. W. 494 (1917);
Dietzman, supra note 13.
16. Cf. Bosworth v. Anderson, 47 Idaho 697, 280 Pac. 277 (1929); (city's diversion
of sinking fund to pay interest no violation of duty as collecting agent) ; Protest of Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 164 Okla. 114, 23 P. (2d) 158 (1933) (surplus of municipal
revenues can be applied only to current year's deficit in sinking fund); (1932) 21 NAT.
M N. REv. 101 (diversion of sinking funds enables Indiana cities to levy taxes above the
blanket limit, since debt charges must be met).
17. In Chicago, for example, a $60,000,000 subway construction fund built up over a
period of years, was all used to pay city Salaries. (1932) 21 NAT. Mu N. REV. 144. Other
funds were diverted to pay bond interest when tax revenues were insufficient. Cf. Gates v.
Sweitzer, 347 Ill. 353, 179 N. E. 837 (1932) (diversion not illegal if replacement of funds
is "intended").
18. The smaller towns in Milwaukee county, Wisconsin, turned over their delinquent
tax rolls in place of cash on sums owing the county, while the city of Milwaukee paid its
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are practices difficult of either discovery or prevention. 0 The state legislatures,
far from endeavoring to correct this condition of uncontrolled municipal finan-
cing, have frequently sanctioned and encouraged it. Various prerequisites to
borrowing have been waived 20 and the issuance of scrip, notes and tax war-
rants authorized to meet ordinary 2' as well as relief22 expenditures. And not
only has pledging of unsold bonds, illegal unless expressly unauthorized,2 3 also
been permitted24 but outstanding scrip of doubtful legality2- has been validated
by subsequent legislative action.26
The short term borrowing which has thus been available to cities has ulti-
mately had unfortunate repercussions. The depreciation of warrants issued
by Chicago authorities in payment of public school salaries is well known.
2 T
Inability to renew unsecured loans, or loans secured by unrealized tax revenues,
has in some cities resulted in virtual banker dictatorship over municipal
budgets.28 In other instances accumulating short term maturities which
could not be funded have precipitated receiverships. 2 9  Legislative attempts to
full share of county taxes. The city was then forced to pay an unfairly large proportion
of county levies to cover these delinquencies. (1933) 22 NAT. M&uN. REv. 345, 346; see
also Gates v. Sweitzer, supra note 17.
19. Cf. Hoan, Milwaukee Financially Sound and Content (1932) 21 NAT. Muir. R.v.
88; Lynagh, The Surplus that Made Milwaukee Famous (1932) 21 id. 152.
20. E.g., Orno (Page, Cum. Code Supp. No. 11, 1934) p. 35, H. B. 9; R. I. Laws
1931, c. 1855.
21. Ind. Acts 1933, p. 845, c. 161; IL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 1461/2;
Mich. Acts, 1931, No. 26; Acts 1933, Nos. 46, 214; N. H. Laws 1931, c. 126, § 2; N. Y.
Laws 1932, c. 2; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 263; Omro CODE (Page, Cum. Code Supp. No. 11,
1934) p. 35, H. B. 9; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 12; Tex. Laws 1933, p. 154, c. 76.
22. Pa. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1932, p. 13, No. 6; R. I. Laws 1931, c. 1855; S. C. Acts 1933,
No. 308.
23. City of Sanford v. Chase National Bank, 44 F. (2d) 206 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), com-
pelled the return of unsold bonds pledged by the city without statutory authorization to
a local bank as collateral security on the *city's certificates of indebtedness; Barde v.
Funk, 24 P. (2d) 334 (Ore. 1933) (Portland charter provision for sale of bonds does not
authorize hypothecation). See (1931) 20 NAT. Mvw4ir. REv. 298. Cf. City of Dawson v.
Wilkinson, 174 Ga. 539, 163 S. E. 485 (1932) (city may not without statutory authority
reissue bonds purchased by itself and held in treasury).
24. E.g., FLA. Coinp. LAWS (1927) § 1552.
25. Scrip to be used as currency cannot be issued without express statutory authority.
Thomas v. Richmond, 79 U. S. 349 (1870); Barde v. Funk, supra note 23 (scrip to be
self-liquidated by affixing stamps).
26. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 1463/2, §§ 18, 20, 21b; Mich. Acts
1933, No. 26; N. Y. Laws 1932, c. 2. See Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County,
supra note 10 (legislature has power to validate issues).
27. See (1932) 21 NAT. Mvu. Rv. 587.
28. Bankers have continued to lend short-time money in Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit
and New York only on condition that the financial house be put in order. Beyer, Financial
Dictators Replace Political Boss (1933) 22 NAT. MtuN. REv. 162.
29. The Fall River, Massachusetts receivership was precipitated by the accumulation
of short time loans. See Fishack, A Financial Dictatorship for Fall River (1931) 20 NAT.
MuN. REV. 201.
prevent by criminal penalties the circulation of warrants at a discount ° seem
destined to be of negligible effect; while legislation 3' requiring municipalities
to receive warrants or scrip in payment of all 32 taxes, where not held uncon-
stitutional, 33 may well prove injurious rather than remedial.3 4  More effective
have been the "cash basis" laws of Kansas, Minnesota and Montana,35 and
the Illinois and North Carolina provisions for "cash working funds,"3 6 which,
in addition to militating against further short term borrowing, have in some
cases provided for the funding of the existing short term debt.37 Although the
retirement of floating indebtedness is dearly preferable to its funding, the lat-
ter expedient, often the only possible one, has at least the salutary effect
of making possible the measurement and supervision of municipal debt.
Long Term Borrowing. The rigid limitations imposed upon long term bor-
rowing by statutory and constitutional debt restrictions became increasingly
burdensome as greater congestion in urban areas and generally rising standards
of living demanded the continued expansion of municipal activities. It was thus
inevitable that cities should seek means of obtaining greater amounts of bor-
rowed funds than were allowed by the limits set in an earlier age. Advantage
was soon taken of the laws by which some states permit excess borrowing for
30. Ind. Acts 1933, p. 845, c. 161, § 7, providing that the purchase of a warrant at a
discount of more than 8% of face value shall be a misdemeanor, and shall subject the
offender to no more than six months in jail or a fine of not over $300. N. D. Laws 1933,
c. 263, § 17, prohibiting discounting of tax certificates; violators are to be deemed guilty
of a felony and sentenced to the penitentiary for one year.
31. Bond, warrants or scrip are made receivable in payment of taxes by the following
statutes: Ala. Acts (Sp. Sess.) 1932, p. 55, No. 47; ARx. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
1919), §§ 1993, 2008, 10045, ARx. DiG. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 5646(i); CoLo. Comr,.
LAWS (Courtright, Supp. 1932), § 9072.12, Colo. Laws 1933, c. 115, § 6; Fla. Laws 1933,
cc. 16048, 16251, 16252, 16254-16258, 16288; Idaho Laws 1933, cc. 183, 207, § 5, 213;
Iowa Acts 1933, c. 141; KAx. REv. SrAT. (1923) c. 79, § 2003; Mich. Acts 1933, No. 133;
N. J. Stat. Serv. (1932 Ann.) § 192-89a(2); N. D. Laws 1933, c. 267; Ohio Laws 1933,
p. 221, H. B. 94; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 324; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 7322; S. D. CoArp.
LAws (1929) § 6764; Utah Laws 1923, c. 97; WAsHr. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932)
§ 7442-1; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 199. For the Illinois legislation see Mereness v. Board of
Education, 349 Ill. 291, 182 N. E. 383 (1932).
32. Warrants or scrip issued in anticipation of taxes are, of course, almost always
receivable in payment of those particular taxes.
33. Such legislation has been held invalid in Howard v. State, 226 Ala. 215, 146 So. 414
(1933); McNee v. Wall, 4 F. Supp. 496 (S. D. Fla. 1933) (as to Fla. Laws 1933, cc. 16048,
16251, 16252); Straus v. Ketchen, 28 P. (2d) 824 (Idaho 1933) (as to Idaho Laws 1933,
c. 183).
34. Cf. Mereness v. Board of Education, supra note 31; note 81, infra.
35. REDUciON or Expmnsas, supra IB, note 40.
36. Id. note 41.
37. See ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 24, §§ 662(c)-662(h), c. 34, §§ 107(h)-
107(i), c. 122, §§ 327(a)-327(p), providing for bond issues to fund existing short term
indebtedness incurred in the form of tax anticipation warrants. These bond issues must
be retired by mandatory tax levies which may exceed statutory tax limits.
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"temporary loans,"3 in case of "calamity," 39 or for capital improvements upon
approval of a certain proportion of the electorate.40 Of greater significance
have been the frequent exemptions, up to a certain percentage of the general
debt limits, of bond issues for construction or acquisition of public utilities"
and waterworks.4 2  Municipalities have also found it possible to finance
revenue-producing services by "special fund" bonds without doing violence to
debt limitation provisions; this type of obligation is said43 not to create municipal
"indebtedness," as that term is used in the statutes and constitutions,
unless the general taxing power of the municipality has been pledged to
secure any deficiency in the special fund.4 Instalment or conditional sales con-
tracts, and leases carrying options to purchase have been made to perform a
similar function. 45  And where these means have proved to be insufficient,
cities have secured the establishment of new political subdivisions having the
power to borrow. Thus permanent improvements have been financed by bond
issues constituting in rem liabilities of special assessment districts,4 0 while funds
for increased general activities have been secured by the creation of more and
more overlapping taxing districts, until investors in the securities of these public
borrowers have no means of ascertaining the total taxation to which the property
within their bounds is subject.47
With these devices of evasion available, long term borrowing continued
undiminished until 1932,48 the proceeds of this borrowing aiding municipalities
to tide themselves over the first years of the current depression. In that year,
however, there occurred a considerable decline in new issues. In many instances
cities either found it impossible to market securities or were unable to secure
38. ALA. CONST. art. X, § 225.
39. MicH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 2231.
40. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (allowing indebtedness exceeding revenue pro-
vided for a given year on approval of two-thirds of qualified voters) ; LA. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 14f (additional indebtedness not exceeding 10% of assessed valuation upon assent of
voters). Other states whose constitutions permit additional percentage indebtedness are
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and Utah. Legis. (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 269,
270, n. 5.
41. Alabama, Arizona, South Dakota, Washington. Id. at 269, n. 3.
42. Colorado, Georgia, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington and Wyo.
ming. Ibid.
43. See Note (1914) 14 CoL. L. Rav. 70, 72.
44. For a full discussion and collection of cases see Legis. (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 688.
Even where the general taxing power is thus pledged, the municipality's obligation, con-
tingent upon the insufficiency of the special funds, is not a "general" one requiring approval
of the electorate. Anderson v. City of Fargo, 250 N. W. 794 (N. D. 1933).
45. Legis. (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 269.
.46. A municipality is not liable for insufficiency of the fund to be raised by special
assessment unless remiss in the duty of levying and collecting the assessments. Note (1931)
44 HARv. L. REV. 610. Nor do the bonds evidence an "indebtedness" of the municipality.
Note (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 70.
47. This device avoids all but blanket tax limits. SEcRisT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 97.
48. Shanks, Municipal Credit in the Current Depression (1933) Am. BANExm (Dec.) 6.
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the necessary approval of the electorate; 49 and in some eight states5" blanket
tax limits virtually put an end to municipal borrowing on the security of gen-
eral revenues, as cities could not meet the statutory requirement that provision
for taxes within those limits sufficient to pay interest charges and assure re-
tirerhent at maturity be made at the time of issuance of the bonds.5 ' The
new demands of the depression were for a time met primarily by short term
borrowing. Upon the passage of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act
of 1932,52 which among other provisions authorized loans up to $1,500,000,000
to municipalities for "self-liquidating" projects, the desirability of enabling
cities to share in the fabulous sums thus offered by the federal government
led some of the legislatures to waive statutory restrictions upon municipal in-
debtedness. 3 Owing, however, to the high interest rates imposed and to con-
stitutional restrictions upon the pledging of general tax revenues as security,
this plan for borrowing from the RFC proved to be a failure. Although the
$300,000,000 appropriated for grants of direct relief under another section of
the Act was fully distributed by May, 1933,r 4 only forty-one loans from the
remaining funds set aside had been approved through March 1, 1933 5
Since the public works provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
became effective, however, cities have again been able to do a substantial part
of their financing through long term securities. Approved loans by the PWA
to municipalities, secured as far as required by municipal bonds," totaled
$15,270,781 in February of the present year and $25,399,004 in March. 7
In the case of loans for financing revenue-producing improvements, legislative
stipulations that "special fund" bonds shall be payable solely out of revenues
derived from the improvements and shall not constitute a municipal "indebted-
ness" within the meaning of the restrictions imposed, have given assurance of
the effectiveness of that evasion of the limitations.58 Where the city's proposed
improvements will give rise to no additional revenues, attempted issues can
scarcely be denominated "special fund" bonds and on that ground issued
49. Ibid.
50. INcrnAsEs in REvENus, supra IA, at p. 931 and note 29.
51. Shanks, supra note 48.
52. 47 STAT. 709 (1932), 15 U. S. C. Supp. VII, § 601 (1933).
53. Conn. Gen. Acts 1933, c. 32a, §§ 89b, 94b; N. H. Laws 1933, c. 162; N. Y. Laws 1933,
c. 782; Ohio Laws 1933, S. B. 403, p. 601; R. I. Pub. Laws 1931, c. 1855, Pub. Laws
1932, c. 1919, Acts and lesolves 1933, c. 2028.
54. (1934) 138 Comr. AND Fmi. CmnoN. 2447.
55. See Betters, Federal Aid for Municipalities (1933) 22 NAT. MUN. Rxv. 174, 176.
56. Of these loans, 30 per cent of the cost of labor and materials is a direct grant, while
the remainder is secured by 4 per cent municipal bonds. See IxcREAsEs ix RE=WNuES, supra
IA, note 161.
57. (1934) 138 Comm. Aow Fm. C mox. 2448.
58. Ala. Acts (Sp. Sess.) 1933, Nos. 46, 47, 66, 102, 107; Idaho Laws 1933, cc. 186,
187; Ind. Acts 1933, p. 561, c. 85; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 111; Me. Laws 1933, cc. 243, 251;
Mo. Laws 1933, p. 363; Neb. Laws 1933, p. 561, c. 146; N. M. Laws 1933, c. 57; N. D.
Laws 1933, c. 179; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 297; S. C. Acts 1933, No. 299; Utah Laws (2d Sp.




in excess of debt limits- 9 Other means of circumventing these restrictions
have, however, been found. In North Carolina, a bond issue for water and
sewer improvements has been held to be for a "necessary expense" and not
subject to such limitations, 0 while a Michigan city's bond issue for unemploy-
ment relief has been declared within the exception authorizing excess loans in
case of "calamity."' The Colorado legislature has gone so far as to authorize
borrowing regardless of constitutional provisions. 2 Although of seeming futility,
such a provision may be quite effective, for the courts can only prevent a sale
of bonds in excess of prescribed limits which is contested in due time by a
taxpayer or other party in interest.0 3 A method of evasion predicated upon
estoppel is also available in jurisdictions in which statistics on total debt and
assessments are not recorded or in which it is held that reliance may be placed
upon the findings of municipal officials with regard to such information. Where
this is the case, once bonds are issued and in the hands of a purchaser for value
the municipality may, in an action on them, be estopped from defending on
the basis of facts admitted in the recital on their face.64  Even in jurisdictions
where, because of statutory provisions requiring publication of financial state-
ments or of information on assessed valuations and total bonded debt,3 no
such estoppel can arise, 6 municipal authorities may fail to plead a defense on
the ground that to do so would jeopardize the credit of the city. 7 Only in
those states where approval of, or certification of all facts to, a state adminis-
trative board or officer, and publication and recordation of its findings, is
required prior to the issuance of any securities, is there but little opportunity
for the utilization of this means of circumventing debt and tax restrictions.S
Some such control as this to avoid otherwise unchecked evasion would be clearly
desirable were it not combined, as it is in most of the states providing it, with
rigid limitations which prevent borrowing when it is most necessary.00
59. See Reimer v. Town of Holyoke, 27 P. (2d) 1032 (Colo. 1933). But cf. Department
of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles v. Vroman, 22 P. (2d) 698 (Cal. 1933).
60. Starmount Co. v. Town of Hamilton Lakes, 205 N. C. 514, 171 S. E. 909 (1933).
61. Muskegon Heights v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83 (1931).
62. Colo. Laws (Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 16.
63. See note 11, supra.
64. Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 173 U. S. 255 (1899); State Bank of
New York v. Henderson County, Ky., 35 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) ; Brown-Crummer
Investment Co. v. City of Florala, 55 F. (2d) 238 (M. D. Ala. 1931); Chemical Bank &
Trust Co. v. Oakland County, supra note 10; Edmunds v. City of Glasgow, 89 Mont.
596, 300 Pac. 203 (1931).
65. See, e.g., CoLO. CowT. LAws (1921) § 8841 (complete financial statements to be
published semi-annually); cf. Sultiff v. Board of Commissioners of Lake County, 147 U. S.
230 (1893).
66. Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S. C. 242, 161 S. E. 454 (1931); Kentucky Utilities Co. v.
City of Paris, 248 Ky. 252, 58 S. W. (2d) 361 (1933).
67. Cf. Ohio Corrugated Culvert Co. v. Logan County Court, 171 S. E. 110 (W. Va.
1933).
68. For the facts which a purchaser must notice at his peril, see HARRs, MUNICIPAL
BoNDs (2d ed. 1917) 115; cf. Bolton v. Wharton, supra note 66.




Retiring of Securities and Refinancing. Interest charges and maturity pay-
ments on short and long term indebtedness have consumed in many cities a
large percentage of current revenues. In Detroit debt charges in 1931 equaled
42 per cent of the local tax levy, ° and in Knoxville, Tennessee, 87 per cent.71
For 81 cities debt service charges were in the same year 37 per cent of total
operating costs exclusive of expenditures for public welfare.72 Maturities of
term bonds have often caused embarrassment because of diversion of sinking
funds created for their retirement to pay interest charges and other current
expenses, and because of failure to levy, or to collect, taxes to offset such diver-
sions. 73 Even serial bond maturities often could not be met as a consequence
of shrinking receipts. The combination of these factors with large short term
debts, poor tax collections and bank failures has produced temporary crises in
some of the best managed cities. 74 State legislatures, realizing the threat to
continuation of municipal services, payment of salaries and political patronage,
have attempted in almost every conceivable way to enable municipalities to
reduce debt service charges, to fund the short term debt and refund bond
issues, and to encourage compromise agreements with creditors.
As one means of effecting a reduction of debt charges, local governments have
been empowered to purchase outstanding bonds at current market prices. 7
But while this would enable municipalities to benefit by any depreciation in
the value of their obligations, many cities whose bonds were selling below par
would in all probability not be in a position to take advantage of such laws.
Some of the states have therefore provided for outside assistance. In Florida
this takes the form of an authorization to state officials to purchase bonds of
certain local districts and hold them in trust, while in North Carolina the cities
themselves may borrow funds with which to purchase any of their bonds
that are selling at a discount of 40 per cent or more.76
An expedient which has been devised for the purpose of retiring obliga-
tions without any direct outlay of cash is acceptance by municipalities of their
own outstanding bonds at par in payment of both current and delinquent
taxes.77 In certain situations the constitutionality of statutes authorizing this
practice is doubtful. The taxpayer who, because he can procure no bonds, must
pay in cash, is perhaps entitled to invoke the guaranty of equal protection of
70. Stason, The Fifteen Iill Tax Amendment and Its Effect (1933) 31 Micr. L. Rv.
371, 373.
71. PUBLIc ADamnNsTRATio SrvicF No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, Appendix B.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Ibid.
74. See Beyer, supra note 28, at 165, for an account of Detroit's recent financial diffi-
culties.
75. Fla. Gen. Laws 1933, cc. 15889, 15891, 15892 (county and district bonds to be pur-
chased out of gasoline tax revenues). ILL. Rav. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 122, § 155c
(purchase by municipalities out of idle funds); Mich. Acts 1933, no. 204 (same); N. C.
CODE (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 2492 (69) (municipalities may borrow money to purchase
their bonds at 4017 discount or more).
76. See statutes cited in note 75, supra.
77. See note 31, supra, for collection of the statutes.
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the laws. It has also been said that such laws work a discrimination between
non-taxpaying bondholders and those who own taxable property in the dis-
trict.7s The creditor whose bonds are secured only by special assessment liens
dischargeable as against a particular property when the assessment is paid,
certainly stands to lose by payment of assessments in bonds. Indeed, in one
of the several7 9 decisions holding invalid such a procedure as applied to special
assessment bonds, it has been emphasized that liens are discharged against
the most valuable bonds, leaving worthless parcels as the only security.80
Even where the bonds are secured by the general credit of the city, to make
taxes payable in securities when at the time the bonds were sold they were
payable only in cash, seems a patent violation of the obligation of contracts.81
Several courts, however, have in such instances, sustained the enactments as
valid efforts to liquidate delinquencies, to return to the rolls lands sold for taxes,
and, by retiring a portion of the city's obligations, to improve the security
available for those remaining outstanding.8 2  Whatever the tenability of this
view it would appear to be least subject to criticism where lands are still held
by the state after several years of delinquency. Yet as applied to such a case
a federal District Court has held such a provision void on the ground that
for the state to accept bonds rather than cash before the redemption period
expired would be a violation of its duty as "trustee" for the county and local
taxing districts.8 3  General acceptance of this reasoning by courts in the many
states which have recently extended the redemption period on delinquent lands
held by governmental units 4 would prevent the retirement of municipal securi-
ties in this manner until the longer redemption period had expired. 85 The
decision conflicts with the usual view that county and other liens may be dis-
charged after a reasonable period of delinquency; 86 in such circumstances,
moreover, there is little justification for interference with legislative discretion.
Though framed primarily to aid distressed municipalities, the advantages
to a city of these legislative provisions 7 are outweighed by their disadvantages.
The receipt of bonds in place of cash can only benefit a municipality if tax
obligations that would not otherwise be paid are thereby discharged. Yet the
78. See Re Cranberry Creek Drainage District, 202 Wis. 64, 68, 231 N. W. 58s, 589
(1930).
79. See Howard v. State; Straus v. Ketchen, both supra note 33.
80. Re Cranberry Creek Drainage District, supra note 78. Cf. Halderman v. City of
Astoria, infra note 82, in which such a law was held valid as to bonds that were also gen-
eral obligations of the city.
81. Crummer v. City of Fort Pierce, 2 F. Supp. 737 (S. D. Fla. 1932); McNee v. Wall,
supra note 33. But ef. Amy v. Shelby County Taxing District, 114 U. S. 387 (1885);
Mereness v. Board of Education, supra note 31.
82. Dowling v. Butts, 149 So. 746 (Fla. 1933); Halderman v. City of Astoria, 140 Ore.
160, 13 P. (2d) 358 (1932).
83. McNee v. Wall, supra note 33.
84. See INcpEAsEs l REvEIumEs, supra IA, note 54.
85. This period may be five years, or longer. Ibid.
86. Id. note 80.
87. See note 31, supra.
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extension of such a privilege to taxpayers may well result not only in a serious
diminution of cash revenues8s but also, if the provision is incorporated into the
bond contract, in embarrassment to the city should a different policy later be
attempted.8 9 Furthermore, in the retirement of a municipality's indebted-
ness"0 the city rather than the taxpayer should be enabled to benefit from any
depreciation in value by assistance in the purchase of bonds at the market. 1
Legislatures must expressly grant to municipalities the power to issue bonds
the purpose of which is to fund short term loans or to refund long term securi-
ties; the power cannot be implied from an authority to incur indebtedness for
other purposes.9 2  Since, however, such bonds create no new "indebtedness"
within the meaning of debt limitation provisions,93 constitutional restrictions
do not prevent legislative authorization of their issuance without prior electoral
approval, nor in excess of the permissible percentage of property valuation.
The numerous statutes and charter provisions which in the past have granted
the power to sell refunding bonds have accordingly not usually imposed any
such conditions.9 4 And similar advantage has been taken in recent legislation 5
providing for the funding of the large floating debts which are for the most
part peculiar to the current depression. Furthermore, enactments of both
these types usually do not prohibit sale at a discount or limit the rate of
88. See Crummer v. City of Fort Pierce, supra note 81, where it was alleged that as
a result of the acceptance of bonds in payment of taxes, the current levy was insufficient
to pay even interest charges on remaining indebtedness; and cf. City of Little Rock v.
Howard, 103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900), where the allegation was made that if issuance
of warrants receivable for taxes were ordered by mandamus, the city's cash revenues would
be reduced by 25 per cent.
89. The legislature could not repeal such a provision. Cf. Hartman v. Greenhow, 102
U. S. 672 (1880); City of Little Rock v. Howard, supra note 88.
90. Acceptance of securities in payment of taxes is sometimes employed as a device
for returning delinquent property to the tax rolls. See INcaXAsEs 3N REvENUEs, supra IA,
at p. 933. But there are a number of more efficacious and less disadvantageous means of at-
taining this result, as by selling the property for what it will bring or permitting pay-
ment of the delinquent taxes in instalments, compromising accrued interest and penalties
when necessary. Ibid.
91. Some benefit could doubtless be made to accrue to the municipality by providing
for the receipt of bonds at 50 to 75 per cent of face value. But it would be difficult so
to vary a statutory percentage as to have it approximate at all times the rate of discount
obtaining in the bond market plus a margin sufficient to induce taxpayers to take advan-
tage of the provision.
92. McQu=nm, MumcinA. CoaORArloxs (2d ed. 1928) § 2441.
93. Id. § 2385.
94.. E.g., Idaho Laws 1933, c. 157; M cH. CoNT,. LAWS (1929) § 2695; Onxo Con
(Page, 1926) § 3925; TEmx. CODE (1932) § 3700; VA. CODE (Mfichie, 1930) § 3090a.
95. Idaho Laws 1933, c. 131 (highway district warrants), c. 153 (county warrants),
c. 157 (same for school districts) ; ILr. Rxv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 24, §§ 662-(c) to
(h), c. 34, §§ 107(h) to (1) (county indebtedness for poor relief) ; N. H. Laws 1933, c. 163
(short term notes); N. Y. Laws 1932, cc. 1, 2 (liability incurred for public welfare); Pa.
Laws 1933, p. 1065, No. 249, p. 1066, No. 250 (relief debt); Wis. Laws 1933, c. 382.
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interest,96 as is commonly true of legislation authorizing other bond issues. 7
But whatever immunities refunding bonds possess obtain only insofar as the
bonds remain within the "refunding" category. If the principal amount of
the new issue is greater than that of the old, new "indebtedness" may arise as
to the excess. Under the constitutions9 s of some of the states, the whole new
issue would then presumably have to be approved by the electorate. Or if the
excess, plus other obligations, totals more than the allowed percentage of
property valuation, the entire issue may be void for lack of any divisibility.
Recently imposed constitutional tax limits,99 moreover, while excepting levies
to meet interest on bond issues which fund or refund indebtedness incurred
prior to their adoption, may well be interpreted as preventing taxation above
their limits to pay debt charges on the principal amount by which the new
bonds exceed the old. Such a rule would render difficult any exchange of
bonds that might be necessitated by inability to market the refunding issue,
especially were it desired to fund interest in default and add it to the principal
of the new bonds. Another not illogical restrictive interpretation of the word
"refunding" would exclude that portion of the total amount of refunding bonds
the proceeds of which are used for some purpose other than retirement of the
old issue. Thus, if an issue is refunded by bonds of the same principal sum
but sold at less than par, the amount of the discount may be said to create
new "indebtedness."
These possibilities are implicit in the recent declaratory judgment of the
Michigan Supreme Court 00 construing the fifteen mill tax amendment to the
state constitution. The court declared that charges on funding and refunding
bonds could be met by levies above the tax limit only insofar as the principal
sum was no greater than that of the old issue, and only if the new bonds were
not sold at a discount; any excess, the court held, would have to be absorbed
by other revenues. On the point of sale at less than par the Michigan opinion
is directly contrary to an earlier decision of the Florida Supreme Court' 01
holding that funding bonds authorized to be sold at a discount were within
the constitutional provision excepting "refunding" bonds from the requirement
of electoral approval. Under both the decisions, however, refunding bonds
may carry an interest rate higher than that on the old bonds. The metaphysics
of the Michigan court therefore seem rather devoid of practical effect, for the
only purpose of preventing sale at a discount or of confining the new issue to
96. Notes 94 and 95, supra. Cf. Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So.
211 (1921).
97. E.g., Coro. Com. LAws (1921) § 1991; Colo. Laws 1933, c. 115, § 4; GA. CODE
(Michie, 1926) § 439(34); Ky. STATs. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 3071, 3079, 3261; MICe. CoM ,.
LAWS (1929) §§ 2690, 14706; N. Y. GEN. M-uN. LAW (Cahill, 1930) c. 26, § 8; Omo CODE
(Page, 1926) §§ 3923, 3924, 3926; OxtA. STATS. (1931) §§ 5927, 5928; TENN. CODE (1932)
§ 3698: Txx. REv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 708; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932)
§ 5583-3; W. VA. CODE (1930) c. 13, art. 1, § 21; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) § 22-1605.
98. See note 1, supra.
99. See INCREAxsEs I REVENE, supra IA, note 29.
100. Wilcox v. Board of Commissioners, 262 Mich. 699, 247 N. W. 923 (1933).
101. Sullivan v. City of Tampa, supra note 96.
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the same principal amount as the old, would appear to be to assure the retire-
ment of the old bonds at no additional cost to the municipality. Nevertheless,
some escape from the rigidity of constitutional limits on taxes and debts is prob-
ably essential at the present time; inability to fund and refund obligations
might well precipitate default.
To facilitate forced refunding and compromise agreements statutory assistance
has been made available by some of the state legislatures. Inasmuch as
bondholders cannot be coerced into accepting refunding bonds instead of cash
in payment of interest and principal maturities,' 0 2 several states have sought
to encourage such acceptance by guaranteeing the interest and principal of
refunding issues, 0 3 or by providing for an exchange of state for municipal
bonds. 10 4 In some jurisdictions state commissions have been given plenary
powers over refunding and compromise agreements,'35 while in others pro-
vision has been made for the appointment of receivers upon application of
municipal authorities to effect necessary financial adjustments.'0 6 Either with
this statutory encouragement or in its absence, several types of refinancing have
been attempted. Thus a refunding agreement providing for postponement in the
payment of both the interest and principal on outstanding obligations enabled
Detroit to reduce debt service charges appreciably during its period of emer-
gency; the burden on future taxpayers will be greater, however, by the amount
of the indebtedness thus deferred. 0 7 Another type of compromise, proposed
for Coral Gables, Florida, 0 s would relieve a municipality of a portion of its
debt if it is unable to collect certain delinquent taxes constituting the only
security for that part of the refunding issue the obligation of which is con-
102. Emmett Irrigation District v. McNish, 38 Idaho 241, 220 Pac. 409 (1923); Legis.
(1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1050, 1052. And see RIGHTS or CREDrroRs Arm DEFAULT, infra HiB.
103. See, e.g., Conn. Acts 1933, c. 32a, § 90c (municipal bonds for relief); N. H. Laws
1933, c. 63 (bonds of municipalities in financial straits). But cf. Ky. CoNsT. § 177 (credit
of state not to be given or loaned to municipalities).
104. This has been done in Arkansas, California, Georgia, North Carolina and Texas.
See REDUCTION or ExPE sEs, supra IB, note 30.
105. Mich. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, No. 13 (Debt Commission); N. J. Stat. Serv. 1931,
§ 136-4700(101-103) (M unicipal Finance Commission); N. C. Laws 1931, c. 60 (Public
Debt Commission). See Legis. (1933) 46 HlAv. L. Rlv. 1317, 1320. Cf. Ontario Stat.
1932, c 27; Quebec Acts 1932, c. 56; Saskatchewan Stat. 1930, c. 116 (boards or commis-
sions have power to force adjustment with creditors).
106. Ore. Laws 1933, c. 433; TEx. REV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 830. Cf. Mass. Acts
1931, c. 44, instituting a receivership for the city of Fall River.
107. The city's general indebtedness of $259,000,000, maturing in 1933 and 1934, was
refunded late in 1933 into 20 and 30 year bonds, on which no principal payments were
to be made for two years; the interest in default, plus the difference in the rate of 3%
payable the first 2 years and the average rate of 4.5%, was funded at 3.25%. The city
was thus able to avoid a present burden of about $30,000,000 a year. The cost of retir-
ing the issue in this manner has, however, been estimated at $124,000,000 more than if it
had been retired without refunding. (1933) 22 NAT. Mux. REv. 352; see (1933) 22 id. 573.
108. A small minority of bondholders have failed to deposit their holdings. PuBLIc
ADUrntsTRATION Snwica No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, Appendix B.
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tingent.10 9 But creditors will seldom agree to compromises of this kind unless
it is clear that the financial difficulties of the city are of a serious and perma-
nent nature.
II
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AFTER DEFAULT
The desperate efforts of municipalities to avert defaults by developing
new sources of revenue, by administrative reforms and other reductions of
expenses, and finally by extensive borrowings, have in a great number of
cases been wholly unsuccesful. But it is the unhappy lot of creditors of
municipal corporations that in most cases they are entirely without power
to intervene in the affairs of their debtor until default has actually occurred.'
When default does occur, however, the creditors' rights mature, and it be-
comes important to determine what remedies they have and what control they
may exercise over the affairs of the municipality.
A. ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS
Mandamus. The prerogative writ of mandamus, the traditional remedy of
the holders of obligations of public corporations, is available in theory only
when other legal remedies are inadequate.2  But judgment creditors can have
execution only upon such of a city's properties as are not devoted to a "public
purpose"; and courts have been diligent in finding some semblance of public
use for almost any property upon which creditors seek to levy.3 Garnishment
of a municipality's debtors is apparently subject to similar limitations. 4 In-
deed, the usual remedies of the law profit a city's creditors so little that failure
to resort to them is frequently disregarded by the courts in issuing mandamus.0
109. Under the plan for Coral Gables, creditors would be given $4,000,000 in refund-
ing bonds, sinking fund payments to be deferred six years; and $4,166,000 in "corporate
stock." The interest on the latter would be payable out of revenues from various delin-
quent taxes, special assessments and public utility funds. For other compromise proposals,
see PUBLiC ADvMISNTRATION SERvicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, Appendix B.
1. Where a statute requires an annual levy for repayment of interest and principal of
bonds, however, mandamus will issue to compel such levy even though the debt has not
yet matured. Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N. C. 30,
123 S. E. 636 (1924).
2. Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1867); 6 McQuiLn~, MuNIciPAL.
CospoRAnoNs (2d ed. 1928) § 2705; 2 BAILEY, HABEAS CoRpuus (1913) § 203; FEauus,
EXAoRmnnARY LEGAL RFmamias (1926) § 212. For a collection of cases on remedies of
creditors of municipalities, see Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations
of Public Corporations (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 28; Legis. (1933) 33 id. 1050; Legis. (1933)
46 HARV. L. Rxv. 1317.
3. Fordham, supra note 2, at 29, 30, n. 7-19.
4. Id. at 30-32, n. 20-33.
5. In the case of a bonded debt the validity of which is not in dispute it is not always
necessary to have even a judgment. Little River Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnson, 105
Fla. 212, 141 So. 141 (1932); Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co. of Kansas City v.
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American courts have in fact been exceedingly liberal in granting this "ex-
traordinary" remedy, permitting it at any point at which an official duty may
be clearly discerned. Not only may bondholders force a city treasurer to ful-
fill an already issued order of payment,6 and compel such an order to be issued 7
whether or not funds are available; 8 but the creditors may also require the col-
lection of levied taxes, 9 and even the levy of new assessments10 within the
municipality's constitutional or statutory taxing power. Thus mandamus is in
fact generally available to a city's creditors, and at least when a default results
from dereliction of official duty, or from mere disinclination to pay just debts,
it is entirely adequate.
But in a depression, defaults upon municipal indebtednesses are likely to
arise from inability to pay, rather than from mere unwillingness. Such in-
ability may be legal, or factual, or both. If all of the funds already collected
and in a city's treasury are required for its current operating expenses, courts
will not allow bond or warrant holders to secure payment therefrom." And
if constitutional or statutory tax limits have been reached,' 2 a city will
be entirely without power, and a court cannot compel it, to procure further
Morris, 127 Kan. 283, 273 Pac. 425 (1929). In the Federal courts mandamus may issue
only in aid of a judgment. Wood Brothers Construction Co. v. Yankton County, S. D.,
21 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). And where the law provides that bonds shall be
paid by a tax levy, mandamus after judgment may be the only remedy available. Heine v.
The Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1873).
6. McQuiLzaL, op. cit supra note 2, § 2719, n. 35.
7. Sellers v. Frohmiller, 24 P. (2d) 666 (Ariz. 1933); Beach v. Myll, 264 Mich. 604,
250 N. W. 324 (1933), State ex. rel. Morris v. Clark, 116 Minn. 500, 134 N. W. 129 (1912);
State ex. rel. Newton McDowell, Inc. v. Smith, 67 S. W. (2d) 50 (Mo. 1933); Fordham,
supra note 2, at 37, n. 70; cf. Peters v. State ex. rel. Jaehn, 42 Ohio App. 307, 182 N. E.
139 (1932), where the court refused mandamus for issuance of a warrant on the ground
that the award of the city council, upon which the suit was based, had been unmerited.
8. Symons v. United States ex. rel. Masters, 252 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918);
Robertson v. Board of Library Trustees, 136 Cal. 403, 69 Pac. 88 (1902); see Herdman v.
State ex. rel. Jacobs, 6 Boyce 24, 30, 96 AtI. 199, 202 (Del. 1915). Contra: Board of
Improvements v. McManus, 54 Ark. 446, 15 S. W. 897 (1891); McCaslan v. Major, 64
S. C. 188, 41 S. E. 893 (1902). The question may have particular importance in the event
of warrants Being receivable for taxes, since the fact that they may not be paid is not
then controlling as to their value. Cf. City of Little Rock v. United States ex. rel. Howard,
103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
9. State ex. rel. Vans Agnew v. Johnson, 150 So. 111 (Fla. 1933); Ziccarelli v. Stuckart,
277 111. 26, 115 N. E. 192 (1917); Gunderson v. Young, 48 S. D. 448, 205 N. V. 28
(1925); Stinson v. Godbe, 48 Utah 444, 160 Pac. 280 (1916).
10. 6 McQuILUN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2722, n. 50; Fordham, supra note 2, at 44, n.
119.
11. East St. Louis v. United States ex. rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321 (1884); United
States ex. rel. Stayton v. Paschall, 9 F. (2d) 109 (E. D. Ark. 1925). But a reduction has
been ordered, and the order sustained, where expenses were apparently increased to defeat
the success of a creditor's claim. Deuel County, Nebraska v. First National Bank of
Buchanan County, 86 Fed. 264 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
12. Constitutional and statutory provisions of this nature are collected in Legis. (1934)
47 HARv. L. REv. 688, 689, n. 6, 7.
19341 COMMENTS
YALE LAW JOURNAL
funds in order to pay its debts. 13  Even when the law does not thus complicate
the creditors' rights, exhaustion of taxpayers' resources, depreciated real estate
values, and the sympathy of municipal officials with their debt-ridden neigh-
bors, may make mandamus wholly ineffective. If an increase in the tax rate
will be productive only of further delinquencies, creditors will profit little from
their right to secure mandamus. 14  Nor will foreclosure of tax liens be of bene-
fit; the absence of competitive bidders may compel the city itself to buy in the
land, thus accomplishing only the removal of the property from the tax rolls.'7
Indeed, foreclosure may be precluded by legislative enactment or by the un-
willingness of local officials to eject citizens from their homes. In earlier periods
of financial distress it happened not infrequently that tax collectors and sheriffs
accepted jail sentences for contempt of court rather than obey mandamus
orders issued to compel collection of a new tax.' 6 But such extreme self-
sacrifice is not ordinarily necessary to render a mandamus order innocuous. If
the official to whom the order is directed merely absents himself from the
jurisdiction, the petitioning creditor will be helpless to enforce it until he
returns or until a substitute official has been appointed. If such an appointment
is made the new appointee may in turn leave the state.' 7 And it is all too easy
13. Mandamus may only compel exercise of existing power; it can create no new power
to tax. United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582 (1878); J. B. McCrary Co. v.
Brunson, Mayor, 204 Ala. 85, 85 So. 396 (1920). But where 'the right to tax has not
been fully exercised for several years the court may order that the unexhausted taxing power
that has accumulated during this time shall be exercised in one year even though the
resulting tax exceeds the usual legal limit. Evans v. Yost, 255 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 8th,
1919); cf. Stevenson v. Love, 106 Fed. 466 (C. C. D. N. J. 1901). Cases are collected
and the question more fully discussed in Fordham, supra note 2, at 49-51.
14. "[A] protective ... committee for the city ... where defaulted debt is more
than $7,000,000, obtained a writ of mandamus for the levying of a 100 mill tax . . . The
... Committee for [another city], whose debt is more than $17,000,000, obtained a
writ for the levying of sufficient taxes to pay all past due bonds and coupons . . . about
$6,000,000 ... Such tax collection in a single year was obviously impossible . . . mandamus
writs for heavier taxes are easy to obtain, but there is a point beyond which returns
from higher taxes diminish." (1932) 12 BARuox's (No. 16) 13.
15. INcREAsEs n REavNuEs, supra IA, at p. 929, n. 13.
16. Failure to comply with a mandamus order will subject the recalcitrant officer to
personal liability for the damages thus caused, Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U. S. 136
(1870), or to contempt proceedings. United States v. Green, 53 Fed. 769 (C. C. W. D.
Mo. 1892); In re Copenhaver, 54 Fed. 660 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1893). In St. Clair County,
Missouri, it was at one time a qualification for office that the candidate agree to go to
jail rather than have a hand in tax collection for the purpose of debt payment. In 1932
the Mayor and seven other officials of Hollywood, Florida, were sentenced to thirty days
in jail for refusal to obey a mandamus writ. PUBLic ADIr=sTrATxON SERViCE No. 33,
Municipal Debt Defaudts (1933) 19. Bond litigation has dragged through the courts for
as much as forty-five years with little result. State v. Woodruff, 150 So. 760 (Miss. 1933),
noted in (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 831.
17. A Kansas county chose its officials with the understanding that they should remain
in hiding and appear in the jurisdiction to transact business only at night. PuBlic
ADaSIISmATiON SEWvicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 16, at 13. The general rule is that a writ
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for a city to occasion extensive delays by not appointing or electing persons to
fill the office of tax collector.
Equitable Relief. Nor will equity come to the aid of a city's bond and war-
rant holders, although with mandamus thus ineffective their remedy at law is
hardly adequate. Upon petition by creditors holding a lien upon the property
of a defaulting private corporation, equity will willingly appoint a receiver of
the debtor's business and assets.' 8 Similarly, appointment of a receiver to
conserve the assets of a defaulting public corporation, and to collect revenues
and apply them when proper to the payment of debt charges, might be
granted; 19 for it could be said that real estate taxes and assessments con-
stitute a lien upon the property within a taxing district, and the voters in ap-
proving an issue of bonds so secured may plausibly be deemed to have con-
templated that holders of the bonds should be accorded the usual equitable
remedies. But American courts have not been willing thus to interfere in the
administration of a public corporation. Neither waste and misuse of funds,20
nor refusal of officials to collect taxes,2 ' nor even complete abolition of the
obligated taxing district and failure to elect the officials charged with levy and
collection of taxes,2 2 will entitle creditors of a political subdivision to a receiver
of their debtor.23  It is true that in Iowa and Maryland legislation early re-
lieved creditors of municipalities of this predicament by providing that courts
of equity could appoint officers to perform all the acts required to satisfy a
writ of mandamus. 24  And statutes in a few jurisdictions have authorized ap-
pointment of receivers to collect taxes levied for the payment of a defaulting
drainage or irrigation district's bonds.Y In most states, however, it is still
impossible for a defaulting municipality's creditors to secure payment of their
obligations.
B. READJUSTMIENT OF MUNICIPAL DEBTS: THE DISSENTING CREDITORS
The impasse in which creditors of a city thus find themselves soon indicates
the inevitability of a compromise which will give them an enforceable right
against a public officer runs against the office and does not abate upon his resignation. 6
McQuiLLin, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2733. And in some states resignation does not
become effective until a successor has been appointed or until the statutory term of office
has expired. United States v. Green, supra note 16.
18. 2 CLAK, REc.Vz Rs (2d ed. 1929) § 700.
19. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Allen County, 115
U. S. 550, 561 (1885).
20. Marar v. San Jacinto and P. V. Irrigation District, 131 Fed. 780 (C. C. S. D. Cal.
1904).
21. Thompson v. Allen County, supra note 19.
22. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880).
23. See also Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. 107 (1873); Heine v. The Levee
Commissioners, supra note 5.
24. In Iowa such a provision was enacted in 1S60, now found in IOWA ConE (1931) §
12453. A similar provision, enacted in I88, is to be found in MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby,
1924) art. 75, § 141. In Supervisors of Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1868),
the Court exercised the right granted under the Iowa statute.
25. See statutes collected in Legis. (1933) 46 HAv. L. Rav. 1317, 1320, n. 24.
1934] COMMENTS
YALE LAW JOURNAL
against the city-a conclusion to which city officials in most cases readily assent.
A number of state legislatures have facilitated the negotiations which follow by
authorizing receiverships or by creating commissions with power to control,
among other matters, refunding or compromise agreements; a few statutes pro-
vide that during the period of negotiation the creditors' right to mandamus shall
be suspended.' Many cities and their creditors have agreed upon much needed
readjustments, enabling the former to perform their essential functions and
at the same time to pay their debts as rapidly and as fully as possible. The re-
adjustment plans have called for scaling down of principal obligations, or for
reduction of interest rates, or for mere deferring of payment, as the circurn-
stances of each city have required.2  When acceded to by all creditors, these
agreements have at least provided solutions for the more immediate problems.
But, as in the reorganization of private corporations, difficulty has been en-
countered in dealing with dissenting minorities of bond and warrant holders.
Cooperation may be secured from as many as seventy or eighty per cent of
such creditors, and yet abandonment of the plan made necessary by the de-
fection of the others.3 Enforcement of the terms of the plan against a re-
calcitrant minority encounters the constitutional prohibition against impairing
the obligation of contracts. And mandamus, though ineffective when full pay-
ment is sought by all creditors, becomes, in the hands of a dissenter, a strong
weapon for the obstruction of a readjustment plan; funds intended for a pro
rata payment to all in accordance with the plan may be reached by such a
creditor and made a source for the full payment of his claim.4 Since the
expense of "buying out" the dissenting minorities is in most cases prohibitive,
control of them by law is essential to effective readjustment of municipal debt
structures.
1. Note 6, infra. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals recently upheld the con-
stitutionality of such a statute, the question before the court being the right to stay credi-
tors' remedies against a municipality in the control of a state finance commission. N. Y.
Times, April 13, 1934, at 14.
2. Details of several plans are set out in Appendix A of PuaLic ADarssRATIOrN SERVICE
No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults (1933).
3. Coral Gables, Florida, has perfected a plan whereby $9,000,000 of bonds are to be
replaced by $4,000,000 of bonds and $5,000,000 of "stock" and the city to be limited to
$220,000 a year for current expenses. About 90% of the creditors are favorable to this
plan, but its execution has been delayed by the refusal of the remaining 10% to cooperate
and the inability of the city to secure funds to pay their claims in full. A town in
Alabama, with a debt of $952,000, is reported to have perfected a plan of readjustment
agreeable to creditors holding $950,000 of bonds; but the plan was rendered useless when the
holder of the remaining $2000 brought suit and disrupted the settlement. HEAmaNGs Brxor
SuBco mrEE or m SxATAr Co mrrs or m JuDic my oN S. 1868 msD H. R. 5950,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at 14.
4. Mandamus may not be refused for the reason that only part of the bonds are
represented by the petitioner. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. Snow, 151 So. 393 (Fla.
1933); Territory ex. rel. Parker v. Mayor, 12 N. M. 177, 76 Pac. 283 (1904). And in many
instances full payment of a claim may be enforced from funds on hand even though a
preference over other creditors thereby results. Comment (1933) 21 CALW. L. REv. 161;
Note (1933) 12 ORE. L. REv. 164.
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Restrictions on Mandamus. Perhaps the simplest effective measure for con-
trolling the recalcitrant minority among a municipality's bond and warrant
holders would lie in judicial refusal to grant mandamus at their petition. Man-
damus is traditionally a discretionary writ, and certainly courts could not
exercise their discretion in a cause more socially important than the preserva-
tion of municipal solvency. Nevertheless, during earlier periods of financial
distress the rule was developed that economic emergency and threatened munici-
pal insolvency did not constitute grounds for denying mandamus to a city's
creditors;r" and it has even been said that legislative enactments making these
defenses available to a city would be inoperative.0 A similar attitude has been
taken by most courts considering the question during the present depression.7
It is probable, therefore, that no assurance of control over dissenting creditors
will be found in restrictions upon mandamus.
Eminent Domain. If funds necessary for such a purpose could be procured,
condemnation of the dissenters' bonds by eminent domain might provide an
effective solution to the dilemma. There are no restrictions upon the kind of
property rights which may thus be seized for public purposes. Authority may
be found for condemnation of real property and of appurtenant rights such as
easements and riparian rights,8 tangible personal property,9 contracts of dif-
ferent kinds,10 corporate franchises,"1 shares of stock,' 2 even including the
5. City of Gelena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 (U. S. 1866); City of Little Rock v. United
States, 103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Hammond v. Place, 116 Mich. 628, 74 N. W.
1002 (1898).
6. Previous attempts to restrict creditors' rights against municipalities have been un-
successful. Cf. Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (1880); Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S.
284 (1886). A statutory restriction on mandamus was recently held unconstitutional in
Florida. State ex. rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 150 So. 508 (Fla. 1933). Analogous
laws have, however, been passed elsewhere. N. J. Stat. Serv. (1932) § 136-4700 (352);
N. C. CODE ANN. (Mitchie, Supp. 1933) § 2492 (66).
7. Cf. City of Victor v. Halstead, 84 Colo. 450, 271 Pac. 185 (1928); Dos Amigos, Inc.
v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 1313, 131 So. 533 (1930); see Gillespie v. County of Bay, 151 So. 10
(Fla. 1933) (defaulted instalments prorated over several years on grounds of undue hard-
ship). In New Jersey a mandamus writ against a financially distressed township was re-
fused, apparently on the ground that to grant it would confuse the township's financial
affairs. At the time the township was under supervision of a commission, authorized by
legislation the constitutionality of which had not yet been upheld. Hourigan v. North
Bergen Township in Hudson County, 165 AtI. 74 (N. J. 1933). The constitutionality of the
statute and the decision of this court have been sustained in the state appellate court. See
note 1, supra.
8. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1870); New York Elevated Rr. Co. v. Fifth
National Bank, 217 U. S. 333 (1910); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200
U. S. 527 (1906); State ex. rel. Britton v. Muloy, 61 S. W. (2d) 741 (Mo. 1933).
9. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897); United States v.
New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341 (1923).
10. Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106 (1924); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931) ; In re Opening of Twenty-second Street, 102 Pa.
108 (1883).
11. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (U. S. 1837); West River Bridge
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taking of shares held by a minority in order to effect a railroad readjustment,! 3
and debts, claims and choses in action.14  There would seem to be little dif-
ficulty in meeting the one requirement that the taking be for a public use; 'x
it has frequently been declared that "public use" is practically synonymous
with public benefit. 16 The exercise of eminent domain would, it is true, require
available funds for payment of the dissenters; compensation must be given for
all property condemned. 17 Backers of the readjustment plan would gain, how-
ever, in that the condemned bonds or warrants would be purchased or paid not
at their par but at their market value.' 8 But even if this approximate equivalent
of enforcement of the readjustment plan could be financed by a defaulting muni-
cipality and its creditors, a further obstacle would be found in the fact that
eminent domain proceedings could reach only bonds or warrants, or their
holders, within the same state. Insofar as a debt may be said to have a situs
apart from the domicile of the creditor, such situs would presumably be that
of the physical evidence of the indebtedness; 19 it would be difficult to sustain
Co. v. DEx, 6 How. 507 (U. S. 1848); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.
S. 650 (1885).
12. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424, 37 At. 1070
(1897); People ex. rel. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475 (1879); Spencer v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. Co., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (1904); see Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523,
159 N. E. 55 (1927); 1 LEwis, EM NNT DomAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 216.
13. Offield v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co., 203 U. S. 372 (1906).
14. Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 224 (1866); Dunlap v. Toledo & A. A. Rr. Co., 50
Mich. 470, 15 N. W. 555 (1883); see Chemical Foundation, Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 29 F. (2d) 597 (D. Del. 1923); City of Phoenix v. Dickson, 40 Ariz. 403,
12 P. (2d) 618 (1932).
15. 1 Lawis, op. cit. supra note 12, § 250.
16. Cf. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., supra note 8. In neither of these cases was the condemned property to be used by the
general public; it was in fact used by individuals. But the state legislature had declared
that to take property for some of the basic industries of the state was to take it for public
use, apparently on the theory that encouraging these industries enhanced the general
prosperity. The constitutionality of this taking was upheld by both state and federal
courts. Further cases are collected in 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 12, § 257, n. 26-30. On
the other hand it may be argued that "public use" should include only a use made
directly by the general public, such as a right of way [id. § 258], and it has been held
that property must be directly taken by the public or by public agencies, and that public
use and public welfare are not the same. Cf. Arnsberger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 61
Atl. 413 (1905); In re Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429
(1888); Wisconsin River Improvement Co. v. Pier, 137 Wis. 325, 118 N. W. 857 (1908).
17. Both federal and state constitutions forbid taking of private property without
compensation. The constitutional provisions are collected in 1 Lwis, op. cit. supra note
12, §§ 9-61.
18. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878); Boston Chamber of Commerce v.
Boston, 217 U. S. 189 (1910).
19. "Where a right is, by the law which created it, embodied in a document, the right
is subject to the jurisdiction of the state which has jurisdiction over the document." CON-
fLiCT op LAws RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 56. Under Section 56 the comment is
that "A bond or a negotiable instrument, a so-called specialty, is a document embodying
a right; and the state which has jurisdiction of the document has jurisdiction of the right."
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an in rem action against the creditor in a state having no basis for jurisdiction
other than that it is the debtor's domicile.20  Of course, as soon as a non-
resident creditor came within the state to seek payment of his claim, an alert
city attorney might institute an eminent domain proceeding with jurisdiction
based upon personal service. But the cooperating majority of a city's creditors
would hardly be willing to carry out a readjustment plan with no more certain
control over the dissenters than this.
Emergency Police Power. The most effective solution of the problem pre-
sented by the minority creditors lies in enforcement against them of the terms of
the readjustment plan. Such enforcement by authority of state statutes would
presumably be permitted as against creditors who became such after enactment
of the statute; analogy could be drawn to similar legislation dealing with the
reorganization of banks, 21 and to the cases holding that legislation to have been
incorporated into the contracts of subsequent creditors.22  But even a statute
thus upheld would perhaps prove inadequate as a solution of municipal prob-
lems, for the theory that a state cannot carry its legislation beyond its own
bounds might preclude enforcement against non-resident creditors.23  The im-
mediate problem of American cities, however, arises not from prospective in-
ability to reach future creditors, but from the prohibition which the Contract
Clause of the Constitution places upon the enforcement of a readjustment plan
against persons now holding municipal bonds, notes and warrants. A possible
escape from this prohibition is suggested by the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in People of New York v. Title & Guarantee Mortgage Co.
of Buffalo.24  The Schackno Act had authorized the enforcement against all
creditors of mortgage guaranty companies of reorganization plans approved by
two-thirds of their creditorsP- The Court of Appeals upheld the statute, even
as against creditors who acquired their claims prior to its enactment, upon the
ground that the law did not unreasonably impair "substantial" rights, and that
circumstances exist which warrant some subordination of individual rights to
social good. There is, however, some basis for the contention that this de-
cision would not justify similar impairment of the rights of a city's dissenting
creditors. It may be argued that since a private corporation's ability to pay is
defined by a limited and ascertainable amount of assets, its creditors' actual
rights are likewise limited; a municipality's assets, on the other hand, are
theoretically unlimited. Thus whereas it may be said that in the former case a
reorganization plan merely re-states nominal rights in terms of actual rights,
20. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
21. These statutes are collected in Legis. (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 1395.
22. Hoff v. First State Bank of Watson, 174 Minn. 36, 218 N. W. 238 (1928); Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank v. Tomlinson, 55 S. D. 185, 225 N. W. 305 (1929); cases cited in
Comment (1933) 32 MICH. L. REv. 221, 222, n. 7-9. Cf. McConville v. Fort Pierce Bank
& Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931); Dorman v. Dell, 245 Ky. 34, 52 S. W. (2d)
892 (1932).
23. Beers v. Haughton, Fed. Cas. No. 1230 (C. C. D. Ohio 1834); Hornick, More &
Porterfield v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 55 S. D. 18, 227 N. W. 375 (1929).
24. N. Y. Times, March 20, 1934, at 15. The case is noted in (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1007.
25. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745.
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readjustment of a municipal obligor's debts clearly constitutes an actual de-
privation of the creditors' property. The fact that, whatever the theory, a city's
assets are not in fact unlimited perhaps affords sufficient answer to such an
argument; but the complete dependence of the decision upon the existing
emergency as the basis of constitutionality makes it at best an uncertain and
tentative method of controlling a city's dissenting creditors.
The Sumners Bill.* With state authorities thus restricted in their power to
enforce a municipality's readjustment plan, the proposal has been made that
recourse be had to the constitutional power of the Congress to pass uniform
laws upon the subject of bankruptcies. The present Bankruptcy Act expressly
excludes municipal corporations from its purview.2 6 Amendment of the Act
by the addition of new sections providing for the reorganization of munici-
pal debts has accordingly been urged; and in June, 1933, a billCT designed
to effect such an amendment, sponsored by Representative Sumners of Texas, 28
was passed by the House and sent to the Senate for consideration. The im-
portance of this proposed legislation warrants an extended examination and
criticism of it.
The Sumners Bill, declaring a national emergency to exist,20 provides that
any political subdivision or taxing district30 may file a petition with the bank-
ruptcy court of the district in which it 3' is located; such petition must allege
that the district is "insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature," and
that holders of at least 30 per cent of its bonds, notes, or certificates of in-
debtedness consent in writing to the filing of the petition and signify either their
willingness that a readjustment plan be drawn up or their approval of a plan
submitted by the petitioner with the petition 32 These allegations may be
denied, and the district's right to file the petition put in issue, by holders of
*The Sumners Bill and related problems are also discussed at pages 989, 997, and 1005,
infra.
26. § 4 (a) (b), 36 STAT. 839 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 22 (a) (b) (1926).
27. H. R. 5950, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
28. This legislation originated as H. R. 3083, an intermediate revision appearing as
H. R. 5267. The bill has been called the Wilcox-Bll, the Fletcher Bill, the Wilcox-
Fletcher Bill, and finally the Sumners Bill. Senator Ashurst's amendment appears as S.
1868. On May 1, 1934, the Senate adopted the McCarran amendment. This differs from
the Sumners Bill chiefly in allowing a city to file a petition only when it has already
secured the approval of 51% of its creditors to a readjustment plan.
29. Inclusion of the emergency provision probably implies doubt as to the constitution-
ality of the amendment. This doubt seems unwarranted. See notes 50-53, infra, and text to
which they are cited. The accompanying provision limiting operation of the amendment
to two years is, upon this theory, unnecessary.
30. "Including (but not hereby limiting the generality of the foregoing) any county,
city, borough, village, parish, town, or township, unincorporated tax or special assessment
district, and any school, drainage, irrigation, levee, sewer, or paving, sanitary, port, improve-
ment or other districts."
31. "Or the major part thereof."
32. A list of the names and addresses of all known creditors must accompany the peti-
tion. And see note 28, supra.
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at least 5 per cent of the bonds, notes, or certificates of indebtedness; the bank-
ruptcy judge is authorized to decide without the aid of a jury whether the
proofs sustain the allegations, and hence whether the petition should be dis-
missed or approved. If it is approved, the court assumes full powers of courts
of bankruptcy under voluntary petitions. The judge may enjoin proceedings
against the taxing district in other courts;33 and he may direct the rejection in
whole or in part of executory contracts upon which the district is obligated,3 4
the resulting breach giving the holder of the contract a provable claim for
damages. But the judge may not interfere with any of the political powers of
the taxing district, nor with any of its properties or revenues that are required
for essential governmental purposes, nor with any revenue-producing property
of the district.35 At any time during the proceedings,36 10 per cent of the
creditors whose claims would be affected by the plan, or the taxing district
itself may submit a readjustment plan.3 7 The bankruptcy judge is required to
dismiss the proceedings if no plan is submitted within six months of the filing
of the petition,38 or if no plan is approved and accepted within a year from the
same date; but the latter period may be extended for an additional year if the
judge finds it necessary to do so. A readjustment plan approved by holders of
not less than 30 per cent of the outstanding bonds, notes and certificates of
indebtedness of the taxing district may be put into temporary effect by an
interlocutory decree of the court, to remain in force until a plan is finally
confirmed or the proceedings dismissed; 3 9 but if a budget has been adopted in
33. In addition to the usual bankruptcy powers and the express power to stay any
action against a taxing district on account of its indebtedness, the bankruptcy judge may
"enjoin or stay, until after final decree, the commencement or continuance of any judicial
proceeding to enforce any lien or to enforce any levy of taxes." State statutes may authorize
courts or commissions to restrict the creditors' right to ordinary remedies, but not their
right to secure mandamus. See note 7, supra. But the proposal to allow federal restriction
of the latter remedy would presumably be sustained because of the paramountcy of the
federal bankruptcy power.
34. No restrictions upon this power are stated; contracts dealing with any phase of
municipal administration, whether related to credit problems or not, may presumably, there-
fore, be escaped.
35. "Unless the plan of readjustment so provides."
36. And regardless of whether a plan was submitted with the petition. See note 28, supra.
37. A plan "(1) shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors
generally, or of any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through the issuance of new
securities of any character or otherwise; and (2) may contain such other provisions and
agreements, not inconsistent with this chapter, as the parties may desire." No reason
occurs for thus requiring alteration of creditors' rights.
38. Since proof of the allegations necessary in the petition might occupy considerable
time, particularly in the case of large cities, approval of a contested petition might not be
secured within this six-month period; at best the time allowed would be appreciably re-
duced by a contest of the petition. See p. 977, infra. This difficulty would be obviated if
the period were to run from approval of the petition, rather than from its filing. Yet the
further delay which would be thus sanctioned would hardly be desirable.
39. The permission thus granted to reduce budgets and levies when the consent of
less than one third of the bondholders (the third need not even be of all creditors) has
been secured, seems of questionable wisdom.
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reliance upon such a temporary plan, dismissal during the budget year is for-
bidden.40  Final confirmation is permitted only when a readjustment plan has
been approved by two-thirds of each class of creditors adversely affected by it,,"
and by the district. And before confirming a plan, the judge must determine,
among other things, that it is "fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the
creditors, and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors,
and is fairly based upon the reasonable capacity of the taxing district to pay,
and is feasible, '42 that all of the expenses of the readjustment have been dis-
closed, and are reasonable; and that the taxing district is authorized by law
to take all action necessary to carry out the plan. Upon confirmation, the
essential purpose of the proceedings is to be realized: the readjustment plan
becomes binding upon all creditors, regardless of whether they have filed their
claims or of whether they have accepted the plan, and upon the taxing dis-
trict. The final section of the bill provides that its enactment shall not impair
in any way state administrative supervision or control of political subdivisions;
and if such supervision of fiscal affairs is provided, no petition may be filed,
and no plan put into temporary or permanent operation, without the approval
of the state supervisory agency.
The constitutionality of the proposal has been questioned,'3 upon the grounds
that the bankruptcy power may be exercised by the federal government only in
behalf of persons who are insolvent, that the subject of bankruptcies extends
only to proceedings looking to the surrender of the debtor's assets for distribu-
tion to his creditors and to discharge of the debtor, and that the proposed amend-
ment interferes with the states' right to control their own political subdivisions.
None of these grounds is persuasive. It is true that if a taxing district may be
said to have assets equaling the value of taxable properties within its bound-
aries, it could hardly become insolvent in the bankruptcy sense;4 4 moreover, a
petitioning district need not even allege "insolvency," since inability "to meet
its debts as they mature" alone qualifies it under the Sumners Bill. But the
practical as well as existing legal limitations upon municipal tax rates suggest
40. It is unfortunate that this prohibition was made absolute. The judge would pre-
sumably have the power granted even without its express allowance. But if the provision
is to be included, mere authorization to continue the interlocutory decree in force during
the budget year would accomplish the same purpose without tying the judge's hands when
circumstances do not warrant such a continuation.
41. Consent is not required of creditors "(a) whose claims are not affected by the plan,
or (b) if the plan makes provision for the payment of their claims in cash in full, or (c) if
provision is made in the plan for the protection of the interests, claims, or liens of such
creditors or class of creditors."
42. Such redundancy seems unnecessary.
43. Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy Jurisdiction be Extended to Include Municipalities and
Other Taxable Subdivisions (1933) 19 A. B. A. 3. 637; Morford, Federal Legislation for
Corporate Reorganization; A Negative View (1933) 19 id. 702, 703; Stebbins, Constitution-
ality of the Recent Amendment to the Bankruptcy Law (1933) 17 MAQUETT L. REv.
161; James A. McLaughlin, HEAI GS BEFORE SUBCOMAITTEE OF THE COMITTE ON THE
JUDIcARY ON S. 1868 AND H. R. 5950, op. cit. supra note 3, at 126 et seq.
44. § 1 (15) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (15) (1926).
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that the aggregate of a taxing district's assets is in fact its current revenues
and not the total of its taxable property, 45 so that insolvency is far from im-
possible. And in any event, insolvency is not a prerequisite of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. A voluntary petition may be filed under Section 4 of the Act by
"any person," without regard to his solvency; 46 an involuntary petition based
upon an assignment for the benefit of creditors is good even though the debtor
be solvent both at the time of the assignment and at the time the petition is
filed against him; 47 and an "involuntary" petition may be based upon the
debtor's written admission of "his inability to pay his debts.1'4s Nor is the
composition contemplated by the Sumners Bill in excess of the bankruptcy
power. The privilege of working out a composition agreement uhder the pro-
tection of the bankruptcy court, and of enforcing it against minority creditors,
was granted debtors by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, and is now available
through Sections 12 and 14 of the present Act.49 The case of In re Reiman,50
decided in 1874, definitely established that these composition provisions are
properly included in the subject of bankruptcies. 51 Unless, therefore, the fact
that the debtor is a political subdivision of a state is fatal, there should be little
doubt as to the constitutionality of the Sumners Bill. Too much federal control
over local units of government would, of course, be invalid. 52  But it may be
45. See discussion of INcRExsEs in REvssc-zs, supra IA.
46. 36 STAT. 839 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 22 (a) (1926); In re Foster Paint and Varnish
Co., 210 Fed. 652 (E. D. Pa. 1914).
47. § 3a (5) of the Act, 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. Sup'. VII § 21a (5) (1933);
George M. West Co. v. Lea Brothers & Co., 174 U. S. 590 (1899).
48. § 3a (6) of the Act, 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. Supp. VII § 21a (6) (1933).
While the language quoted is similar in purport to that of the Sumners Bill, the Act requires
that an involuntary petition based upon this subdivision of Section 3a also allege the debtor's
written consent that he be adjudged a bankrupt. In re Erie City Airport, Inc., 44 F. (2d)
673 (W. D. Pa. 1930). This involuntary petition thus closely resembles a voluntary
petition. GILBERT, COLLER ON BANKRUpTcy (2d ed. 1931) 124. The 1933 bankruptcy
amendment permits reorganization of a railroad that is, as the Sumners Bill requires peti-
tioning taxing districts to be, "insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature." 47 STAT.
1467 (1933), 11 U. S. C. Supp. VII § 201-205 (1933). See Rodgers and Groom, Reorgan-
ization of Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 571, 575 et seq.; Legis. (1933) 33 id. 704, 706; Weiner, Reorganization under Sec-
tion 77: a Comment (1933) 33 id. 834, 845 et seq.; Note (1933) 28 Irm. L. REv. 398; Com-
ment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 387; Garison, The Power of Congress over Corporate Re-
organizations (1933) 19 VA. L. Rv. 343.
49. 30 STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §§ 30, 32c (1926).
50. Fed. Cas. No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874), aff'd, No. 11,675 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875).
51. The Supreme Court has not passed upon the validity of the composition sections, and
the lower courts have assumed the correctness of the Reinan case. Even if bankruptcy
contemplates a cessa bonarum [Meyers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S. 380 (1927);
In re Klein, Fed. Cas. No. 7,865 (C. C. D. Mo. 1843); In re Adler, 103 Fed. 444 (W. D.
Tenn. 1900)], composition agreements can be upheld, since they involve a surrender by
the debtor of his assets. In re Reiman, supra note 50.
52. Cf. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); 1 WILLoUGBY, CON-
sITUTION or THE UNITED STATEs (2d ed. 1929) §§ 68, 97, and cases cited.
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observed that Congress, not the Constitution, excepted municipal corporations
from the purview of the Bankruptcy Act as it now reads. And a statute merely
enabling a taxing district to place itself within the jurisdiction of the federal
bankruptcy court, while preserving the political powers of that taxing district
and requiring its consent to any readjustment plan, would not appear to en-
croach seriously upon state sovereignty. Furthermore, the Sumners Bill is
careful to respect state control over political subdivisions, even to the extent of
permitting the state to forbid its governmental units to resort to the bankruptcy
court.53 The conclusion therefore seems justified that the Sumners Bill is
constitutional in its utilization of the bankruptcy discharge as a means of en-
forcing comp6sition agreements between taxing districts and their creditors.
Criticism of the Sumners Bill should begin with full recognition that some
method of enforcing readjustments of municipal debt structures against
minority creditors seems essential, and that utilization of the federal bank-
ruptcy power appears to be the most feasible device for accomplishing such
enforcement. In its essential purpose, therefore, the bill promises highly
desirable relief for distressed municipalities. A study of its mechanics and
draftsmanship, however, prompts the conclusion that the bill is not in fit
shape effectively to serve in aid of the reorganization of municipal finances.
Judging from repeated statements of its proponents, the bill has been drafted
on the general notion that creditors and representatives of the debtor taxing
district will draw up around a table and promptly agree upon a plan of debt
readjustment; that only when a "recalcitrant minority" of the creditors
threatens the plan will the new legislation show its teethP4 This picture, as
reference to known comparable experience makes clear, is an aggravated
over-simplification of such proceedings. The process of reorganizing private
corporations including railroads and other utilities, affords the closest
analogy. Indeed, the Summers Bill, by its affirmative provisions and by its
failure to provide necessary safeguards, contemplates for municipal debt
reorganization many of the more objectionable features of traditional corpor-
ate reorganization through equity receivership.
Dissatisfaction with equity reorganization procedure has frequently been
53. "(1) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the
power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof
in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor, and
including the power to require the approval by any governmental agency of the State of
the filing of any petition hereunder and of any plan of readjustment, and whenever there
shall exist or shall hereafter be created under the law of any State any agency of such
State authorized to exercise supervision or control over the fiscal affairs of all or any
political subdivisions thereof, and whenever such agency has assumed such supervision or
control over any political subdivision, then no petition of such political subdivision may be
received hereunder unless accompanied by the written approval of such agency, and no plan
of readjustment shall be put into temporary effect or finally confirmed without the written
approval of such agency of such plans."
54. See, for example, the remarks of Representative Sumners, HnuAoIGs BEFORE Sun-
coararT E oF THE SENATE CoMArrrz ON THE JUDIIARY ON S. 1868 AND H. R. 5950, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 24, 59.
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expressed because it defers impartial scrutiny of the fairness of a plan until
the reorganization has been virtually consummated. Origination and pro-
motion of the plan is left entirely to the debtor and to the usual retinue of
bondhouses, bond "specialists," "committees," and lawyers. When the
formal consent of a formal majority"0 of the creditors has been secured,
the parties return to court and seek enforcement of the plan against dissenters
by means of a judicial sale. 7 And in passing upon the reorganization at
that time the principal concern of the court is with the determination of a
fair upset price rather than with the terms of the plan adopted58 That such
a procedure may not adequately protect minority interests has long been
recognized. 9  Even more important, however, is the almost complete absence
of protection for any public interest that may be involved, a difficulty which
has been conspicuous in the costly failures and reorganizations of railroads.
The first attempt to take control of railroad reorganizations from the bank-
ers took the form of supervision by the Interstate Commerce Commission
over all railroad security issues.60 But the measure proved ineffective.61
Accordingly, in providing last year for bankruptcy reorganizations of rail-
roads, Congress required submission of the plan to the Commission "before
creditors and stockholders of the debtor are asked finally to accept" it, and
directed the Commission thereupon, after hearing, to "recommend a plan of
reorganization (which may be different from any which has been pro-
posed) .,,62
Even more than in the reorganization of railroads the public interest
demands protection in the formulation and adoption of a municipal debtor's
readjustment plan. Yet the Sumners Bill, taking no account of this fact,
entrusts a distressed city's financial future to the hazards of a bargain driven
by a helpless debtor with creditors who have every incentive to bleed the
city without regard either to its public duties during the operation of the
55. See discussion in LowENTH., THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933) 368 et seq.; dissent of
Commissioner Eastman in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Reorganization, 131 I. C. C.
673, 711 (1928); Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganization (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 541, 565.
56. See McLaughlin, HEARIos BzroRE SuBcomIT-rTE or r SENATE COIMITTEE oN
THE JuDicARY oN S. 1868 AND H. R. 5950, op. cit. supra note 3, at 126, 128.
57. For descriptions of the procedure in reorganizations through receiverships, see
LowENr mL, op. cit. supra note 55; Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1917)
17 COL. L. REv. 523.
58. See discussions cited note 55, supra. The importance of focusing judicial attention
upon the sale received emphasis in First National Bank v. Flershem, 54 Sup. Ct. 298 (1934).
59. See Frank, supra note 55; LowENTHAL, loc. cit. supra note 55.
60. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (1926).
61. Principally because the Commission's powers were vague, and could not be exer-
cised until too late in the reorganization proceedings. Note (1931) 44 HAiv. L. REv. 838;
dissent of Commissioner Eastman in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Reorganization,
supra note 55.
62. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. Supp. VII § 205 (1933). See discuzirons cited
in note 48, supra.
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plan or to its financial condition at the termination of such operation. Cer-
tainly the requirement of approval by two-thirds of the creditors, though
perhaps an adequate check against any lack of formal integrity in a read-
justment plan, affords small protection for the interest of the public in the
necessary services of a municipal government. The "honestly selfish" demands
of adverse claimants do not inspire reliance upon them as public fiduciaries.
And the taxing district's weakness in bargaining strength when bankers
and bondhouses submit and insist upon a completed plan, and its possi-
ble irresponsibility in financial management warrant an equal lack of con-
fidence in it. If, therefore, the effect of a reorganization plan upon a mun-
icipality's ability properly to perform its essential functions of government
is to receive careful consideration under the procedure afforded by the Sum-
ners Bill, it can only be at the hands of the bankruptcy judge. Provision
is made, it is true, for hearings upon the plan or plans submitted. But while
these hearings promise a welter of advocacy, little clarification upon other
than predominantly legal issues may be anticipated. Enlightenment upon
the effect of a readjustment plan on all the details of municipal administra-
tion will be more difficult to procure. Indeed, in expressly permitting the
taxing district to be heard upon all questions, and in requiring creditors to
secure leave to intervene before they may be heard upon any question other
than the proposed confirmation of a plan, the bill by inference excludes the
allowance of a hearing to taxpayers, voters, boards performing municipal
services, and others whose criticism of the reorganization plan would not be
based upon a pecuniary interest. The conclusion seems required that the
Sumners Bill makes inadequate provision for protection of the public interest.
Criticism of reorganizations through receivership has also centered upon
the expensiveness of such proceedings. The fees of receivers, attorneys,
appraisers, and others frequently mount into the tens of thousands,63 and
sometimes the hundreds of thousands. 4 The Sumners Bill places no restric-
tions on the size of these fees, or upon who may receive them; instead the
bill expressly authorizes the judge to "allow a reasonable compensation for
the services rendered and reimbursement for the actual and necessary ex-
penses incurred in connection with the proceedings, and the payment of
special masters, readjustment managers and committees or other representa-
tives of creditors of the taxing district, and the attorneys or agents of any
of the foregoing." And "appeals may be taken, from the orders making
such allowances, to the circuit court of appeals . . . independently of other
appeals which may be taken in the proceedings, and such appeals shall be
heard summarily." No fees shall be assessed against the taxing district
63. Douglas and Weir, Equity Receiverships in the United States District Court for
Connecticut (1930) 4 CoiNx. BAR J. 1.
64. N. Y. World, Feb. 17-28, 1924. The expensiveness of the reorganization of the
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company has been much publicised. See
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Reorganization, supra note 55; United States v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Rr. Co., 282 U. S. 311 (1931); LowENTHAL, op. cit. supra
note 55.
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"except in the manner and in such sums, if any, as may be provided for in
the plan of readjustment." Thus not only does the proposed statute permit
large reorganization expenses; it even enables the claimants therefor to carry
their demands to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and to hold up the operation
of the readjustment plan until provision is made for their payment. Any
hope that in requiring the judge's approval of these allowances the bill
assures their reasonableness is negatived by the fact that similar powers of
judicial scrutiny have had little effect upon the large fees characteristic of
equity reorganizations. The suggestion65 that the taxing district by refusing
to accede to a plan may compel the reduction of exhorbitant fees is not per-
suasive; when committees of bondholders and bankers present but a single
plan, and when resistance will in any event involve heavy additional expense,
even competent and conscientious taxing district officials will see the hand-
writing on the wall.
In other respects also the Sumners Bill is subject to criticism. Leisurely
negotiations followed by interminable hearings and persistent contests over
every technicality, have made delay a much criticized 6 but perhaps largely
inevitable characteristic of equity reorganizations. Where large interests are
at stake, as will be true in the readjustment of many municipal debt struc-
tures, reorganization proceedings drag on for long periods of time. Far from
providing machinery that could avoid such of these delays as are unneces-
sary, the Sumners Bill offers new opportunities for consumption of time.
The lack of precision that appears in many of the bill's provisions will per-
mit repeated demands for judicial construction. And several administrative
provisions will prove time-consuming. Cumbersome municipal accounting
systems will make a speedy determination of insolvency, whatever the appli-
cation of that term to taxing districts may be held to mean, difficult if not
impossible. Procuring the consent of creditors to a contest of the petition's
allegations, or to the submission of a readjustment plan, may necessitate long
delays; so also may the determination of whether creditors consenting to
these matters, or to the original filing of a petition, constitute the required
percentages of all the creditors. Whether various creditors are "adversely
affected" by a plan, and if so, how they should be classified, as well as
numerous other matters, may be decided by the bankruptcy judge only after
hearing preceded by notice to interested parties. The Sumners Bill, it is
true, requires dismissal of the entire proceedings if no readjustment plan is
approved within a maximum of two years from the filing 67 of the petition.
But the desirability of the provision, standing alone, is open to grave ques-
65. Statement of Representative Wilcox, HxAuwcS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SEN-
ATE CoMuTTEE ON THE JuDIClAY ON S. 1868 AND H. R. 5950, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 145.
66. Douglas and Weir, supra note 63, at 8; Swain, Economic Aspects of Railroad Receiv-
erships, in 3 EcoNonIc STUDIES (1898) 53; statement of Professor W. A. Sturges, HnARiGs
BEFORE SUBCO-fMTTEE OF THE SENATE COM"ITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1868 AIND
H. R. 5950, op. cit. supra note 3, at 100-101.
67. See note 38, supra.
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tion. 68 It superimposes an arbitrary time limit on the proceedings while
the rest of the bill necessitates protracted negotiations. Consequently it may
induce hasty and ill-considered action upon essential but highly complex
issues.
Employees of the city are entirely excluded from readjustment proceedings
by the Sumners Bill; their claims may not be filed along with those of other
creditors, and no provision is made for a hearing upon their rights. This
discrimination seems grossly unfair. While all other creditors may prove
their claims, only the required percentages of bond and note holders need
consent to filing of the petition, contests of its allegations, or to temporary
adoption of a readjustment plan. The exclusion of other classes of creditors
may be designed to avoid difficulties in ascertaining a taxing district's total
indebtedness for purposes of calculating the designated percentages; but it
is probably to be explained rather as evidence of undue concern for a single
class of creditors.
Finally, the general rationale of the Sumners Bill is clouded by obscurity.
A properly qualified taxing district may file a voluntary petition to effect
a readjustment of its debts; the readjustment plan shall be "fairly based
upon the reasonable capacity of the ta-ng district to pay." These provi-
sions hint at relief of distressed municipal debtors and through them of
taxpayers, allegedly the dominant purpose of the bill.69 Yet the "protection"
accorded bondholders greatly blurs this purpose. The district can file such
a voluntary petition only if 30 per cent of its bondholders agree; and 5 per
cent of the bondholders may contest the allegations of the petition. These
provisions manifest more solicitude for creditors than for the taxing district.
On the other hand, the bill provides no constructive remedy for creditors of
a taxing district that is not disposed to work with creditors in meeting the
emergency. Apparently there was fear that a provision authorizing invol-
untary proceedings against such a taxing district would be unconstitutional.
The fear does not seem warranted. There can be no question but that in-
voluntary proceedings as much as voluntary proceedings constitute a proper
exercise of the power of Congress over the subject of brankruptcies. Upon the
score of interference with states' rights, as stated above, the provisions for-
bidding the bankruptcy court to interfere with "any of the political or govern-
mental powers of the taxing districts," and the section giving full effect to any
state control or supervision of political subdivisions," would appear to afford
ample assurance of constitutionality.
68. There is some ground for believing that this limitation was not included in order
to expedite the readjustment proceedings, but rather for the sake of consistency with the
emergency provision limiting the operation of the amendment. Cf., however, note 29,
supra. Yet the purpose for which such a limitation was included would not determine
its actual effect.
69. Statement of Representative Wilcox, HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE Or THE SEN-
ATE COMlaiTTEE ON THE JUDICIARy ON S. 1863 AD H. R. 5950, op. cit. supra note 3, at 33.
70. See note 53, supra.
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III
EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPERVISION OF LOCAL CREDIT
Section 80 (h) of the Sumners Bill provides that upon the entry of a decree
discharging a taxing district from its debts except in accordance with a plan
of readjustment, "the jurisdiction of the court in the proceedings shall cease."
Limitations upon federal powers probably necessitate some such surrender of
control in this or any similar amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Yet protec-
tion of the public interest is as essential upon the consummation of a city's
readjustment of its debts as it is in the plan's formulation. The readjust-
ment provisions may be so severe and inflexible that a municipality will
be financially unable to respond to unforeseen needs of the community it serves,
needs which are necessarily fluctuating and uncertain. And even if further
borrowing, other than to refund existing debts, is permitted under the readjust-
ment plan, the control of the city's purse-strings established by the bankers and
other creditors who dictated the terms of the readjustment might deter other in-
vestors from extending credit. A monopoly of the city's financing, with com-
plete control of terms in the lenders, would thus result. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that confirmation of a plan of readjustment by a court of bank-
ruptcy would offer no assurance that the indebted taxing district would not im-
mediately, or at least upon the termination of the operation of the plan, resume
the practices and policies that brought it into financial difficulty or made it
easier prey thereto. A readjustment plan may provide for strict supervision of
municipal finances for a period following discharge; on the other hand, it may
concern itself only with a realignment of the city's debts, with no attempt
at even temporary financial reformation. In any event, it can set up no per-
manent machinery to insure the continued availability of low-cost borrowing,
avoidance of future defaults, or even, perhaps, complete fulfillment of the terms
of the readjustment plan itself. Yet from the point of view of the public in-
terest of the entire state, the most important aspect of a city's financial
readjustment is not the mere solution of the immediate problems of actual
default, but the establishment and maintenance in the future of a sound finan-
cial structure. The present depression has amply demonstrated that the poor
credit standing of one city taints that of all other public borrowers within the
state, including the state itself.' And the effect of financial mismanagement
upon investors, some of them savings banks, insurance companies and other
quasi-public institutions, is dearly of general concern.2 It should be a matter
of state public policy, therefore, that any plan for rehabilitating a city's credit
structure should include in addition to an enforceable compromise agreement
a constructive solution of its basic financial difficulties.
Recognition by state governments of their vital interest in municipal credit
1. See Bond Buyer, Jan. 2, 1932, at 5.
2. See PUBLIc AnmnSTRAT oN SRvicz No. 33, Municipal Debt Defaults (1933) 2;




and of the utter inability of local officials, for reason either of politics3 or of
downright incompetence,4 to conduct their financial affairs efficiently, early
led to the adoption of statutory and constitutional debt and tax limits, debt
referendum requirements, and restrictions upon the purposes for which indebted-
ness might be incurred. 6 But the gross inefficacy and even the viciousness of
limiting tax rates and indebtedness to a designated percentage of assessed valu-
ations has become common knowledge.7 Such limitations are hopelessly hap-
hazard even in theory. In prescribing uniformly for all taxing districts, or even
for all those similarly classed, they disregard the infinite variations that may
affect the financial requirements and resources of individual communities; in
providing the same limits from year to year and from decade to decade, they
ignore wide fluctuations in economic conditions and the steady increases in
municipal functions demanded by rising standards of living. The attempted
uniformity and inflexibility of these provisions becomes even more incongruous
in the light of variations in assessment bases between cities and from time to
time within a single city. Moreover, the absence of relationship between assessed
valuations on the one hand and a municipality's need for improvements, its
ability to finance them, and its ability and willingness to repay upon the other,
renders such restrictions wholly arbitrary; necessary and proper investments are
as much precluded as are waste and extravagance.8 If the limits are too high,
they constitute an invitation to levy the maximum of taxes and to incur the
maximum of indebtedness. If too low they lead to evasions and subterfuges,
chief of which have been the multiplication of taxing districts within the same
geographical boundaries; 9 new avenues are thereby opened to mismanagement
of local finances and abuse of local credit, and tax burdens are raised to im-
possible heights. Yet when taxpayers respond to the viciousness of such over-
lapping taxation by adopting blanket tax limits, the resulting rigidity may vir-
tually prevent all municipal borrowing and seriously limit the ability of the
city to perform essential functions of government. 10
3. SEcRIST, Ax ECONomc ANALYSIs OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RxEsTRicTioNs UWo PUBLIC
INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1914) 104; PuBLIc ADMINIsTRATIoN SERTICE No. 33,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 19; LAxcAsTm, STATE SuPEvISIoN OF MumiciAL INDEBTEDNEss
(1923) 97.
4. SEcgisr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 105.
S. Id. Part II, c. I; LAxcAsTER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 23; Stason, supra note 2, at 837;
PuBLIc Annm-sTATIoN SERvicE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9, 19.
6. See INcRaAsEs n REVENUES, supra IA, at p. 929; BoRRowIN, supra IC, at p. 950. For
general descriptions, citations, and criticisms see SEcaIsr, loc. cit. supra note 3; LAxCASTER,
op. cit. supra note 3, c. 2; Stason, supra note 2, at 837, 838, n.7; cf. WHrTE, TRENDS IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1933) c. 5, at 50, 51, tables IV and V.
7. See especially S~cPis, op. cit. supra note 3, cc. 3, 4; LAxCASTER, op. cit. supra note
3, at 31-33.
8. Debt limitations, of course, do not safeguard the character or quality of the debts.
Stason, supra note 2, at 838.
9. See INCREASEs IN REVEu-s, supra IA, at p. 931; BoRRoWING, supra IC, at p. 954.
10. Stason, The Fifteen Mill Tax Anendment and its Effect (1933) 31 MIcir. L. REV.
371; Sheppard, Indiana Adopts a Tax Limit Law (1932) 21 NAT. MUN. REV. 641.
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The more or less detailed "self-executing" statutory regulations of municipal
borrowing" which now supplement debt and tax limits in many states are
subject to somewhat similar objections. 12  These "bond codes," dealing with the
incurrence of indebtedness, the purposes and procedure for the issuance of local
obligations, and their terms, sale, redemption and refunding, cannot be applied
with the flexibility and judgment necessary for wise handling of varying mun-
icipal credit problems. Moreover, enforcement of these provisions is too fre-
quently left to the initiative of taxpayers in securing mandamus or injunctive
relief to make effective regulation possible. And even if enforced, statutes of
this type obviously cannot prevent extravagance, incompetency or dishonesty
upon the part of municipal officials.
The very circumstances that make both "self-executing" and statutory and
constitutional provisions ineffective means of controlling local credit are the
chief grounds upon which the necessity for a thoroughly flexible system of cen-
tralized administrative supervision may be established.13 The immediate ob-
jective of any form of state control should be the giving of assurance that
municipal credit will be managed upon a business rather than a political
basis.' 4 If this is to be done, appropriate machinery for handling details must
be set up; adjustments and regulations must be adapted to individual cases; and
expert judgment must be relied upon in providing suitable correctives for dem-
onstrated evils. With these matters must be combined a careful regard for the
11. These usually constitute "municipal bond codes": ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§
2294(1)-2294(70); CAr.. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) acts 841-861; CAL. POL. CODE (Deer-
ing, 1931) §§ 4445-4449; FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) §§ 3008-3042, id. (Supp. 1934) §§ 457 (1)-
457(19), 2383(1)-2383(35a); IDAHO CODE (1932) §§ 55-201 to 55-226; KAN. REV. STAT.
(1923) §§ 10-101 to 10-125, id. (Supp. 1933) C. 10; LA. CONST. OF 1921 (Dart, 1932) art.
XIV, LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 8854-8950; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 44; MiCH.
Comp. LAWS (1929) §§ 2690-2705; Mirx. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 1934-1973, id. (Mason,
Supp. 1931) c. 10; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 11-101 to 11-1007; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926)
c. 59; N. J. CoMP. STATS. (Supp. 1924) §§ 136-4600 to 136-46001 (29); N. M. STAT. (Court-
right, 1929) c. 16; N. Y. GEN. 1MiuN. LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 1-55; N. C. CODE (Michie,
1931) §§ 2936-2959, id. (Michie, Supp. 1933) c. 56, art. 26; N. D. Laws 1927, c. 196; OHIO
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 3912-3954; OKLA. STAT. (1931) §§ 5913-5956; S. C. CODE
(Michie, 1932) §§ 7319-7344; S. D. Coirn. LAWS (1929) §§ 6983-7006, 7592-7611; TENN.
CODE (1932) §§ 3003-3610, 3696-3708; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 701-842;
VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) §§ 3358-3387; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) §§ 3079-3090a; NV. VA. CODE
(1931) c. 13; Wyo. Rxv. STAT. (1931) §§ 22-1601 to 22-1621, 29-701 to 29-809, 99-1001 to
99-1024. See LANCASTER, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 3.
12. LANCASTER, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 5; Stason, supra note 2, at 840.
13. SECRIST, op. cit. supra note 3, at 117; LANCASTER, op. cit. supra note 3, cc. 4, 5;
Stason, supra note 2, at 842 et seq.
14. LANCASTER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 93: "... by far the greater part of the problem
of municipal government resembles the management of any privately owned service cor-
poration. This is especially true of financial affairs. In selling an issue of bonds a city is
forced to compete for capital in a way which differs little, if any, from the same necessity
when faced by a commercial enterprise. No personal rights or questions of far-reaching
importance are sacrificed by formulating the rules of public financing in conformity with
the best commercial practise."
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public duties of municipal government and for the rights of every creditor.r
The experiences of England and of several Canadian provinces attest the ef-
fectiveness of administrative supervision in achieving such objectives. In Eng-
land, where local credit is closely supervised by the Ministry of Health,0 local
debt defaults have apparently been unknown even during the present depression.
The contrast between eastern and western Canadian provinces affords even
more striking evidence. In Ontario and Quebec, where central supervision
until 1930 and 1932 consisted for the most part of self-executing statutes, with
only haphazard attempts17 at some phases of administrative supervision, recent
debt defaults and excessive debt burdens have been as frequent as in the
United States. 18 On the other hand, some of the western provinces, such as
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, which have had complete administrative
supervision for about two decades,19 are said to be entirely free from municipal
defaults.
20
A. PRESENT ADmINIsTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL INDEBTEDNESS
Anglo-American legislative enactments dealing with administrative supervision
of local credit frequently evidence a disregard of the fact that a municipality's
credit standing, like that of any commercial or industrial business unit, is a
product not only of its borrowing history but of all phases of its fiscal manage-
ment. Supervision of local indebtedness is, however, of primary importance in
the establishment of a sound municipal credit structure.
Supervision of Incurrence of Indebtedness. Legislation requiring municipal-
ities to report the debts they propose to incur,' or those already incurred,2
15. SECRIST, op. cit. supra note 3, at 136.
16. Ministry of Health Act, 9 & 10 GEo. V, c. 21 (1919); see C=UtO C=n¢ Tn ,
STATE SUPERVIsIoN OVER MuINICiPAL FriANCE r-7 ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1930).
17. Ontario Stats. 1906, c. 31, Stats. 1917, c. 14, Stats. 1921, c. 63, §§ 1-4, Stats. 1922, c.
72, parts XII-XIV; QUEBEC REV. STATS. (1925) c. 101, c. 102, Div. XII, § 28, cc. 110, 111.
18. See (1934) 138 Com. AND FIN. CHRON. 1432 (municipal debt defaults in Ontario);
(1933) 136 id. 3022, 3394, 3762, 4314 (municipal debt defaults in Quebec); (1933) 137 id.
356, 530, 1094, 1618, 2312, semble.
19. ALBERTA Rxv. STAT. (1922) c. 17, c. 20, §§ 96 et seq., c. 51, §§ 151-178, c. 108, §
195, c. 110, §§ 214, 215, 220, c. 131, §§ 4-9; MANITOBA STATS. CONSOL. AIxMD. (1913-1924)
c. 133, §§ 21, 51, c. 135, Manitoba statistics 1926, c. 33, id. 1933, c. 28, § 2; SASKATCHEWAN
REv. STAT. (1930) cc. 24, 29, 121.
20. PuBLIc ADLmClS=TRATION SERVICE No. 33, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17.
1. FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) §§ 5106-5107 (special debt report); IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns,
1926) § 14240 (special debt report) ; IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 365, 366 (special debt report) ;
KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) §§ 10-107 to 10-111 (bond registration; such report as state auditor
may require); MASS. GEx. LAWS (1932) c. 44, § 24 (special financial report); MxcH.
Co r. LAWS (1929) § 2698 (special debt report), amended Acts 1931, no. 142; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 2225 (bond registration); Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 2914-2921 (bond
registration); NEB. CoNT. STAT. (1929) § 11-117 (bond registration); N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §§ 2492(9)-2492(11) (special financial reports); PA. STAT. Am. (Purdon,
1931) tit. 53, § 1953 (special debt report); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 709-
715 (special debt report; bond registration) ; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1, § 25 (such
report as Attorney General may require) ; Wis. STATS. (1931) § 67.02 (report of proceedings).
2. CoLo. Com. LAWS (1921) § 312 (periodical financial reports); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
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to a central administrative authority has been enacted in a relatively large num-
ber of states.3 Such reports, though they can operate only indirectly in deter-
ring unwise incurrence of indebtedness, afford wholesome publicity regarding
a city's financial condition; some of them, moreover, may prove to be of
considerable value as a basis for more direct supervision of indebtedness 4 and
as a guide to the formulation of the state's local credit policy.5 A more effec-
tive method of securing the adoption of sound policies in municipal borrowing
without active state intervention in local affairs has been found by a few states
in the establishment of an advisory commission. Thus, the North Carolina 6
and Pennsylvania 7 legislatures have directed their state administrative bodies
to proffer advice, service and cooperation to municipalities in financial mat-
ters." Such assistance should be welcomed by local officials, 9 but in many in-
stances it will be ignored. A few states, without authorizing independent
determination of the propriety of proposed borrowings, permit a review of the
actions of local officials when a designated number'of taxpayers allege miscon-
duct. In Indiana,' ° for example, ten taxpayers, and in Utah" 10 per cent of
(1930) § 1093 (periodical financial reports); IDHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 55-301 to 55-305
(debt report, 30 days after sale of bonds) ; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) § 10-1007 (periodical
debt reports); MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 44, § 28 (special debt report); MCH. Col'. LAWS
(1929) § 2697 (periodical financial reports); NEB. CoM. STAT. (1929) § 11-108 (special
debt reports); N. J. CoT'. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 192-12, 192-13 (periodical finan-
cial statements), id. (Supp. 1930) § 136-4600 I (12) (periodical debt statements);
N. Y. GEN. MuN. LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 30-38 (periodical financial reports); N. C.
Coon AN. (Michie, 1931) §§ 2492(29), 2492(31) (periodical debt reports); ORE. Con
ANN. (1930) §§ 67-328 to 67-330 (periodical debt reports); S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) §§
7332, 7333 (special debt reports); Tex. Laws 1931, c. 230 periodical debt reports).
3. Several of these statutes also include provisions for the discovery, collection, com-
pilation, recording and publication of municipal debt and general financial data by central
state authorities. MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 44, § 44; MicE. Com'. LAWS (1929) § 2697;
N. C. CODE ANN. (1931) § 2492 (21); ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 67-328 to 63-330, § 69-
1205; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71, § 334; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 73.03 (14a).
See also the material in Haygood, State Control of Local Expenditures Through Central-
ization of Financial Statistics (1933) 11 TAx I AG. 301, 346.
4. Most of the statutes requiring reports of proposed borrowings are coupled with pro-
visions making administrative approval a prerequisite to incurrence of indebtedness. See
statutes cited in note 1, supra, with the exception of those of Minnesota and Wisconsin.
5. LANCASTER, STATE SUPERvISIoN or LOCAL INDEBTEDNESS (1923) 56.
6. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1931) § 2492(3).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71, § 334.
8. Similar provisions are found in MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 44, § 37 ("advice and as-
sistance") ; S. C. Acts 1933, no. 231; cf. Mdanitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, § 58(1); Ontario Stat.
1932, c. 27, § 78(9).
9. CLARx, TE INTRNA DEBTS OF = UNnrED STATES (1933) 286; Stason, State
Administrative Supervision of M[unicipal Indebtedness (1932) 30 MIcE. L. REv. 833.
10. IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1926) §§ 14240, 14241. A similar provision, but by court
review, is found in Kan. Laws 1933, c. 319, §§ 5, 6.
11. Utah Laws 1931, c. 53 (but providing only for publication of review findings); cf.
proposed Utah Constitutional Amend. (1930) art. XIII, § 11, in Utah Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1930,
p. 23. In Iowa the state authority may now pass only upon questions of legality and power,
and its disapproval may be obviated by popular referendum. IowA CODE (1931) §§ 363-367.
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the total number, may petition the administrative agency to review the legality
and wisdom of proposed bond issues. In these proceedings the administrative
body is apparently confined to the issues raised by the petition, and the burden
is upon the taxpayers to establish the truth of their allegations. Such a review
would seem adapted particularly to investigations upon the more limited ques-
tions of alleged violations of bond codes, fraud, and abuse of discretion.12
Thorough-going supervision of the incurrence of local indebtedness can be
obtained only if the administrative body is empowered actually to substitute its
judgment for that of municipal officials. But while this more drastic method
of supervision is becoming more common, most of the statutes still permit ad-
ministrative consideration only of the legality of a proposed borrowing, seeking
merely to secure validation of the bonds before issuance.13 Administrative
action is the typical method; 14 but since validation is largely a matter of law,
some legislatures have delegated it to the courts, to be exercised either by
judicial review of the administrative authority's decision1 5 or by direct juris-
diction in the first instance.'6 Recently, however, a number of legislatures,
following the example of several Canadian provinces, 7 have substituted adminis-
12. Stason, supra note 9, at 845, 847, 855; cf. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 285.
13. FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) §§ 5106-5129; GA. CODE AmN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 445-462;
IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 364-366 (objection may be filed by 5 or more taxpayers; budget
director to hold hearing, approve or modify issue; decision appealable); K-. STAT. (Carroll,
Supp. 1933) §§ 186c-6, 186c-7; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 44, § 24; Icx. Comp. LAWS
(1929) § 2698, Acts 1931, no. 142; Mo. Ray. STAT. (1929) § 2915 (state auditor's certifica-
tion to be only prima facie evidence of legality; appealable), §§ 2926-2930 (municipality
may get pro forma decree from circuit court as to validity of proposed issue; decree ap-
pealable), §§ 6254-6257 (circuit judge to approve legality of ordinance providing for bond
issue); MONT. REV. CODE (1921) § 7211; NEB. Com.. STAT. (1929) § 11-117; NaV. Co M.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 8030, 8031, 8066; N. J. Stat. Serv. (1931) § 136-4600 1 (1l)c-(11)e
(certificate by Commissioner of Municipal Accounts is conclusive); N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 33-3802; N. Y. GEN. MuN. LAW (Cahill, 1930) §§ 22-29; N. C. CODE
AwN. (Michie, 1931) §§ 2492(1)-2492(14) (Local Government Commission, state-appointed,
to certify to validity of bond issues; decision may be overruled by voters; approval of
commission not to be regarded as approval of legality of issue) ; OLA. CONST. art X, § 29,
OiXA. STATS. (1931) § 5934; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 53, §§ 1951-1955, 1960-
1967; S. C. Acts 1933, no. 299; Tax. Rv. Civ. STATS. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 709-715; W.
VA. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1, §§ 25-30 (Attorney General to approve or disapprove validity
of bond issue; appeal to supreme court on petition by interested party); Wyo. CONST. art.
XVI, § 8. Cf. Ontario Stats. 1932, c. 27, §§ 84-86; SASXATCHEWAN REV. STAT. (1930) c. 29.
14. See, in note 13, supra, statutes of Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
15. See, in note 13, supra, statutes of Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West
Virginia.
16. See, in note 13, supra, statutes of Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
vada, New York, and Oklahoma.
17. ALBERTA REV. STAT. (1922) c. 20, § 96 et seq. (approval required for issuance of mun-
icipal debentures); Manitoba Stats. 1926, c. 33, §§ 59-64 (provincial board to consider
nature and object of proposed expenditure and its expediency and necessity, as well as the
financial condition of the municipality, and to disallow the borrowing or issuing of deben-
trative for local discretion even as respects the wisdom and expediency of
the incurrence of local indebtedness. This substitution is sometimes lim-
ited to certain classes of obligations, such as temporary emergency borrowings,' 8
borrowings in excess of debt limits'9 or beyond the current budget and tax levy,
20
or indebtedness incurred to offset tax delinquencies. 21 But Connecticut and
North Carolina have made the supervision more extensive. In the former state
an Emergency Relief Commission,22 appointed by the governor for two
years, must approve the issuance and terms of all municipal bond issues.
North Carolina's Local Government Commission-3 is directed to examine into
the necessity for, and expediency and feasibility of all proposed issues of bonds,
notes and other securities. If it disapproves the issuance, it must then grant
a hearing at which the city's officials, citizens and taxpayers may be heard, and
thereafter must make public its reasons for disapproving the incurrence of all or
part of the proposed indebtedness. An adverse decision by the commission may
be overridden by a referendum2 4 of the city's voters.2 5  Similar substitution"
of administrative discretion is provided in some states only upon certain con-
tures, or permit it in such amount and on such terms as is deemed wise); Ontario Stats.
1932, c. 27, §§ 78-87 (similar to Manitoba) ; Quebec Stats. 1931-32, c. 56, §§ 24-30 (approval,
based on examination of objects, necessity and expediency of incurring indebtedness and
on financial condition of municipality, required for all borrowing), id. 1933, c. 50, § 3
(Municipal Commission may authorize temporary loans, specifying conditions and terms);
SASxATCHrEWAN Rv. STAT. (1930) c. 29 (similar to Ontario and Manitoba); cf. 38 & 39
Vict. c. 55, § 233 (1875) (approval by Minister of Health of notes issued by municipalities
to pay costs incurred under Sanitary and Health Acts).
18. NEv. Com. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 3020 (board may also determine interest rates);
cf. MANrrOBA STAT. CONSOL. A=Dxan. (1924) c. 133, § 51 (unusual expenditures); Quebec
Stat. 1933, c. 50, § 2 (promissory notes over $100).
19. R. I. Acts and Resolves 1933, c. 2028; Pa. Pub. Laws 1933, nos. 249, 250 (court
to approve temporary loans beyond debt limit); cf. N. Z. Pub. Acts 1921-22, no. 36, § 7
(in case of emergency, Minister of Internal Affairs may authorize borrowing beyond debt
limits).
20. Aaxz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3099 (emergency bonds or warrants).
21. OH Io GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1933) § 2293(5d)-(5e) (approval to be based on find-
ing of inability to finance essential functions by other means, compliance of budget with
tax limits, and certain percentage of delinquency; amount of bonds to be determined by
administrative agency); PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, Supp. 1933) fit. 53, §§ 1896-1901 (abso-
lute necessity to be basis for approval of borrowing up to amount of delinquent taxes) ; cf.
Manitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, §§ 93-97 (issues of debentures to cover shortage in assets
caused by compromise of tax arrears and penalties).
22. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1931-33) c. 32a, § 89b.
23. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 2492(9)-2492(12).
24. But probably the voters would ordinarily uphold the decision of the administrative
body. See WI=, TRamms =u PuBrc AUmnusAm ao (1933) 51.
25. Compare the elaborate procedure set forth in N. Z. Pub. Acts 1926, no. 60 (Local
Government Board to investigate all proposals for local borrowing, disapproving altogether
or sanctioning all or part and referring back for modification; after approval has been
obtained, referendum is required; if vote is favorable, Governor General's consent is re-
quired, and he may alter interest rate or other terms).
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ditions, 26 or only for some classes of local governments.27 Appeals to the
courts from these administrative decisions are frequently allowed.28
Supervision of Sale of Obligations, Use of Proceeds, and Redemption. But
the necessity for, and the legality and wisdom of incurrence of indebtedness
constitute only one aspect of local borrowing. Administrative supervision of
the sale of municipal bonds and of disbursement of proceeds is virtually un-
known in the United States, although considerable political patronage may be
dispensed in the appointment of a city's financial agents and in the spending
of borrowed money. North Carolina29 has sought to obtain the most favorable
market possible for local securities by delegating the sale of them to the Local
Government Commission; Connecticut 0 has adopted a less direct method of
supervision in requiring local governments to report the conduct of their finan-
cing to the state authority 31 The latter state also requires reports32 upon the
disbursement of bond sale proceeds.3 3  Supervision of the levy and collection
of local debt service taxes, of the creation, maintenance and management of
sinking funds, and of disbursements for payment of interest and principal is
more common, probably because these matters of redemption so directly affect
municipal credit. Assurance that debt service taxes will be levied and collected
26. IN. AN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 14240, 14241 (unless more than 5% interest is
to be paid, administrative approval required only upon appeal of ten taxpayers); TEx. REv.
Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 752 (d)-(i) (administrative authorization of referendum
and determination of proper amount and terms of bond issue required only upon appeal
of fifty taxpayers) ; N. H. Laws 1933, c. 63 (municipality in financial distress authorized to
secure governor's consent to issuance of state-guaranteed bonds and notes).
27. NEv. ComT. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 8066 (approval required for issuance of con-
struction bonds by local improvement districts); N. V£. Laws 1931, c. 119 (State Board
of Education must approve issuance of school district bonds) ; S. C. Acts 1933, no. 299, § 11
(approval of state sinking fund commission required for municipal public service system
bond issues which are to be payable solely out of revenue); Wyo. Rv. STAT. (1931) §§
87-124 to 87-127 (District Court to approve all borrowing and debt incurrence by com-
missioners of power districts). Cf. N. Z. Pub. Acts 1927, no. 74 (necessity for, and
expediency of borrowing by borough council in anticipation of revenues to be determined
by Local Government and Loans Board, which may impose conditions as to repayment
of any amount borrowed in excess of statutory limitations).
28. E.g., Kan. Laws 1933, c. 319, § 6; cf. SASKATcHEWAx REV. STAT. (1930) c. 29, § S1.
But see IND. A.N. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 14240.
29. N. C. CODE ANz. (Michie, 1931) § 2492 (15)-(18).
30. Co"N. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, § 89b.
31. See also CoLo. Comx. LAws (1921) § 2079 (approval required of rescission of un-
sold bonds by irrigation districts); Nxv. Comw. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 3475 (approval
required of irrigation districts' use of own bonds in paying contractors).
32. Cosmr. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, § 89b.
33. Cf. IN. STAT. ANN'. (Burns, 1926) §§ 12667, 12669, 12670 (on appeal of 25 taxpayers,
state examiner may review the letting of public contracts and compliance of public im-
provements with specifications; he may also correct and approve proposed contracts, and
may refer improprieties to the Attorney General and the grand jury for civil and criminal
prosecution); N. C. CODE AsN. (Michie, 1931) § 2931 (a) (disbursements from special re-
volving fund, raised with consent of Local Government Commission, permitted only
when approved by Commission).
[Vol. 43
1934] COMMENTS
is sought for creditors in some states merely by directing state or county au-
thorities to calculate, usually on the basis of indebtedness and financial reports
made to them, and to certify to municipalities, the amount or rate of taxes
legitimate and necessary to meet their debt charges.3 4 When local officials
fail to levy and collect these taxes, state35 or county36 officials may be directed
to do so themselves, or the courts may be authorized to appoint a receiver for
the purpose. 37 A few legislatures have provided for state collection of debt
service taxes at all times.38 Creation and maintenance of sinking funds are also
supervised in a number of ways, beginning with mere inclusion of reports of such
funds in general financial or indebtedness statements39 and provisions for muni-
cipalities reporting their sinking funds specially to the administrative agency. 40
34. CoLo. CoAr'. LAws (1921) § 1997 (county commissioners to fix irrigation district
levies for bond payments); FLA. Comp. LAWS (Supp. 1932) § 2740(16) (state board to
verify to local officials amount necessary for debt service on road and bridge bonds; local
officials must levy taxes for such amounts) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 2917 (State Auditor
to certify annually to municipalities amounts required for bond payments); N. J. Comy.
STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 192-56 (sinking fund requirements, certified to municipalities by
state commissioner, to be mandatory budget items); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§ 2492(34) (thirty days before time for tax levy, Director of Local Government Com-
mission to send statement to municipalities of amount to be provided by taxation and
other means to pay all debt service charges during fiscal year); ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)
§ 69-1207 (Tax Supervisory and Conservation Commission to direct municipal tax levies
within each county of 100,000 population or more); S. C. CODE (1932) § 7335 (thirty
days before time for tax levy, Comptroller General to notify each municipality of debt ser-
vice obligations to be met in following year); W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 3, § 6 (State
Sinking Fund Commission to notify municipalities of levy required to make sinking fund
payments) ; cf. S. D. Laws 1931, c. 138, § 102 (county auditor to levy tax for interest and
sinking funds of school bonds and warrants).
35. CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 4088; IOWA CODE (1931) § 7181; LA. GEN. STAT.
(Dart, 1932) § 6781; OrL. STAT. (1931) § 5939; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1, § 20,
Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, c. 4.
36. CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 4449: CoLO. Coarp. LAws (1921) §§ 8370, 8378;
MriN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 1836, 1945; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 12300; OIcaA.
STATS. (1931) § 5939 (State Auditor to ascertain and to certify amount needed to county
treasurer, who is to levy and collect special property tax with other county taxes); ORE.
CODE Am. (1930) § 69-1208; S. D. Laws 1931, c. 138, § 102; WASH. REv. STAT. (Reming-
ton, 1933) § 9547; Wyo. REv. STAT. (1931) § 89-4517.
37. ARx. DrO. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) §§ 3633, 5451; FLA. Com. LAWS (1927)
§ 1493; IowA CODE (1931) § 12453; N. 14'. LAWS 1931, c. 55; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 19, art.
21, § 23; cf. 56 & 57 Vic'r.c. 54, § 12 (1875).
38. CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 3670b, 3670c (municipal debt service taxes
collected by state treasurer); Mo. STAT. Am. (1932) § 2917 (municipal debt service tax
collected with state tax); cf. Mnw. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 2226; S. D. ComP. LAWS
(1929) § 6762; VA. TAx CODE (Michie, 1930) §§ 396a, 396b (state department to appoint
collectors in certain classes of cities and counties to collect certain local tax levies).
39. E.g., MicH. Comis. LAWS (1929) §§ 2697, 2698; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 69-1205;
Tex. Laws 1931, c. 230. See also note 2, supra.
40. N. J. Comn. STATS (Supp. 1924) §§ 192-5, 192-11; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§§ 2492(26)-2492(29).
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The New Jersey,41 North Carolina 42 and Pennsylvania central authorities are
given power to examine, advise, direct, review, approve, and enforce laws deal-
ing with the creation, maintenance and preservation of local sinking funds. In
North Carolina this supervision includes determining and enforcing proper
depositary requirements for all municipal funds,44 a provision apparently made
necessary by the acute banking crisis in that state. In West Virginia the
State Sinking Fund Commission itself assumes the administration of municipal
sinking funds.
45
Supervision of Payment and Refunding. Disbursements for payment of
municipal obligations and refunding operations are ordinarily controlled, if at
all, only through publication of routine financial statements.46  Special reports
dealing with payments are, however, sometimes required.4 North Carolina's
commission gives thirty days' notice to all municipalities of the amount of ob-
ligations coming due and of the time and place of payment; 48 and in a few
jurisdictions, state agents are designated as fiscal agents of local units of gov-
ernment.49 Moreover, the necessity for careful judgment in determining
whether maturing obligations can and should be met out of revenues or should
be refunded, has led some jurisdictions to provide for state advice and assist-
ance to municipal officials,50 or for administrative determination of the legality
of refunding issues.51 And in Michigan a commission having power to forbid
the issuance, in whole or in part, of bonds for this purpose must approve, on
grounds of wisdom and policy, the refunding operations of any city which is
in default or in danger of becoming so. 52  But legislation of this tenor is not
common in the United States. 3
41. N. J. CozP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 192-3 to 193-11.
42. N. C. CODE ANN¢. (Michie, 1931) §§ 2492(4), 2492(26)-2492(29).
43. PA. STAT. Axn. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 53, § 1958.
44. N. C. CODE ANr. (Michie, 1931) § 2492(30)-2492(31).
45. W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 3.
46. See statutes cited in notes 1 and 2, supra.
47. MAss. GEr. LAws (1932) c. 44, § 25 (town or district to. notify director of accounts
when note is paid) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 2918 (municipality to certify to state auditor
all bonds redeemed); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 2492(25) (municipalities to re-
port simultaneously with remitting payment).
48. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 2492(35). A similar provision is found in S. C.
CODE (1932) § 7338.
49. FLA. ComI. GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1932) §2470 (State Board of Administration is fiscal
agent in disbursement of municipal road and bridge debt service funds); MA=. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 2227 (county treasurer pays coupon holders of railroad aid bonds) ; NEB.
Comp. STAT. (1929) § 11-101 (county treasurer fiscal agent of municipalities; all bonds pay-
able at his office); W. Va. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 59 (state commission to make payments
on county road bonds).
50. Ore. Laws 1933, c. 256; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71 § 334; S. C. Acts
1933, no. 231; cf. Manitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, § 58(1).
51. N. M. ANN. STAT. (1927) §§ 90-1101 to 90-1104; PA. STAT. AN . (Purdon, 1931)
tit. 53, §§ 1959, 1960.
52. Mich. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1932, no. 13, amended Acts 1933, no. 143, §§ 4, 5, 211 (the
commission is to disapprove refunding issues which would not be sound municipal financing
or would not accomplish the relief intended; its findings of fact are conclusive).
53. FiA. Com.p. LAws (Supp. 1932) § 2470(16) (approval necessary to issuance of re-
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Supervision of Debt Readjustments. A subject for supervision equally im-
portant as the incurrence of obligations and provision for their redemption is
the readjustment of municipal debts after default has occurred. And the les-
sons taught by the present depression have brought widespread legislative rec-
ognition of the fact that in dealing with this problem an administrative body
may provide invaluable assistance both to a city's creditors and to its taxpayers.
Several states now require administrative 4 or judicia 5 approval of plans for
the readjustment of municipal obligations. But experience in other types of
reorganizations has demonstrated that supervision during the formulation of
the plan, rather than mere approval after its completion, is the more effective
means of assuring proper regard for the interests of a city's citizens, its tax-
payers and the multitude of its poorly-informed creditors.56 Accordingly, a
few legislatures have directed state authorities to assist municipal officials and
to cooperate with them in every way possible in their negotiations with cred-
itors.' 7 While vigorous activity might enable state authorities, thus empowered,
to guide the course of a readjustment, particularly if they made judicious use of
publicity, authorization of direct intervention by the administrative body would
ordinarily prove even more efficient. Such statutes now exist in New Jersey5 s
and Oregon, 9 where state officials act for defaulting municipalities in the
conduct of negotiations with creditors; and similar supervision is provided in
several other states.60 The Washington legislature has adopted the most log-
funding bonds in place of levy of taxes for road and bridge bonds); Oio GEN. CODE
(Page, Supp. 1931) § 2293-5 (state bureau to determine necessity for refunding bonds to be
issued before June, 1933, and to set maturities therefor); Ore. Laws 1933, c. 102 (state
commission to determine benefits conferred, and to permit as one alternative refunding up
to this amount); cf. ALBERTA REv. STAT. (1922) c. 110, § 220 (provincial board must con-
sent to extension of terms of municipal debentures) ; Manitoba Stats. 1926, c. 33, §§ 78, 79
(provincial board to permit extension of terms and refunding when necessary to equalize
life of municipal debentures with life of improvement they financed); N. Z. Pub. Acts
1926, no. 14, § 30 (approval of issuance of consolidated debentures required) ; SASKATCHEWAx
Rzv. STAT. (1930) cc. 29, 121 (similar to Manitoba's statute).
54. Ore. Laws 1931, c. 50 (irrigation district readjustments); cf. N. Y. proposed S. B.
1214 (1933); N. Z. Pub. Acts 1932-33, no. 41, § 9-13 (consent of Governor General re-
quired for conversion of municipal obligations into new securities with reduced interest rates;
until March 1, 1935); Quebec Stat. 1933, c. 50, § 44 (commission to ratify municipal re-
adjustment plan).
55. Idaho Laws 1933, c. 174 (drainage, irrigation and highway district readjustments);
N. J. Stat. Serv. 1933, §§ 136-4700 (407) to 136-4700 (408) (court to determine whether
city's readjustment plan measures its capacity to pay, and is fair both to creditors affected
and to those not affected).
56. See RIGHT OF CREDITORs AFTER DEFAULT, supra IIB, at p. 975.
57. Ore. Laws 1933, c. 356; PA. STAT. ANN'. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71, § 334; S. C. Acts
1933, no. 231.
58. N. J. Stat. Serv. 1931, §§ 136-4700(101) to 136-4700(406).
59. Ore. Laws 1933, c. 356 (does not apply to irrigation and taxing districts); cf. Ore.
Laws 1931, c. 50.
60. CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3480c(1) (reclamation district readjustments);
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Strr'p. 1933) §§ 2492(64)-2492(65) plan negotiated by commission
at request of municipality to be submitted to latter for final acceptance), § 2492(69)
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ical and complete supervision, empowering the Director of Conservation him-
self to decide upon a readjustment plan before making state funds available
to financially distressed diking, drainage, or irrigation districts.61 It is this
type of supervision of readjustments which is most familiar in Canada.' Even
such plenary authority cannot, of course, ordinarily enable an administrative
agency in this country to enforce a readjustment plan against unwilling cred-
itors, as is done in Canada, 63 although legislation proposed recently in New Jer-
sey"4 in reliance upon the emergency police power 65 would attempt to grant
this power.
An administrative agency charged with supervision of local indebtedness
could provide assurance that the municipal debtor will comply in good faith
with the terms of a readjustment plan, and that if circumstances permit or re-
quire variation from those terms, the necessary degree of flexibility will be
available. Several state administrative agencies are now authorized to super-
vise municipal officials engaged in carrying out a readjustment plan,"0 and a
variety of statutes authorize such agencies either to act as receivers 7 themselves
(commission may negotiate loan to buy up city bonds at 40% discount, and may
negotiate with RFC for refinancing loans); S. C. Acts 1933, no. 231 (commission to nego-
tiate on request of municipality); cf, Fla. proposed H. B. no. 150 (1933) (state board
to have exclusive power to deal with defaulting city's creditors); SASKATCHEWAN Rnv.
STAT. (1930) c. 29 (board to take such action as may be necessary).
61. Wash. Laws 1933, c. 16.
62. ALBERTA REV. STAT. (1922) c. 131, §§ 4, 5 (at request of municipality or of holders
of one-fourth in value of its bonds, commission to make investigation and hold hearings
and to recommend readjustment plan); Manitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, § 72 (after inquiry
and investigation, board to formulate plan of readjustment); Ontario Stat. 1932, c. 27,
part IV, § 98 (board to dictate readjustment plan).
63. ALBERTA Rv. STAT. (1922) c. 131, § 5 (commission's plan to be binding against
municipality and all persons interested when approved by holders of three-fifths in amount
of indebtedness, and by Lieutenant Governor); Manitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, § 72
(binding when approved by holders of three-fifths in amount of debentures) ; SASICATCIIANI_
REv. STAT. (1930) c. 116, cited in PUBLic ADamISTRAT oN SERVIcE No. 33, Municipal Debt
Defaults (1933) 55.
64. N. J. proposed S. B. no. 56 (1934).
65. Reliance has been placed principally upon Home Building and Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), though the New York court's decision in People of New
York v. Title & Guarantee Mortgage Co. of Buffalo, N. Y. Times, March 20, 1934, at
15, should prove helpful. See RIGHTS OF CREDITORS A:FTER DE AuLT, supra IIB, at p. 969.
66. N. J. Stat. Serv. 1931, §§ 136-4700(101) to 136-4700(406); Wash. Laws 1933, c. 16,
§ 5, cf. Fla. proposed H. B. 150 (1934); N. Y. proposed S. B. 1214 (1933); ALBERTA Rv.
STAT. (1922) c. 131, § 6; Manitoba Stats. 1926, c. 33, § 75; Ontario Stats. 1932, c. 27, part
VI, § 98-117.
67. Mass. Acts 1931, c. 44 (special Board of Finance to act as receiver for Fall River);
N. H. Laws 1921, c. 226 (special finance commission to act as receiver for city of Man-
chester); N. J. Stat. Serv. 1931, § 136-4700(101) to 136-4700(406); cf. MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 1946-9 (court supervision and control of municipal affairs while municipality is at-
tempting to reach settlement with creditors) ; N. D. proposed S. B. 335 (1933) (state
commission to supervise expenditures of defaulting or financially embarrassed local units);
Quebec Stats. 1931-1932, c. 56, §§ 32-45.
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or to appoint 8 or petition a court to appoint 69 receivers, to supervise their
activities by means of reports, review, approval or order,70 and to request7 '
or require 72 termination of the receivership. Receivers appointed under these
statutes may have power only to operate municipal utilities,7" or to levy and
collect taxes; 74 but in some states such receivers are authorized to assume par-
tial75 or full 76 control over the financial affairs of the cities, or even to oust local
government officials entirely.
77
B. PRESENT ADuINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LocAL TAX BASES AND OF
EXPENDITURES
Even if thorough supervision of all aspects of a city's indebtedness were
provided, however, the complete soundness of its credit would still not be
assured. Other factors may be of equal consequence in determining the city's
ability to meet its obligations. Certainly no cautious investor would lend
money to an industrial or commercial corporation without first investigating,
among other things, its income and expenses; and these factors also lie at the
foundation of a sound municipal credit structure. Indeed, since a city ordi-
68. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 2492(33); cf. ALBERTA REV. STAT. (1922) c.
131, § 8 (Lieutenant Governor to appoint administrator); Ontario Stats. 1932, c. 27, §
91 (Municipal Board may appoint committee of supervisors to control administration of
municipality).
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, § 91b; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 79; cf. Manitoba
Stats. 1926, c. 33, § 77 (Municipal and Public Utility Board requesting Lieutenant Governor
to appoint administrator).
70. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, §§ 92b, 94b; N. C. CODE AmN. (Michie,
Supp. 1933) § 2492 (33) (on petition, Local Government Commission to review adminis-
trator's exercise of power); cf. Manitoba Stats. 1926, c. 33, § 77; Ontario Stats. 1932, c. 27,
§§ 92, 93, 117.
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, § 98b.
72. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 2492(33); cf. Quebec Stat. 1931-1932, c.
56, § 37.
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) cc. 33a, 33b; Mich. Acts 1933, no. 94, § 10; S. C. Acts
1933, no. 299, § 10; W. Va. Acts (Ex. Sess.) 1933, c. 26, § 12.
74. See note 37, supra.
75. N. J. Stat. Serv. 1931, §§ 136-4700(201) to 136-4700(402), id. 1932, §§ 136-
4700(201), 136-4700(212); cf. N. D. proposed S. B. no. 335 (1933) (approval of munici-
pal governing body's requisitions for funds, only in such sums as shall be proper
or reasonably neccessary for ordinary expenses of government in defaulting or financially
embarrassed local units).
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 32a, §§ 93b-96b; Mass. Acts 1931, c. 44; N. H.
Laws 1921, c. 226; Af1n. STATS. (Mason, 1927) § 1946-9; N. M. Laws 1931, c. 55, Laws
1933, c. 180; N. C. CODE ANY. (Michie, Supp. 1933) § 2492(33) ; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 433; cf.
MI!ANMTOBA STAT. CoNsoL. Aa sD. (1924) c. 133, § 21; Manitoba Stat. 1926, c. 33, § 77;
Ontario Stat. 1932, c. 27, § 97; Quebec Stat. 1931-1932, c. 56, §§ 39-48.
77. Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 79 (district court may suspend commissioners of drainage or
irrigation district and with consent of governor may appoint special commission to manage
the district); cf. MAxTOBA STAT. CONSOL. AMrEND. (1924) c. 133, § 21; Manitoba Stats.
1926, c. 33, § 77; VIcroRiA STATS. (1929) no. 3720, §§ 430-432.
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narily has no leviable property and since operating expenses have a prior
claim upon its revenues, a purchaser of its securities and others interested
in its continued solvency may be especially concerned with its tax program
and its budget.
Chiefly because of the state's direct interest in securing state and county taxes
levied within a municipality, administrative supervision of tax bases has
been more widely developed than has that of other phases of city credit.1
Administrative bodies in some states disseminate advice on the making of local
assessments,2 endeavor to discover properties omitted from the tax rolls, and
cooperate with state boards of equalization by detecting inequitable assess-
ments and by gathering data, through reports and inspections,3 with which
more accurate valuations of property may be made.4 Likewise, the approval
of administrative agencies may be required for the bonds of local assessors,
or for the removal of these officials and appointment of substitutes by local
authorities, or for the omission of property claiming tax exemption for the
first time.8 In several jurisdictions central authorities also review0 assess-
ments in order to secure equalization between taxing districts and between
different classes of property, and establish uniform systems of assessment
books and entries therein. State appointment of local tax assessors is pro-
vided only infrequently.8
Administrative supervision of local expenditures is quite uncommonP It
most frequently appears in the requirement of periodical or special financial
reports to central authorities,' 0 who may give due publicity to municipal
expenditure programs. A proper economy is sought in many states through
control over municipal budgets and so over the tax levies. Yet ordinarily such
control goes no further than administrative prescription of mandatory forms
I-B
1. WALLACE, STATE ADsnsTRATVa SUPERVISION OF CrlES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1928) 64-91; see also WHITE, REcENT TRENDS nT PUBLIC Am iIsmTATIoN (1933) 57-63.
2. This is done through correspondence, pamphlet and newspaper publicity, personal
inspections and conferences. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 71-73.
3. Id. at 66; see Cal. Laws 1931, c. 694.
4. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64, 65, 67.
5. Id. at 74.
6. Id. at 74-77; see also Utah Laws 1931, c. 53; W. Va. Acts 1932 (Ex. Sess.), c. 4;
Wis. STAT. (1931) § 73.03; cf. Alberta Stat. 1929, c. 47; MAN OBA STAT. CONSOL. A=END.
(1924) c. 132.
7. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 83-87; see also Cal. Laws 1931, c. 694.
8. WALLACE, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 87-89; cf. Ohio Laws (1913), p. 786, repealed by
Laws 1915, p. 246; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 4042a-11. But provision for the removal
of delinquent local assessors by or through the intervention of state authorities is not
uncommon. WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89; see also MIcEr. Comp. LAWS (1929)
§ 3545.
9. Kilpatrick, Evolving Plans for Review of Local Expenditures (1933) 18 BuLL. or
NAT. TAX Ass'N. 130.
10. See PRESENT ADmIisTRArIoN SUPERVISION OF INDEBTEDNESS, supra liA, at notes
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for the budgets of all" or of certain classes'2 of municipalities; provisions of
this character become more effective when there is added a requirement that
copies of the budgets be filed with state authorities for purposes of record and
publicity.13 In a few states, however, supervision of local budgets and tax
levies extends to substance as well as to form. Thus the services and advice
of central administrative authorities are in some jurisdictions made available
to local officials engaged in formulating budgets.14  In New Jersey; and New
Mexico 6 state authorities examine local budgets for inclusion of mandatory
items, correctness of form, and conformity of expenditures with budget esti-
mates. And several legislatures have made municipal budgets reviewable by
central authorities and subject to revision and modification by them upon
questions of legality17 or policy,'8 or have even required administrative .approval
11. ARiz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 3097-3099; IND. STATS. ANN. (Burns, 1926)
§§ 12636-R 64; IOWA CODE (1931), §§ 368-390, Laws 1933, c.c. 13, 14; KAN. REv. STAT.
(Supp. 1933) §§ 79-2925 to 79-2937; fich. Acts 1933, no. 62, §§ 9, 10; Miss. CODE (1930)
§§ 3970-3977, Mont. Laws 1929, c. 148, Laws 1931, c. 121; NEv. Co~N. LAws (Hillyer, 1929)
§§ 3018-3025; N. J. Cozoi. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 192-1 to 192-40; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) §§ 33-5901 to 33-5908; N. C. CODE (Mlichie, 1931) §§ 1334(53)-1334(76),
2969(n)-2969(q); N. D. Com. LAws (Supp. 1925) §§ 3314a(1)-3314a(12), 3684a(1)-
3684a(13), Laws 1931, c. 199; Onro Gm¢. CODE (Page, Supp. 1933) §§ 5625-19 to 5625-33;
OxTA. STATS. (1931)) §§ 12305-12315, 12674-12679; ORE. CODE (1930) §§ 69-1101 to 69-1115,
Laws 1931, c. 161; TEx. REv. Civ. STATS. (Vernon, Supp. 1933) arts. 689a(9)-689a(20);
Utah Laws 1927, c.c. 54, 75, 76; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) §§ 2577(i)-2577(o); WASH.
REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) §§ 3997-1 to 3997-10, 9000-1 to 9000-24; W. VA. CODE (1931)
c. 11, art. 8, §§ 3, 5, 7.
12. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6789; CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3714; FLA.
COmx. GNm. LAWS (1927) §§ 2302-2308; FLA. Coari'. GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1934) §§ 2306,
2308(1); IDAHo CODE AxN. (1932) §§ 30-1201 to 30-1213; Kyr. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1933)
§§ 938h-33 to 938h-62; Mass. Gmx. LAws (1932) c. 44, §§ 32-34; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926)
c. 42, § 74; N. Y. 2d CLASS CrnEs LAW (Cahill, 1930) § 75, Laws 1932, c. 634, §§ 110-121;
S. D. Com. LAWS (1929) §§ 6955A-,6955J; Wis. STATS. (1931) §59.84. Provisions for
recommendary prescription of local budget forms are found in CONN. GEN. STATS. (1930)
§ 390; Wis. STATS. (1931) §§ 65.01-65.10. See in regard to these statutes and those in
note 11, supra, WmT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 66.
13. CAL. POL. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3714; FLA. Com . Gai. LAWS (Supp. 1934)
§ 2306; IowA CODE (1931) § 383; Mich. Acts 1933, no. 62, § 10; N. M. STATS. AwN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 33-5901; OxI.A. STATS. (1931) §§ 12305, 12306. TEx. REv. Civ. STATS.
(Vernon, Supp. 1933) arts. 689a(11), 689a(13); VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 2577(m2);
WAsn. R.Ev. STATS. (Remington, 1933) §§ 3997-4, 9000-4.
14. N. M. STATS. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 141-507(8); N. C. CODE (Michie, 1931)
§ 2492(3), Laws 1927, c. 91; PA. STATS. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71, § 334; S. C. Acts 1933,
no. 231. Cf. MA.MITrOBA STATS. (1926) c. 33, § 58(1) ; Ontario Stats, 1932, c. 27, § 78(a).
15. N. J. Com. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 192-3.
16. N. AL Com. STAT. (Courtright, 1929) § 33-5905.
17. Ore. Laws 1931, c. 161.
18. IND. STATS. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 14239, Acts 1931, c. 78, §§ 3, 5, Acts 1932,
c. 10, § 4; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1932) § 5625-28; Ore. H. B. no. 273 (1933)
(proposed); Wyo. S. B. no. 38 (1933) (proposed).
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of such budgets, again either upon legality alone' 9 or upon legality and policy.20
Moreover, state authorities, regularly or contingently, may certify tax levies
which may become mandatory budget items2l or which may be otherwise
determinative of municipal tax levies. 22 While administrative review and
approval of local contracts and public improvements would presumably afford
the most complete state control over local expenditures, this form of super-
vision is almost unknown in the United States. 23
C. PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF GENERAL FIscAL MANAGEMENT
The keeping of books and accounts which show accurately and clearly the
amount and present condition of a city's assets; the amount and maturity of
outstanding obligations, as well as current revenues and operating expenses;
the synchronization between fiscal years and tax collections; the methods used
in collecting taxes and in handling and checking disbursements; the efficiency
with which public properties are managed-these and similar matters of fiscal
organization and practice are essential elements in sound municipal credit.
For while they involve only procedure and form, they may provide opportunity
for many unnecessary extravagances. Canadian legislatures have deemed these
matters so important that they have authorized central administrative agencies
themselves to assume managerial responsibility where local officials have failed
to reform their financial practices.' In the United States, however, supervision
19. CoL-o. ComP. LAws (1921) § 7216; IoWA CODE (1931) § 373; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923)
§ 79-1942; Utah Laws 1923, c. 68.
20. FLA. Comp. LAws (Supp. 1934) §§ 2383(36)-2383(131); KY. STATS. (Carroll, Supp
1933) § 938h-38; Mass. Acts 1933, c. 307; MiNN. STATS. (Mason, Supp. 1931) § 1946-26%;
N. M. Comy. STATS. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 33-5904, 141-507(8); ORE. CODE (1930) §§
69-1203 to 69-1207; Utah Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1930, p. 23 (proposed Amend. Const. Art. XIII,
§ 11); Wyo. F~v. STAT. (1931) § 87-120.
21. N. J. Com. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 192-56.
22. See PRzsaxr ADNxsTrzAv SuPmvIsIoN oF LocAL INDEBTEDESS, supra iA,
note 34.
23. IND. Awx. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 12667 (upon petition state examiner may cause all
plans and specifications to be submitted to him for inspection and approval before contracts
are awarded), § 14241 (on petition; state board of tax commissioners to approve both as to
legality and policy, proposed municipal improvements); IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 351-358 (on
appeal of taxpayers, legality of contract for municipal improvement for over $5000 must
be approved by director of State Appeal Board), § 359 (municipality must have approval for
expenditure for public improvement of more than 5% over contract price).
1. ALBERTA REV. STAT. (1922) c. 17, § 15 (ouster of local governing authorities who
fail to correct financial practices and organization disapproved by Minister of Department
of Municipal Affairs, and replacement by appointive administrator); Mvanitoba Stat. 1926,
c. 33, § 58(3) (after investigation into financial affairs of municipality, central board may,
if necessary, take general supervision to insure proper organization and financial practices) ;
SASKATCiEWAN RaV. STAT. (1930) c. 24, § 17 (if inspector reports municipal affairs to be
in undesirable condition and municipal council does not remedy such condition in 60 days,
Department of Municipal Affairs will take over management of the matter).
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of this type is rare; 2 most of the states rely merely upon publicity given to the
financial statements and statistics reported to administrative agencies.3 New
Jersey's state commission licenses municipal accountants or auditors 4 and receives
reports from them,5 and the Local Government Commission in North Carolina
advises local officials on auditing and also on other questions of fiscal organiza-
tion and practice.6 Supervision more nearly resembling that provided for in
Canada is found in statutes authorizing central administrative agencies to aid
in the installation of local accounting systems, or to approve, prescribe, or them-
selves install such systems7 and by other statutes empowering state officials




ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL CREDIT
A. EXTENT OF NECESSITY FOR EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
It is apparent from the character and distribution of the statutes providing
for administrative supervision of local financial affairs that in the United States
there has been little recognition by legislatures of the variety of problems
comprehended within the subject of municipal credit. Some of the different
aspects of local finance are in many states without any, or any but the weak-
est, central administrative supervision. And even where such supervision is
relatively exhaustive, the exercise of it is usually so distributed among various
central officers or bodies, each charged with looking after a separate function,
that organization for, or conscious dedication to a planned program of local
2. The only statute of this type appears to be MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 6954;
cf. N. C. CODE ANx. (lMiichie, 1931) § 1302(17).
3. See PRESENT ADmnmISTRATIvm SUPERVISION Or LoCAL INDEBTEDNESS, supra liA,
notes 1, 2. Administrative authorities also effect some supervision over local practices
through their compilations of financial data and statistics. See Haygood, State Control
of Local Expenditures Through Centralization of Financial Statistics (1933) 12 TAX MAO.
301, 346.
4. N. J. ComT. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 192-69.
5. N. J. ComT. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 192-71. A similar provision is found in N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1334(80).
6. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§ 1302(14), 1334(77); cf. id. § 1334(81) (com-
mission to approve bills for services of local auditors). Pennsylvania also provides state
guidance in general fiscal management. PA. STAT. ANxz. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 71, § 334.
7. For analysis and collection of statutes, see WALLACE, STATE ADamrNISTRATIVE SUPER-
visIoN OVER CrIES IN =E UN=m STATEs (1928) 91 et seq.; WMrE, TRENDS ns PUBLIC
AmNSTRA=TION (1933) 63-66, table IX. See also, as illustrative, ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)
§ 69-1205; cf. ALBERTA REv. STAT. (1922) c. 17; Manitoba Stats. 1926, c. 33, § 58; Ontario
Stats. 1932, c. 27, §§ 60-67; SASEATc-xwAN R±v. SrAr. 1930) c. 24.
8. For analysis and compilation of statutes, see WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 91-96;
WITE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 67, table X. See also, e.g., PA. STAT. A.N. (Purdon, 1931)
tit. 71, § 334; cf. Statutes of Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan cited in note
7, supra; 3 VxcrorA STAT. (1929) no. 3720, §§ 461, 462.
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credit is lacking.1 Yet completely effective supervision must extend to all of the
controllable elements in local activity which determine or affect municipal
credit; it must be of such positive nature2 as to control even local discretion;
and, as a matter of internal efficiency, it must be carefully coordinated in all
of its phases. Continental European countries, unhampered by concepts of
local autonomy, have adopted similar highly centralized control of local credit.
Thus the French commune is subject to central administrative guidance upon
all matters of local finance;3 and in Germany, the financial and other activities
of local governments are strictly regulated under a system of central admin-
istrative supervision. 4 In the United States coordinated central control of this
character may best be effected through allocation of responsibility for all phases
of local credit to a chief administrative body,5 or to a special department of
the state government.0
The diversity of economic, social and political conditions in different parts
of this country, however, precludes advocacy of a single system of administrative
supervision of local credit. The more than two thousand units of local gov-
ernment that have defaulted on their obligations during recent years un-
questionably present a problem of vital public importance. Nevertheless, it
must be remembered that default is still the exception rather than the rule,
for the total number of tax levying governmental units in the United States
exceeds two hundred thousand.7 Baltimore, Cincinnati and Providence afford
conspicuous examples of solvent, well-managed municipalities. When all or
most of the taxing districts within a state have thus demonstrated a capacity
to take care of their own financial affairs, extensive and restrictive state in-
terference would be unwise as well as unnecessary.8 It does not follow, how-
ever, that there is no place for administrative supervision even in these states.
The generalization is warranted that every state would profit from the estab-
lishment of a system whereby local officials reported financial statements to a
state administrative agency, and the latter, in addition to collecting and pub-
lishing this and other financial data, made available competent advice and
1. Coordination of administrative supervision of the various financial activities of
municipalities in the United States seldom goes beyond that inherent in the supervising
officials' or agencies' membership in the state government.
2. For a description of the processes of administrative supervision through which
control may be achieved see WALLACE, STATE ADmINISTRATrvE SUPERVISION OVER CInIEs n
THE UNITED STATES (1928) c. 2.
3. GoocH, REGIroL S n¢ FRANCE (1931).
4. BnAcnrv AND OATmAN, THE GovaNxEzNr AND ADmaINISTRATiON OF GERMANY (1928).
5. See N. C. Cona ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§ 1302(14)-1302(16), §§ 2492(1)-2492(61).
Indiana's Tax Commission is comparable. IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1926) §§ 14209-14244;
Acts 1931, c. 78; Acts 1932, c. 10; Acts 1933, c. 97.
6. Canadian provinces achieve a high degree of coordination by departmental organ-
ization of the various supervisory agencies. Alberta and Saskatchewan have a Depart-
ment of Municipal Affairs; Manitoba, a Municipal Commissioner's Department; and
Quebec a Ministry of Municipal Affairs.
7. For summary of statistics, see INTRoDucT oN, supra.
8. Cf. Wallerstein, What Local Officials Think of State Financial Control (1932) 21 NAT.
Mmr. REv. 557 (Virginia municipalities).
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assistance regarding matters pertinent to municipal credit. Supervisory machin-
ery of this type could hardly offend local autonomy; yet it would not only
afford valuable aid to local officials, and permit attainment of a degree of
uniformity in financial matters throughout the state that would not otherwise
be possible, but it would also satisfy the state-wide interest normally to be
expected in the credit standing of every unit of local government. More-
over, this minimum of administrative supervision of local credit would be
particularly desirable if the central agency were given power to take prompt
control of the affairs of any governmental unit which defaults on its obliga-
tions or is in serious financial straits. A large and populous state cannot
count upon complete freedom from local defaults, even if at present it is able
to boast a generally high municipal credit rating. Indeed, even if competent
city administrations survive the fortunes of politics, defaults may be com-
pelled by catastrophe or prolongation of the depression.
The wisdom of providing in advance for administrative supervision of the
affairs of a defaulting municipality has been demonstrated.' 0 A state com-
mission already fully informed of the city's financial history and of its present
condition, and equipped with adequate information as to the names and
classes of its creditors, may take action promptly upon determination that
a default is inevitable. If responsibility for the formulation of a readjust-
ment plan is lifted from the "honestly selfish" representatives of creditors and
delegated instead to the administrative agency, many of the delays that are all
too familiar to equity reorganizations may be avoided. Even if the plan is
worked out through the familiar bargaining with creditors, however, the au-
thority of the state agency to act for the municipal debtor lends assurance
that neither the city nor the multitude of its creditors will be improperly im-
posed upon either because of lack of bargaining power or for want of ade-
quate information. Excessive costs may be avoided through the speeding up
of the readjustment and through administrative determination of reasonable
allowances for fees. Moreover, the state's administrative agency could super-
vise the operation of a readjustment plan with the greatest degree of ef-
fectiveness. Thus if a change in conditions should make possible a fuller or more
prompt payment than had been anticipated, the state authorities would learn
of that fact and compel the city to make the payment. On the other hand,
the supervisory agency could reserve to itself authority to sanction a tem-
porary relaxation of the terms of a readjustment plan in the interest of the
public if the demands of an emergency made literal enforcement undesirable.
And finally, the supervision thus provided could guarantee that the defaulting
city would not return to improper financial practices and that steps would
be taken to place its credit structure upon a sound basis.
It thus seems clear that every state should establish a permanent adminis-
trative agency which not only is equipped and authorized to cooperate with and
9. See CLARx, TnE INTERAL DrBTS or =E UmrTE STATES (1933) c. 9, 277 et seq.;
Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness (1932) 30 MIcE. L.
REv. 833, 858.
10. See RIGHTs oF CREDITORS AFTER DEFAULT, supe'a IIB, at p. 974 et seq.; PRESENT
ADmINsTRATivE SuvzwsioN or LocAL INDEBTEDNESS, supra IIIA, at p. 989.
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assist local financial officials, but which also has power to intervene promptly and
take immediate control of a taxing district that by its default has shown
itself presumptively unable to maintain its own credit standing. Supervision
of this character, however, is a minimum which would hardly suffice in most
states to restore or to protect sound municipal credit. It does not take many
instances of poor credit management within a jurisdiction to warrant prompt
state intervention in the affairs of all local governments; especially is this true
where large cities become financially embarrassed. Indeed, the depression
has demonstrated that in many jurisdictions the state itself must assume
full responsibility for placing local credit upon a sound basis." No other
course is available when voters are apathetic, local officials either incom-
petent or merely indulgent, governmental organization antiquated, and cred-
itors cunning. When the necessity thus arises, however, for the state to
protect its own credit and that of other public borrowers within the jurisdiction,
as well as to guard the interests of local investors, taxpayers and citizens, its
legislators should recognize that administrative supervision is not completely
effective unless the discretion of state authorities is actually substituted for
that of local officials. The usual legislative provisions, in merely setting the
bounds of local discretion, leave wide latitude for the abuse of municipal credit.
Administrative bodies cannot safeguard that credit unless their supervision
reaches even this residuum of local discretion.
B. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION
Theoretical Objections. While substitution of administrative discretion for
that of local officials is the crux of effective state supervision of municipal credit,
it is also the factor in such supervision that encounters the most serious ob-
stacles. The familiar objection that this form of state control fosters "bureau-
cracy" and stifles local initiative, however, appeals more to the emotions than
to the intellect.' It is only when local initiative has failed properly to manage
a city's affairs that the state, as a matter of self-protection and of govern-
mental responsibility to its other political subdivisions and to its citizens,2
determines to intervene. If a city's loss of its autonomy is unduly distasteful,
it presumably may ultimately regain power to exercise its local initiative by
demonstrating an ability to use it wisely. Meanwhile the label of "bureau-
cracy" will not alter the fact that administrative supervision affords the greatest
possible assurance of sound municipal credit.
Practical Objections. But administrative supervision of local credit is
open to attack upon more practical grounds.3 It is said, for instance, that
11. See BETTERS, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1932) c. 4.
1. Cf. Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness (1932) 30
MICH. L. REV. 833, 843, 854.
2. EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ADmNISTRATION SUPERVISION OF LOcAL CREDIT,
supra III, at p. 979.
3. KILPATRicx, STATE ADMwISTRATIVE REVIEV OF LocAL BUDGET MAXxIG (1927);
Has ihe Indiana Plan Been a Success? (1932) 21 NAT. Mux. REv. 101; Wallerstein, What
Local Officials Think of State Financial Control (1832) 21 id. at 557; Porter, Remote Control
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the possibilities of political influence and of incompetence in the management
of local credit would remain, and would be increased by the unwillingness or
inability of central supervisory agencies to understand local problems and to
handle local activities. The state authorities, the argument continues, would
seek to acquire a reputation for activity by first cutting undesirable expenditures
and then allowing their return in subsequent budgets as "emergency measures;"
by restricting tax levies for legitimate expenditures and then countenancing
undue borrowing, or refunding or sinking fund delinquencies, in order to meet
"current municipal expenses"; and by so limiting borrowing as to hold up
necessary municipal improvements and services. That appointments or elec-
tion to public office will be free from politics, or that the officials will be com-
petent, can never be assured. These are dangers inherent in government of
any kind. Yet state appointment affords ample opportunity for obtaining
financial administrators who are more competent and less partisan4 than
are most of the officials in whose hands municipal credit lies today. Nor
is the argument persuasive that state authorities, because of inadequate or-
ganization and lack of contact with local conditions, could not efficiently
execute the functions delegated to them. There is no reason why the super-
visory system could not, if necessary, be organized departmentally, with head
and subordinate agencies, so that the widespread, close and constant local con-
tact necessary to an adequate handling of municipal business could be achieved.
Legal Objections: Delegation of Powers. It is unlikely, moreover, that
drastic alteration in the organic laws of any of the states would be required
in order to make possible effective administrative supervision of local credit.
The validity of delegating legislative functions to administrative agencies
and conferring upon them such executive and judicial powers as may be
necessary, can no longer be open to serious question.5 Courts sensitive to
the need for administrative supervision in other fields of governmental regu-
lation have reduced the doctrine of non-delegability of powers to a require-
ment that the functions delegated be such as the legislature had power to
exercise itself, or to confer, and that standards be set up for the guidance
of administrative officials in applying general policies to particular facts.6
(1934) 7 STATE GOV'T 30. Contra: THAYS, CONTROL or LOCAL FINANcE THROUGr TAx-
PAxERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND CENTRuAIZED AD I msTRATIoN (1934); Bates, State Control of
Local Finance In Indiana (1926) 20 Am. POL. Sci. Rzv. 352; Leslie, State Control of Local
Expenditure-The Indiana Plan (1932) 49 STONE AND WEBSTER J. 28; Zoercher, Regarding
the Indiana Tax Plan (1932) 21 NAT. MUN. Rv. 309.
4. In Indiana the members of the administrative bodies are reputed to be strictly non-
partisan and entirely removed from politics. Leslie, supra note 3, at 35.
5. By way of comparison, it is said that the Federal courts have never invalidated
a Congressional delegation of power to an administrative officer or agency. See Chafee,
Congressional Reapportionment (1929) 42 HARv. L. Rv. 1015, 1044; cf. Note (1933)
31 MIcH. L. REv. 786.
6. Consult BuRDICK, LAW OF THE AIm.acA= CONSTITUTION (1923) § 60; FREUND,
AMERcXAN ADmnm smTRATrvE LAW (1923) 118-124; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL L=hTITATIONS (8th
ed. 1927) 224-232; Foster, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers
(1913) 7 ILL. L. REv. 397; Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law (1917) 30
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That the legislature in delegating the legislative power may confer any
executive and judicial powers which would be required for effective regulation
by a state administrative body, has long been conceded. 7 And the legislative
declarations of policy which purport to delimit the discretion of its agencies
may be extremely broad and general.8 In the last analysis, the criterion of a
valid delegation of powers is the pragmatic test of the need for effective reg-
ulation 9 Upon this score courts have had little difficulty in upholding ad-
ministrative supervision of local credit.10
Legal Objections: Home Rule. The usual constitutional home rule guar-
anties extant in 17 states," whereby certain classes of municipalities are per-
mitted to frame their own charters and to govern their own affairs, may in
some instance seem to interpose barriers to legislation creating centralized
administrative control over local finances; but they are by no means insuper-
able. Such warranties of state non-intervention, even if not expressly made
HAav. L. REV. 430; Cheadle, The Deegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YAr.n L. 3.
892; Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of Ainerican
Constitutional Law (1928) 14 Coma. L. Q. 168; Note (1929) 27 MAcEr. L. Rxv. 558; Note
(1929) 5 Wis. L. REv. 111; Note (1932) 19 CA r'. L. REv. 448; Note (1932) 7 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 77; Note (1933) 31 Micu:. L. Rxv. 786; Note (1933) 1 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 231;
(1924) 37 HARV. L. Rav. 1118; (1928) 37 YALE L. 3. 1151.
7. See COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 228, n. 2; Berle, supra note 6, at 440; Cheadle,
supra note 6, at 894; Note (1932) 7 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 77.
8. Thus the powers granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission to adjust rail-
road rates, with directions merely to eliminate "undue" and "unreasonable" preferences
or "discrimination" in rates, were upheld. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476
(1914). The delegation to a state board of completely discretionary power to grant or
withhold a barber's license has recently been held valid. Clark v. State, 152 So. 820
(Miss. 1934). See also BuancE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 153; Cheadle, supra note 6, at 899,
908-911; Note (1929) 27 MIcu. L. REv. 558, 561; (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 1118-1120; cf.
Compton v. Alabama Power Co., 216 Ala. 558, 114 So. 46 (1927); Snow v. Riggs, 172 Ark.
835, 290 S. W. 591 (1927).
9. The criteria of a valid delegation of such discretionary legislative power are the
greater efficiency of administrative regulation and the presence of guiding standards of a
degree of definiteness and comprehensiveness which will not sacrifice the flexible applica-
tion and expert judgment required for effective regulation of the particular matter.
Cheadle, supra note 6, at 921, 922; Duff and Whiteside, supra note 6, at 196; Note (1929)
27 MIc . L. Rxv. 558, 559; (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 1118, 1121.
10. Sparkman v. County Budget Commission, 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809 (1931) (up-
holding delegation to County Budget Commission of power to approve local budgets
and revise items on basis of wisdom and expediency); Van Hess v. Board of Commis-
sioners of St. Joseph County, 190 Ind. 347, 129 N. E. 305 (1921) (upholding delegation to
State Board of Tax Commissioners of power to review local debt incurrence, as to legality
and policy). Accord: State ex rel. Freeland v. Evans, 197 Ind. 656, 150 N. E. 788
(1926) ; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Kosciusko and Fulton Counties v. Leonard,
198 Ind. 356, 153 N. E. 777 (1926); Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186
(1930) (upholding delegation to state Tax Commission of power to review the legality of
local tax levies).
11. ARiz. CONsr. art. XIII; CAL. CoxsT. art. XI, §§ 8, 8/ 2 ; CoLo. Co1,sT. art. 'x, §
6; MD. CoNsr. art XI-A; MicE. CoNsr. art. VIII, §§ 20, 21; Mim. CONST. art. IV, § 36;
subject to the general laws of the state,' 2 are always restricted to purely
"municipal affairs;"' 13 in matters of state-wide interest and public policy, state
regulation is supreme.14 Local financial standing, because of its effect on the
credit both of the state and of other municipalities as well as on the welfare
of investors, many of whom may be quasi-public institutions, is clearly of
general state concern and so is a proper subject for state supervision.' 5 If
this view is adopted, central control over local indebtedness in any or all its
phases, over all local expenditures, over local tax assessment and over local
financial organization, by means of devices and to an extent and degree rea-
sonably thought by the legislature to be necessary to the achievement of
sound local credit, would not be violative of any home rule guaranties.' 6
Moreover, each of the credit factors alone may, to a certain extent, be con-
sidered of state concern, and therefore subject to state regulation independent-
ly of its relationship to credit maintenance.' 7  In the constitutions of certain
home rule states, for instance, there is reserved to the legislatures the power
and duty to restrict municipal indebtedness, taxation and assessment' s and to
supervise municipal deposits.' 9 Supervision of local budgets has been consid-
ered a state affair-a matter of state governmental organization necessary to
the realization of a uniform system of taxation and fiscal administration. 20
Mo. Co .s, art. IX, § 16; NEB. CoNsT. art. XI; N. Y. CoNsT. art. XII, §§ 2, 3; OMo
CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3, 7, 13; OKLA. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3; ORE. CoNsT. art. XI, §
2; PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1; TEx. CoNsT. art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5 (adopted
1933); WAsxH. CONST. art. XI, § 10; WIs. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
12. Constitutional Home-Rule powers are expressly made subject to general laws by:
CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8; MIcH. CONST. art. VIII, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 36;
N. Y. CoNs?. art. XII, § 2; OHo CONST. art. VIII, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5 (adopted
1933); WASH. CONsT. art. XI, § 10; WIs. CONsT. art XI, § 3.
13. McBAn, TnE LAW AN THE PRAcTIcE OF MuNicrAL Hora RULE (1916) 673-684;
McGoLDRIca , TiE LAW AND PRAcTrcE OF MuNicPA. Homm RULE 1916-1930 (1933) c. 13.
14. This is equally true where the home rule guaranty originates from the so-called
"inherent right" of self-government. Legis. (1933) 46 HARV. L. Rnv. 1317, 1322; see
McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 12-17.
15. See EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL
CREDIT, supra III, at p. 979; Legis. (1933) 46 HMnv. L. REV. 1317, 1322, n. 50.
16. See Tulsa v. Dabney, 133 Okla. 54, 270 Pac. 1112 (1928); Van Hess v. Board of
Commissioners of St. Joseph County, supra note 10. Both cases recognize state-wide
interest in local credit in case of indebtedness regulation. See also, CLARK, TnE INTERNAL
DEBTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1933) 281; Tooke, Construction of Municipal Powers (1933)
7 TEmjPLE L. Q. 267, 274.
17. See generally McGoDRICx, op. cit. supra note 13, at 338-345; Legis. (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 1317, 1322, 1323.
18. ARIz. CONST. art. IX, § 8; MIcE. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 20; Mo. CoNsT. art. X, §§ 1, 2;
NEB. CONs?. art. XI, § 4; N. Y. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1; OMo CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 13;
OxA. CONST. art. X, § 20; ORE. CoNs?. art. XI, § 5; Tax. CoNsT. art. III, § 52.
19. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 16T/.
20. Zoercher v. Agler, supra note 10; State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St.
86, 119 N. E. 253 (1917); City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640 (1924);
Gilbert v. Fisher, 108 Okla. 67, 230 Pac. 705 (1924). However, by the following cases
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Similarly, municipal taxation, assessment, levy and collection may be of general
public interest since they may affect the basis for state taxation and the dis-
tribution of the burden of state taxes on property.21 Furthermore, it is not
questioned that the general fiscal organization and operation of municipalities is
such an affair of state governmental organization as justifies state supervision
over municipal accounts.22
In certain states, however, specific constitutional provisions would seem to
preclude state control of certain aspects of the local credit situation and to
restrain the use of certain devices of administrative supervision. In Colorado,
home-rule municipalities are given exclusive power over the issuance, refunding
and liquidation of all kinds of municipal obligations; the assessment of local
property; the levy and collection of taxes thereon for municipal purposes;
special assessments for local improvements; and the creation, terms, duties
and qualifications of all municipal offices. 3 And in other states constitutional
guaranties against the performance of local functions by other than local
officials would appear to prevent use of the device of administrative substitution
or other effective administrative control over local financial functions. 24 But
ways of at least partially circumventing these inhibitions have been suggested.2
Thus, under the New York2 6 and Wisconsin2 7 constitutions, which provide for
local election or appointment of authorities to perform the functions exercised
by the political unit at the date of adoption of the constitution, courts have
been able to permit a measure of central financial control on the ground that
local governments, when the state constitution was adopted, did not vest any
official with a veto power over financial plans. 28  The performance of local tax
assessment and collection has been held to be a state governmental function,
thus removing it from the effect of this provision and permitting the state
supervision of budgets, to be valid, must be limited to ministerial examination, not policy
review or revision. Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., 113 Okla. 130, 239 Pac. 912 (1925); City of
Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 118 Okla. 201, 248 Pac. 336 (1926); Grubb v.
Smiley, 142 Okla. 19, 285 Pac. 38 (1930); Bonaparte v. Nelson, 142 Okla. 54, 285 Pac. 100
(1929); Monsell v. Excise Board Tulsa County, 142 Okla. 130, 285 Pac. 836 (1930); cf.
Zoercher v. Agler, supra note 10, at 227, 172 N. E. at 191.
21. Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. City of Yuma, 32 Ariz. 601, 261 Pac. 49 (1927);
State ex reL Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N. E. 134 (1919); Okla. News Co. v.
Ryan, 101 Okla. 151, 224 Pac. 969 (1924); City of Ardmore v. Excise Board, 155 Okla. 126,
8 P. (2d) 2 (1932); State ex rel. King County v. Tax Commission, 26 P. (2d) 80 (Wash.
1933); State ex rel. Hessey v. Daniels, 143 Wis. 649, 128 N. V. 565 (1910); see McB.Ux,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 277; McGoLnaicx, op. cit. supra note 13, at 340-342; Legis.
(1933) 46 H~Av. L. Rxv. 1317, 1323, n. 52. Contra: Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474,
50 Pac. 644 (1897) ; Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 Pac. 780 (1903).
Regarding special assessments see McGoLnascx, op. cit. supra note 13, at 343-346.
22. State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 P. 639 (1911).
23. CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 6(a), (e), (g).
24. Legis. (1933) 46 HAgv. L. REv. 1317, 1323 et seq.
25. Ibid.
26. N. Y. CONSr. art. X, § 2.
27. Wis. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 9.
28. Legis. (1933) 46 HA~v. L. Rxv. 1317, 1323, n. 60.
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officials to review and order reassessment of local taxes. 29 Under the exceptive
doctrine that where the office is temporary in character the state-appointed
officer is non-local and so escapes the restrictions of the constitutional pro-
vision,30 at least temporary administrative supervision and municipal receiver-
ship instituted because of default can be upheld, because they terminate
when the city's finances are rehabilitated. Likewise sustainable under this ex-
ception are statutes which allow the local taxing process to be carried on by
other than usual officials on their non-action or absence.3' And it is not im-
possible, although it may be awkward, for the legislature to avoid the restric-
tions of this provision in individual cases by substituting new units with new
officers.32
Under eight constitutions which provide that the necessary officers of
particular classes of municipalities shall be elected by the voters thereof,33
the temporary character or the public interest in state administrative super-
vision may again form bases of validity. The seven constitutions which for-
bid the legislature to delegate to any special commission power to supervise or
interfere with municipal money, property or effects, or to levy taxes or perform
any municipal function whatever,34 present a more difficult problem. Ob-
viously, such provisions preclude the use of special receivership commissions
like those of Manchester, New Hampshire 35 and Fall River, Massachusetts.3 6
Indeed, these provisions might be construed to prevent any commission con-
trol of local finance. But since they were adopted in an attempt to avert special
abusive treatment of individual municipalities,3 7 it may be argued that they
were not meant to apply to state commissions created to supervise permanently
the financial affairs of all municipalities. 38 A way out might also be sought
in judicial interpretation excluding permanent commissions with regular duties
from the prohibited class of "special commissions.1 39  Where the supervisory
29. See note 21, supra.
30. People v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 (1877); People v. Board of Supervisors, 170 N.
Y. 105, 62 N. E. 1092 (1902); Strange v. Oconto Land Co., 136 Wis. 516, 117 N. W. 1023
(1908) ; McBAw, op. cit. supra note 13, at 36, note 1.
31. Strange v. Oconto Land Co., supra note 30. Cf. 1 McQuirrmT, MuNIcIPAL COR-
PoRATios (1931) § 187, p. 510.
32. See McBAw, op. cit. supra note 13, at 36-37.
33. CAr.. CoNsT. art. II, § 23/4; Ky. CoNsT. § 160; LA. CoNsT. art XIV, § 22; NEB.
CoNsT. art. LX, § 4; Ono CoNsT. art. X, § 1, art. II, § 27; PA. CoNsT. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2;
VA. CONST. § 120; WAsHr. CONS?. AMND. 12.
34. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13; CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 35; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 36;
PA. CONsT. art. III, § 20; S. D. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 26; UTAJ CONST. art. VI, § 29; Wyo.
CoNsT. art. III, § 37.
35. N. H. Laws 1921, c. 226.
36. Mass. Acts 1931, c. 44.
37. See McBAw, op. cit. supra note 13, at 46, 47.
38. Public Service Commission v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 539, 159 Pac. 24, 27
(1916). But cf. People v. Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 Pac. 399 (1924); Logan City v.
Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961 (1928).
39. It re Senate Bill, 12 Colo. 188, 21 Pac. 481 (1889); In re Fine & Excise Commis-
sion, 19 Colo. 482, 36 Pac. 234 (1894); City of Denver v. Landoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 Pac.
117 (1905) ; City of Denver v. 11iff, 38 Colo. 357, 89 Pac. 823 (1906).
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powers are exercised by an individual, courts are of course offered the oppor-
tunity of evading the prohibition by holding that such a person is not a com-
mission.40
Another constitutional provision, found in four states, which may interfere
with central administrative control of local finance is that forbidding the
state legislature to impose taxes for municipal purposes. 1 This restriction
has been held to prevent extension of administrative control over local budgets
and tax levies beyond the determination of legality; 42 to permit a state adminis-
trative body to substitute its discretion by approval or review of local expendi-
ture policy, it, is insisted, would be to give that body unconstitutional power
to levy, assess and collect taxes for local purposes in which the state has no
sovereign interest.43  It is quite conceivable, however, that the state, since it is
intimately concerned with the financial stability of its subdivisions, would be
very much interested in purely local expenditure policies because of their ef-
fect on local credit." The same type of constitutional provision has been
held by one court to prevent a State Tax Commission from reassessing property
for local taxation purposes, but not from reviewing local tax assessments; 45
although review, like reassessment, is sometimes alleged to be tantamount to
imposition of local taxes, the court based its approval upon the general interest
in the state revenue system-a fact which could equally well be used to
justify reassessment.
What has been said, clearly enough, is by no means sufficient to warrant
dismissing as of small consequence the obstacles to effective administrative
supervision of local credit interposed by the home-rule provisions of many
state constitutions. Nevertheless, courts cognizant of the fact that municipal
home-rule provisions were designed to prevent legislative exploitation of muni-
cipalities46 might be willing to minimize application of such restrictions to a
central administrative supervision which looks to the correction of local mis-
management and the better maintenance of municipal credit. They might be
quick to take advantage of any legal circumvention of a home rule restriction
where the economic, social and political need for administrative control is
made apparent to them by the legislature. They might even be willing to evade
specific restrictions against the interference of state officials or commissions in
local affairs and against state imposition of local taxes, by holding the subjects
and objects of such intervention to be not purely municipal but also state affairs.
But even though it be conceded that the courts may feel constrained to give
literal effect to specific constitutional prohibitions, execution of a plan of cen-
40. Kraus v. Philadelphia, 265 Pa. 425, 109 AtI. 226 (1919).
41. CAr.. CONST. art. XI, § 12; CoLo. CoxsT. art. X, § 70; OXLA. CONST. art. X, § 20;
WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12.
42. City of Ardmore v. Excise Board, supra note 21.
43. Id. at 134, 8 P. (2d) at 10.
44. See AD INmSTATVE SUPERVISION or LocAL TAX BASES AND Or EXPENDrrURES, supra
III-B.
45. State ex rel. King County v. Tax Commission, supra note 21.
46. See McBAnq, op. cit. supra note 13, Part I; MCGOLDRICK, op. cit. supra note 13, at
339; LANCASTER, STATE SUPERVISION OF MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS (1923) 103-104.
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tral administrative control over local finances is still not foreclosed. There is
no such difficulty in amending state constitutions as in amending the federal
Constitution. If preservation of municipal credit is deemed of sufficient im-
portance, as it must be, and if, as is extremely likely, a large enough group is
affected by the consequences of local financial mismanagement, barriers which
cannot be surmounted can with slight inconvenience be removed.
C. CONCLUSION: THE RELATION BETWEEN BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGES
AND ADmINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
Bankruptcy legislation and careful state supervision of local credit are both
essential to proper solution of the vital and complex problem presented by
current municipal insolvencies; yet since each of these deals only with a part of
the problem, neither alone is sufficient. The availability of a means of en-
forcing readjustment plans, it is true, appears to be necessary if many taxing
districts are to meet the present crisis in their financial affairs. But enactment
of the Sumners Bill as it is now drawn would afford no constructive relief for
municipal debtors, since without assurance either of the wisdom of a readjust-
ment plan or of the correction of financial malpractices there could be no cer-
tainty that the city would not find itself back in the bankruptcy court after a
few months or a few years. Moreover, enactment of this bill would be def-
initely unwise, both because it imposes upon municipal readjustments all of the
evils of reorganization through receivership and because the easy avenue of
escape which it provides from immediate problems might remove the incentive
for consideration of supervision of local credit by state legislatures.
Proper treatment of the problem of local credit could best be assured if the
Sumners Bill were amended to make bankruptcy enforcement of municipal
readjustment plans available only when petitioned for not by the city itself but
by a permanent state administrative agency. To qualify as a petitioner
such an agency should possess the necessary power to inform itself, both before
and after local defaults, of the financial condition and amount and character
of the indebtedness of local governments; and it should have the authority
to assume effective supervision of every aspect of the defaulting taxing district's
credit management as soon as the district's financial distress is discovered, either
itself to prepare a readjustment plan or at least to act for the city in nego-
tiating such a plan, and to supervise the execution of the plan and the rehabili-
tation of the district's credit structure. Submission of a readjustment plan so
formulated, or the formulation of which has been so supervised, to the bank-
ruptcy judge should be only for the purpose of securing his approval of the
reasonableness of the decisions of the administrative agency. Flexible opera-
tion of the plan should be assured by authorizing relaxation of its terms, when
required by unforeseen public emergencies, upon recommendation by the state
agency and approval by the bankruptcy judge.
A provision thus making a minimum of state administrative supervision of
local credit a condition precedent to the availability of bankruptcy enforcement
of municipal readjustment agreements would encounter practical objections only
1934]
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in its denial of relief to a city situated in a state wherein the legislature had
failed to act. Upon more theoretical grounds it may also be argued that such
a provision would unduly increase federal interference in state affairs. The
same answers may be made to both objections. National interest in the
reestablishment of sound public credit and in the protection of those insurance,
banking and charitable corporations which are investors in the securities of
local governments, alone would justify Congress in seeking to induce state leg-
islatures properly to supervise local credit. Indeed, in view of the direct finan-
cial control now being exercised over so many municipalities by Federal agencies
through the medium of P. W. A. loans and R. F. C. refinancing, it would seem
idle to pose the theoretical undesirability of Federal interference. More im-
portant, however, is the fact that no federal venture into the field of local finance
should be undertaken unless that venture has reasonable prospect of achieving
its objective. Congress should not make a bankruptcy discharge available to
municipal debtors if that discharge will not afford substantial and construc-
tive relief. Thus viewed, the attempt to induce state legislatures to provide a
minimum of administrative supervision of local credit is merely a device for
making effective the proffered bankruptcy relief; and the discrimination re-
sulting would amount only to a refusal to burden the federal courts with the
granting of ineffective relief.
